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Abstract 
 
Advance in Housing Right or Accumulation by Dispossession?  
How Social Housing Is Used as Policy Tool to Promote Neoliberal 
Urban Development in China and in Mexico 
 
Yu Chen, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2018 
 
Supervisors:  Peter M. Ward, Bryan R. Roberts 
 
Social housing is defined as the housing production supported by the public sector 
with the purpose of improving housing access and condition for low-income urban 
population. This dissertation discusses the social housing boom in China and in Mexico in 
2000s and 2010s. I ask what motivates the governmental agenda to make and implement 
social policy for low-income populations in these two developing countries with very 
different political economies. Drawing on mixed-methods, this dissertation undertakes 
three levels of comparison. At the national level, social housing develops through different 
approaches in the two countries: a government-centered approach in China, and a market-
centered approach in Mexico. The variations in these approaches are the result of the 
existing housing regime when the neoliberal transformation of housing and urban policy 
started in these two countries in the 1980s and 1990s. At the local level, local governments’ 
different roles in social housing development reflect their different urban agendas, which 
can be further attributed to the political and the land regimes in the two countries. Yet a 
common denominator of the two cases is the close alliance between the local governments 
vii 
 
with developers. Finally, at the community and household level, I argue that social housing 
in China and in Mexico does not represent an advance in housing rights for the low-income 
urban population, but rather a wave of accumulation by dispossession. I conclude that, in 
contrast to the post-war social housing development in advanced industrialized countries, 
in which the State acts as a force of de-commodification and social provider of essential 
services, social housing in China and in Mexico is used as a tool for the expansion of real 
estate and financial capital towards the urban low-income population. This leads us to 
rethink the nature of social policy in the neoliberal era: disguised as a form of “welfare”, it 
is used as a tool and venue to facilitate the advance of neoliberal projects such as 
financialization towards vulnerable social groups.   
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Chapter 1.  Introduction: Social Housing and a Tale of Two Polities 
 
In June and July 2012, the Chinese Housing Provident Funds (HPF) sent a 
delegation of 16 members to Mexico to visit Mexico’s major public agency of housing, the 
Institute of National Funds for Workers’ Housing (INFONAVIT). The purpose of this visit 
was to learn from Mexico on housing development, particularly how to improve the 
financial efficiency of the housing funds (MOHURD 2013). Two years later, in 2014, a 
delegation led by the then director of INFONAVIT, Alejandro Murat, visited China. 
According to the official report, the Mexican delegation held meetings with their Chinese 
counterparts to discuss topics such as housing finance (and the appreciation of housing 
values) and urban planning (INFONAVIT 2014).  
What the officials learn from these visits and exchanges is, of course, very 
important for the performance of their own institute. However, it remains unclear to what 
extent the experience that they learn from each other may be implemented in their own 
context. The Chinese delegation published a series of reports upon their return to China 
(MOHURD 2013, Tang and Lin 2013, Zhang 2013). The technical details that they 
documented were fairly accurate, particularly on the financial mechanism of the 
INFONAVIT. They particularly praised the INFONAVIT for its efficiency in funds 
collection, the transparency and professionalism in funding administration, and its role in 
expanding housing access among the low-income affiliates (MOHURD 2013).  And yet I 
noticed that these reports did not mention what kind of housing the INFONAVIT system 
had produced, nor provide an evaluation of whether the Mexican model really represents 
an advance in the housing rights of the urban low-income population. Moreover, as will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3, they seemed to have overlooked an important 
fact, that although the HPF and the INFONAVIT are both solidarity funds, 1  the 
INFONAVIT mainly targets the middle and low-income working class in the formal sector; 
                                                          
1 Meaning that the employer has to contribute a sum that equals a proportion the employee’s salary 
to a housing fund. 
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in China most beneficiaries of the HPF are middle- and upper-income groups, who can 
actually afford commercial housing.   
From a sociological perspective, understanding the social and institutional structure 
in which a policy is embedded is the first step before applying the policy in a different 
context. This dissertation will undertake an in-depth sociological comparison regarding the 
social housing development in China and in Mexico from the national, the local and the 
community/ household levels. By taking a mixed-method approach, I will examine the 
structural and institutional roots of the housing deficit among low-income urban working 
class in China and in Mexico, analyze the evolution of social housing policies in these two 
countries, evaluate their outcomes, and generate some policy implications.  
 
1.1. Background and Research Questions 
 
I define social housing as housing development supported in diverse forms by the 
public sector with the purpose of improving low-income groups’ housing access and 
condition. At the core of this concept is an (at least) partial de-capitalization or de-
commodification of housing provision for the groups that are in a “weak negotiating 
position” in the market (Premius 2012: 410, also see Harloe 1995). In this sense, 
“economical housing” and “public rental housing” in China, “social-interest housing” in 
various Latin American countries, public housing and subsidized affordable housing in the 
US, council housing in UK, among other cases, are all examples of social housing (Premius 
2012, Norris 2012, Bratt 2012). Social housing projects in North America and in Europe, 
as a form of direct intervention by the public sector, marked a commitment by the public 
sector to reduce poverty, social exclusion, homelessness and public health hazard (Scanlon 
and Whitehead 2008, Clapham 2012).  Sometimes social housing may also contain other 
latent agenda such as social control, social transformation (for example, mass public 
housing projects in the USSR, see Harris 2013; anti-communism in public housing projects, 
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see Parson 2005) and or the maintenance of status quo (for example, residential segregation 
against the racial minority, see Williams 2004, Hunt 2009, Soss et al. 2011).  
Social housing in advanced industrialized countries encountered serious challenges. 
Its construction and maintenance often involve large subsidies, and thus its financial 
sustainability is highly dependent on the State’s fiscal conditions. Also, social problems 
are inherent to the design and planning of such projects, such as the concentration of 
poverty, residential segregation based on race and class, lack of maintenance and deficit of 
infrastructure and basic service, high delinquency rates, social stigmas etc. These problems 
were often exacerbated when the authorities withdraw its previous commitment to the long-
term maintenance of the social housing projects (Harloe 1995, Hunt 2009).  
Since the late 1970s, with the neoliberal shift of public policy, governments in 
several advanced industrialized countries eventually abandoned the State-centered policy 
approach. Public housing projects in general underwent a residualization process, being 
privatized or demolished. A lot of those projects that remain functioning also suffered from 
funding cuts and neglects (Rolnik and Rabinovich 2014). In this context, the government 
favored a market-oriented approach of indirect intervention (such as Low-Income Housing 
Tax Credit, LIHTC, in the US; see Phibbs 2012) and a communitarian approach 
(cooperatives, or volunteer associations) to low-income housing policy (Milligan and 
Gilmour 2012). However, it is not clear how these new policy paradigms may challenge 
the hegemony of the market (Pattillo 2013). After all, the market alone does not necessarily 
lead to an inclusive approach to housing and urban development, as in many cases rising 
property values of the property are at least in part based on its capacity of distancing itself 
from the poor (Caldeira 1996, Chaskin and Joseph 2015, McCabe 2016). Social housing 
or affordable housing development may encounter resistance from private developers or 
surrounding neighborhoods that are more affluent. Widespread gentrification and an 
increasingly volatile labor market have made housing access more difficult for low-income 
population. The 2008 Financial Crisis not only hit the real economy and the labor market, 
but also led to a foreclosure crisis among victims of predatory lending. While alternative 
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and affordable options are scarce, homelessness and overcrowding problems worsened in 
many cities (Pattillo 2013).  
This research focuses on social housing development in China (economical housing 
and public rental housing) and Mexico (“social-interest housing”). For the reader’s 
convenience, I will call all these sub-categories as social housing in the dissertation, unless 
I zoom in to discuss the nuances among these sub-categories. In both countries social 
housing takes the form of mass housing, and the public sector plays a critical role in its 
development (albeit through different approaches). It has become a housing segment of 
high visibility, and to a certain degree has changed the traditional patterns of urbanization.  
However, social housing paradigms in China and Mexico also have significant 
differences. Currently, social housing in Mexico is essentially subsidized commercial 
housing. It is supposed to target the lower-middle and low-income working class affiliated 
to the public housing agencies (mainly INFONAVIT). In most cases social housing 
projects in Mexico are produced by private developers and the dwellings are sold on open 
market. The role of the public sector in social housing development is critical: it reduces 
the entry bar of the mortgage costs, provides upfront subsidies, and subsidizes the mortgage 
interest rate. In this way it improves the housing affordability and creates a pool of 
homebuyers from low or lower-middle income groups. The Federal Mortgage Society 
provides developers with insurance for on-time loan repayments, and thus improves the 
financial certainty for housing development. Moreover, municipal governments and the 
INFONAVIT are supposed to regulate social housing developments through urban 
planning, zoning codes and other regulatory frameworks. 
In contrast to the Mexican approach, in China the entire development process of 
social housing is led by the government. The government is responsible for the planning, 
finance, and allocation of social housing projects. Developers, in most cases, are merely 
subcontractors of the housing projects. Social housing in China involves a complex 
typology, varying among cities. In most cases it can be roughly divided into two categories: 
economical housing and public rental housing. Both categories are highly subsidized. The 
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ownership of economical housing is shared between the homebuyer and local government, 
and certain restrictions are imposed on its resale to the market. Social housing in China is 
not commercial housing, and dwellers are restricted to those approved by the government.  
Whereas in advanced industrialized countries, social housing was viewed as a 
component of the post-war welfare state, the rapid expansion of social housing in China 
and in Mexico takes place in a much more recent neoliberal context. This new context is 
characterized by the domination and the increasing fluidity of the financial and real estate 
capital, opening to the global market and foreign capital, a deregulation in the land and the 
labor market, privatization, and a reduction of state intervention in social assistance, etc. 
(Portes and Roberts 2005, Roberts 2005, Peck et al. 2009, Tochterman 2012). The 
expansion of social interest housing in Mexico represents a wave of the expansion of the 
financial and the real estate capital, which seeks to incorporate low-income working class 
as its subjects. In China, where urban land is of public ownership and local governments 
play a central role in promoting urban development, local authorities use social housing 
development as a policy tool for “smart urban growth”. By relocating households to social 
housing projects, local governments manage to extract land for urbanization projects and 
huge revenues from the rising land value.  
This research seeks to respond to the following questions: how, and under what 
calculus, do the Chinese and the Mexican governments mobilize resources to make and 
implement social policy for low-income populations? More specifically, how has the 
housing policy for low-income urban population evolved in China and in Mexico, two 
developing countries with very different political economies? What role does the social 
housing development play in the current paradigms of urbanization in the two countries?  
I also ask how social housing policy has implemented at the city level in China and in 
Mexico, and how in the two case study cities urban low-income populations get access to 
a social housing dwelling. Finally, what are the consequences of the expansion of social 
housing for low-income population and to what extent does it represent an advance in the 
expansion of their housing rights?  
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1.2. Literature Review: Housing as a Commodity and a Right  
 
This research will contribute to the literature on the sociology of housing and social 
policy. Housing is sociologically relevant and research is not limited to physical shelters, 
but also includes broader residential setting, living arrangements and housing access, 
including homeownership, residential choice, and residential mobility (Foley 1980). In 
general, housing is embedded in a set of social relations, and consists of a factor that has 
great influence on the wellbeing of individuals, families and communities (Lawson 2012).  
Housing is framed both as a commodity and a social right that is to be fulfilled 
(Pattillo 2013). As a commodity, housing prices and rents are capitalized the quality of 
schools and other installations (and landscapes), crime rates, prestige or stigma and so on, 
and are also partly determined by political and legal decisions such as zoning, taxation, 
infrastructure and service provision (ibid.). This character of housing creates either wealth 
or financial hardship for households, which contributes not only to inequalities between 
families and between social groups, but can also affect the inter-generational transfer of 
these inequalities (Aratani 2011). As neighborhood effects literature has widely discussed, 
housing and neighborhood condition is one of the key determinants of health and 
educational outcomes (Shaw 2004). Early public health professionals were aware that 
precarious housing condition led to higher infant mortality and higher risk of epidemics. 
They advocated that certain regulations should be established and enforced in the 
construction industry (Wile 1920). Shaw (2004) identified more specific pathways through 
which housing becomes a key social determinant of health: as a direct hazard or 
environmental risk, as refugee in social and psychological sense, and as part of the 
sociological circumstances (Shaw 2004). The foreclosure crisis after the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis generated negative health consequences, independent of other economic 
factors associated with the recession (Currie and Tekin 2011, Houle and Light 2014).  
Housing is a key determinant of living arrangements and social mobility, as well as 
an important mechanism of reproduction of inequality and deprivation. In Ray Forrest’s 
(2012) words, “where we live and in what we live have major impacts on how we live”. 
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Residential segregation (as well as gentrification, gated communities) are spatial 
expression social inequality and a mechanism of its reproduction. This has generated 
considerable research on experiences and consequences of living in poor neighborhood 
where disadvantages cluster. The mismatch between the spatial distribution of job 
opportunities and the poor’s residence creates extra barrier for the poor to enter the labor 
market. Public institutions, such as schools and hospitals, in these poor neighborhoods are 
often in decay and deficits. Local residents are thus reduced to a second-class citizens 
(Makris 2015, Massey and Denton 1993, Sabatini 2006, Sampson et al. 2002, Quilian 
2012).  
The idea of a “value-free” or “pure” market does not apply to housing and housing 
markets which are an inherently social and political creation (Pattillo 2013). Housing is 
embedded in the broader social structure, and reflects the changing relations between the 
state, market and society, as well as intergroup relations in terms of race, gender and class 
(Michelson and Van Vliet 2000, Lawson 2012). For this reason, housing is an important 
venue for capitalist accumulation processes, state actions and social movements. Postwar 
public housing projects in many advanced industrialized countries reflected governments’ 
commitment to promoting social inclusion by de-commodifying housing, as well as their 
paternalistic and custodial relations with the beneficiaries. Ethnographic research in US 
public housing projects show that these projects often contained an implicit agenda of 
maintaining social control and segregation upon the poor and racial minorities. The 
residualization of public housing reflects the changing commitment of the State to the poor. 
The recent wave of financialization of homeownership and especially the expansion of 
cheap mortgages to low-income populations reflects new forms of exploiting and depriving 
the poor through homeownership. Moreover, people respond to their built environment and 
issues such as lack of affordability, evictions, and precarious living conditions may trigger 
collective discontent and actions. Housing rights have been one of the core issues in urban 
social movements (Hunt 2009).  
This research will potentially contribute to academic understanding of the 
neoliberal shift of public policy. To a certain degree, the concept of social policy has been 
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redefined. As the dissertation shows, social policy is not only used to de-commodify the 
access to essential social provisions, but is used as a tool to facilitate the expansion of 
capital by converting the low-income population into the target of the expansion of capital. 
My research also highlights how the introduction of a neoliberal policy is characterized by 
embedded in local historical context. These two factors inform us about the structural and 
institutional constraints within which policy options emerge.  
In general, social housing, or public intervention in low-income housing, has been 
framed under the welfare-market dichotomy. For example, several scholars (Harloe 1995, 
Malpass 2008, Matznetter and Mundt 2012) intended to articulate the variations in housing 
policy among different countries to Esping-Anderson’s (1990) typology of the welfare state. 
I argue that this proposition is largely based on the experience of the developed countries, 
where the major focus of the public housing policy was to fix the market failure (Whitehead 
2003, Sprigings and Somerville 2005), and to sustain the welfare state regime (Hoekstra 
2005). For this reason, the discussion of a neoliberal transformation of housing policy is 
often framed around the retrenchment of the State (Dodson 2006). In contrast, in 
developing countries such as China and Mexico social housing policies do not center 
around de-commodification of certain aspects of social provision, but became a useful tool 
for the government-developer alliance to expand market relations (the mortgage market in 
Mexico, and the land market in China) towards the low-income population.  Moreover 
these policies can target the vulnerable social groups in large scale. In this sense my 
research contributes to the academic understanding of social policy. Instead of social 
housing policy giving way to the expansion of the real estate market, social housing policy 
is promoting the market. A similar case can be found in Brazil, where based upon a critical 
reflection on the conditional cash transfer program under the Lula Administration, Lavinas 
(2017) argued that social policy in Brazil did not achieve to expand the scope of rights and 
citizenship or equalize opportunities, but rather served as collateral to access financial 
markets through credit. In this sense, the neoliberal shift of social policy is multifaceted 
and takes various forms: withdrawal of the State, changing nature of social control and 
political manipulation, an emphasis on the “targeting” and “efficiency” of the policy, as 
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well as the promotion of the expansion of market relations and extracting profits from 
vulnerable social groups.   
This discussion is also relevant to the US context in which predatory lending and 
the foreclosure crisis after the 2008 Financial Crisis became a focus among scholars from 
different disciplines. For example, Matthew Desmond’s work (2016) documented how 
eviction became an abusive and exploitative practice in the recent rental housing market 
that extracted enormous profits from the vulnerability of the poor (see also Martin 2017). 
Discussing the subprime debt boom in the 2000s, Williams and his colleagues (2005) 
argued that the deregulation of the banking and mortgage system disrupted markets and 
social relationship, which created new opportunities for exploitation. Social policy has 
played an important role in the new and creative ways to exploit the poor, to quote Soss et 
al.’s (2011: 176) terminology through the marketization of the poverty governance, which 
is characterized by a reliance on market actors and outsourcing and an emphasis on 
profitability for investors.   
 
1.3. Research Methods: A Comparative Case Study 
 
This research takes a mixed-methods approach, combining a comparative-historical 
approach with a qualitative one. This section will explain the rationale of this choice.  
First, I compare the evolution of housing policy and social housing development in 
China and in Mexico. These two countries are of very different political, economic, social 
and cultural contexts. For example, while China is often classified as an authoritarian, 
centralist regime, Mexico is considered as a democratic, federalist polity. By 2010, Mexico 
is a highly urbanized country with approximately 78% of the country’s population residing 
in cities and a moderate urban population growth rate (1.65% annually between 2005 and 
2010). In contrast although it has urbanized fast, China barely had half of its population 
classified as urban, and the urban population growth rate was much higher (3.55% annually 
between 2005 and 2010, UNPD 2014).  
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That said, the two countries also share some important similarities. Both countries 
went through a revolution that caused dramatic social, political, and cultural changes in the 
first half of the twentieth century (earlier in Mexico). The post-revolutionary regimes 
actively sought to launch agrarian reforms, promote labor rights and lead the country 
towards industrialization and modernization. Both countries are ruled (or were once ruled) 
by an authoritarian party for decades. Since the 1980s both countries have launched 
economic and political reforms that stimulated the private sector, readjust central-local 
relationship (decentralization), deregulate certain aspects of the economy, and opened the 
country’s economy to the global market, etc. Today, both economies are classified as 
emerging markets,2 and are deeply inserted into (and dependent upon) the world economy. 
Meanwhile both countries still suffer from insufficient institutional capacity and 
widespread corruption. In 2015, China and Mexico ranked 83 and 111 respectively in 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (out of 168 countries).3  
Although China and Mexico find themselves in different stages of urbanization in 
demographic terms, cities in these two countries are experiencing similarly accelerating 
spatial expansion. In the urban housing sphere owner-occupied housing (formal and 
informal) is the predominant form of housing access. Although social housing development 
in the two countries takes different approaches, it nevertheless represent a significant part 
of the urban housing stock. Social housing in China and in Mexico mainly targets the native 
urban population, 4  and its boom is closely associated with the spatial expansion and 
reorganization of the city, as well as the recent dynamics of urban land market.  
                                                          
2 According to World Bank data, in 2017, the GDP per capital of China was 7,329 US$ and that of 
Mexico was 9,946 US$ (both in constant 2010 US Dollars, Source: World Bank, World 
Development Indicators 2018. Retrieved from: 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD ).  
3  Source: Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, Transparency International. Retrieved from: 
https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015  
4 As later chapters will address, social housing in Chinese cities is largely reserved for native 
families that hold the city’s registration, not for former peasants who recently migrated to the city. 
This means that even China and Mexico are at different stages of urban population growth, this 
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The purpose of taking a comparative and historical approach is intended to make 
sense of these differences. The strength of this approach is to identify the key factors that 
led different contexts to have similar outcomes, or that led similar contexts to have different 
outcomes. These “key” factors are of great analytical values and can generate important 
theoretical lessons. In her work on women’s rights and family law in North African 
countries, Charrad (2001) identified the post-colonial state formation processes as the key 
factor that led to three Maghreb countries (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) to have different 
policy outcomes regarding family law and women’s rights. That research highlighted the 
role of kinship as a form of social organization.  
In my research I found that large Chinese and Mexican cities had similar residential 
tenure structures on the eve of the state-led industrialization (i.e. the 1940s-1950s). 
Moreover, both governments used housing policy to create a favorable condition for 
industrialization and to consolidate the power of the post-revolutionary regime. A 
comparative and historical perspective guided me to seek the “key factors” that led to the 
variation in housing policy in the two countries in later years, as well as the implications 
of this variation for the current policy approaches to housing policy. This is somewhat 
different from the prevalent comparative housing research, in which authors seek to build 
a typology of housing policy regimes and articulate them to welfare regimes (Harloe 1995, 
Kemeny 2001). As readers may find later, the main argument of the dissertation is not 
centered on the retrenchment of the State, but rather on how the social housing policy is 
used as a tool to promote the expansion of real estate and financial capital, in a context of 
an increasingly capitalized urban land and housing market.   
A historical dimension is indispensable in the comparison. Historical events and 
trends provide us a valuable set of empirical evidence, and inform us about the critical 
junctures for the evolution of the policy. The time span chosen in this research is from 1950 
to 2015 (when I completed fieldwork). The year 1950 corresponds to the initialization of 
                                                          
difference does not quite affect the rationale of policy-making regarding social housing 
development.  
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the state-led industrialization in both countries -- although the import beginnings of import 
substitution industrialization started in Mexico slightly earlier (during the Avila Camacho 
Administration [1940-1946]). For China it started with the first Five-Year Plan in 1953. 
The year 2015 also marks a cut when more solid data are available in both cases.  
In this dissertation I will show how the advance of neoliberal projects as a global 
phenomenon is deeply embedded in local and historical context. According to Peck and 
her colleagues (2009), this perspective of embeddedness captures how the neoliberalization 
actually takes place in a specific context as “an uneven, contradictory and ongoing process”, 
rather than a formidable, abstract force imposed from outside. In this sense, I follow the 
tradition of “structural analysis of political outcomes”, to use Charrad (2004: xii)’s term. 
Yet I do not intend to overstate the power of embeddedness in making causal arguments. 
Rather, past events and local context consist of powerful structural constraints which 
inform us about potential policy options in those critical junctures, and lead us to think the 
reason why alternative options were not adopted.  
I conduct the comparison on three levels: the national, local and community/ 
household levels. On the national level, I traced the development of urban housing policy 
for low-income population in China and in Mexico between 1950 and 2015. I not only 
documented policy evolution, but also its articulation to the transformation of the regime 
of accumulation and the role of the State in economic development and social provision. 
The comparisons at local and community level further widened the scope of the research. 
On the citywide level I conducted two case studies: the Metropolitan area of Nanjing, China, 
and the Metropolitan area of Guadalajara, Mexico (Illustration 1.1, Illustration 1.2).5 These 
case studies examined how social housing policy is actually implemented at the local level, 
and highlight the critical role of local government in urban development. In particular local 
governments in both cities somehow reinterpreted the policy established by the national 
government in order to pursue their own urban agenda, although the different political and 
land regime in the two countries led to different roles of the local governments in urban 
                                                          
5 For a brief background comparison in these two case cities, please refer to Table 1.1. 
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development. Finally, based on fieldwork, I compared the dwellers’ experiences and the 
living condition in social housing projects in Nanjing and in Guadalajara (Illustration 1.3, 
Illustration 1.4). The purpose of this last comparison is to assess the effectiveness and 
nature of policy outcomes, particularly their impacts on local income population’s 
wellbeing and housing rights.   
 
Illustration 1.1: Location of Nanjing in China (Google Maps) 
 
 
Illustration 1.2. Location of Guadalajara in Mexico (Google Maps) 
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Table 1.1: Background Statistics of the Prefecture of Nanjing and the Metropolitan 
Area of Guadalajara (by 2015)  
Nanjing, Prefecture  Guadalajara, Metropolitan Area 
Area a, b  6,587 sq. km. 2,543 sq. km. 
Population 
(metropolitan area, 
2015)a, b 
8.24 million6 4.8 million 
Political and 
administrative 
status  
Capital of Jiangsu Province; 
Important regional center in 
East China;  
Former capital of China 
Capital of the State of Jalisco; 
Important regional center of 
Central-Western Mexico;  
Second largest metropolitan area 
of Mexico 
Metropolitan-level 
government  
Yes No  
Number of districts/ 
municipalities 
11 87 
GDP per capita in 
2014 (PPP, US$)c 
24,6958 17,206 
Annual growth rate 
of GDP per capita: 
2013-2014 (%)c  
6.5% 0.8% 
Three most 
important economic 
sectors c 
Manufacturing (39.8%) Business/ Finance (27.7%) 
Business/ finance (15.4%) Trade/Tourism (24%) 
Trade/ tourism (14.7%) Manufacturing (19.1%) 
(Sources: a. Nanjing Statistical Yearbook, 2011, 2016; b. IMEPLAN, retrieved 
from: http://imeplan.mx/en/home; c. The Brookings Institution, 2014 Global Metro 
Monitor Map)  
                                                          
6 Referring to the total population, including both the population “registered” in the city as well as 
migrants who are not registered in the city.  
7 The municipality of Zapotlanejo was incorporated into the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara in 
2015, and since then the metropolitan area is formed by 9 neighboring municipalities. To keep the 
consistency of data, this dissertation does not take into account the municipality of Zapotlanejo.     
8 While GDP statistics at municipal level are easily available in China, they are very difficult to 
obtain in the Mexican context. The Brookings Global Metro Monitor is one of the few reliable 
sources for cross-country comparison of GDP statistics at metropolitan level. The Brookings Global 
Metro Monitor used Nanjing’s registered population (6.45 million) to calculate the city’s GDP per 
capita, and the result was US$ 31,434 (PPP). However, in 2014, the city’s total population 
(including migrants whose household registration was not in the city) was 8.21 million. Thus, I 
adjusted the GDP per capita of Nanjing in 2014 is to US$ 24,695 (PPP). According to official 
statistics, the GDP per capita in Nanjing in 2014 was 107,545 Yuan, or approximately US$ 17,515 
(in 2014 value, Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2015).    
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Illustration 1.3. A Social Housing Project in Maigaoqiao, Qixia District, Nanjing 
(photo taken by the author) 
 
 
Illustration 1.4. A Social Housing Project in the Municipality of Tlajomulco de 
Zúñiga, the Metropolitan area of Guadalajara (photo taken by the author) 
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In both sites I conducted archival research and fieldwork. Archival data come 
mainly from the census, government documents and local media. In the case of Nanjing 
for example, the prefectural and district governments each year publish official yearbooks 
(including a specific one on the real estate development in the city), which document the 
major events in the city and the government’s achievements. In these documents I gathered 
data on a variety of aspects of the housing development, including housing price, 
investment in the housing sector, progress of the social housing production and distribution, 
land market, the scale of demolition, etc. Of course, these data can be exaggerated and even 
contradictory given that the authorities have incentives to manipulate statistics for the 
benefits of their programs and individual careers. One major concern, for example, is the 
reliability of the data on relocations, given that these became a major focus of government-
society tension in the 2000s. Yet I also found that local authorities were quite frank about 
the amount of the dwellings they demolished, partly because they considered it as evidence 
of their efficiency in implementing their policy agenda. There are also several ways to 
triangulate the validity of the data. For example I was able to validate the data provided by 
the prefectural government by triangulating with those provided by the district 
governments. In general, although the data found in Nanjing are far from perfect, I am 
confident that I was able to reflect the general trends of housing and urban development in 
the city.  
In the Mexican case I was able to access the data at various administrative level 
provided by major public agencies and secretariats, including INEGI, INFONAVIT, 
CONAVI and SEDESOL, among others. I obtained a record of urbanization authorizations 
with the assistance from Dr. Edith Jiménez at the Universidad de Guadalajara – also one 
of my committee members. I accessed and reviewed mainstream local media reports on 
social housing development and the conditions in social housing projects. These local news 
agencies include El Informador, Milenio, Mural and La Jornada, mainly through the 
database vlex. 9  I also consulted a weekly local newspaper La Verdad, where several 
                                                          
9 Link: https://vlex.com.mx/  
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journalists living in the municipality provide a lot of valuable information, reports and 
(critical) opinion.    
Fieldwork was an important element in both Nanjing and Guadalajara. In both cities 
I conducted in-depth interviews, surveys and observation during the field trips. In the 
Prefecture of Nanjing10 -- my home town where I was born and raised -- I interviewed local 
officials in a variety of positions, including officers who worked on relocations, on social 
housing construction and distribution, on the management of social housing projects 
(Illustration 1.5). I visited a dozen of social housing projects all over the city, and conducted 
150 questionnaire surveys in three large social housing projects: Huanggang, Maigaoqiao 
and Jingming Jiayuan. The first two projects were among the four mega social housing 
projects constructed and inaugurated in the 2010s, and had 17,000 and 17,500 dwellings 
respectively, while Jingming Jiayuan was inaugurated in the early 2000s and 
accommodated 6,754 households.  
In the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, I undertook participant observation by 
living for more than one year in a social housing project named Hacienda Santa Fe. Located 
in Tlajomulco de Zúñiga (aka Tlajomulco), where over 100 social housing projects were 
constructed, Hacienda Santa Fe is one of the largest social housing projects in the country, 
with over 15,000 dwellings. It was constructed by Homex -- the then leading company of 
the social housing industry. The first phases of the project were inaugurated in 2004, and 
President Vicente Fox attended the ceremony of inauguration. There I developed a rich 
rapport and network with the local community and government officials (Illustration 1.6). 
                                                          
10 Note that a prefecture is not necessarily a metropolitan area, though the two concepts overlap to 
certain extent. In China, a prefecture is designated administratively and a province is divided into 
various prefectural-level entities. A prefecture is usually formed by various districts and counties, 
and the prefectural government in China is in between the provincial government and the county-
level government. For a comprehensive review of the Chinese urban system, please see Chan 
(2010). In contrast, in Mexico, a metropolitan area is most likely to form when the urban built area 
of the neighboring municipalities became connected as a result of urbanization. Municipal 
governments in a metropolitan area are politically and judicially equals, and they coordinate over 
metropolitan affairs. Yet, a metropolitan area is not an administrative level, and thus a 
“metropolitan government” does not exist in Mexico.   
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I not only obtained a first-hand knowledge of dwellers’ experiences of moving-in and the 
living condition in the social housing projects, but was also able to conduct participant 
observation by assisting in neighborhood meetings, and in general, participating in the 
daily life of the neighborhood.   
 
Illustration 1.5. Fieldwork in Social Housing Project Huagang, Nanjing 
 
Illustration 1.6. A Mural in Social Housing Project Hacienda Santa Fe that Local 
Artists and Neighbors Painted before I Ended the Fieldwork  
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It should be noted that I do not offer a “comparative ethnography” in the 
dissertation, and I consider this as an important limitation of the dissertation. One reason 
is that the unequal access I gained and the very different positionalities I carried in these 
two contexts. In Nanjing, I was a native but paradoxically perhaps found it difficult to 
obtain access to interview both social housing dwellers and the authorities. The design of 
social housing projects in Nanjing (predominantly high rise developments), posed a further 
physical obstacle for me to access and interact with the dwellers. Local authorities in 
Nanjing in general were not willing to be interviewed, particularly regarding relocations or 
unauthorized housing projects, although I managed to interview some of them by 
mobilizing my own informal social network.    
In Guadalajara I was a foreigner but after an initial period developed almost full 
rapport with many members of the community. It is beyond the scope of this research to 
reconcile these tensions and contradictions, but this imbalance between observation and 
surveys meant that I felt unable to provide the “thick description” and a more grounded 
ethnographic account in Chapter 6 that I had originally intended. Instead I was limited to 
present the main approaches of housing access in social housing projects and the broad 
features of the living experience in these projects. As the main focus of the dissertation is 
on the State and policy, in Chapter 6 I prioritized the policy outcomes and the community 
and households’ response to those policies albeit in a rather general way. That said, I should 
point out that the ethnographic work I conducted helped me to triangulate and make sense 
of the data I acquired in the archive research.   
 
1.4. Chapter Organization and Dissertation Structure  
 
This dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 1 has introduced the research 
background, main research questions, a broad literature review, possible contribution of 
the research, as well as the principal research methods. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on national 
housing policy development in China and Mexico respectively. Chapter 2 focuses on China 
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and the planned economy that prioritized the heavy industry and the formation of a large 
public rental housing stock in Chinese cities. Yet, given that industrial investment, housing 
production and social welfare was largely marginalized, and there was a rampant deficit of 
housing throughout the period of the planned economy. I document the market-oriented 
housing reform in the country that began in the 1980 and was consolidated in early 2000s, 
and which led to a redefinition of the meaning of housing, a shift in the State’s role in social 
provision, but at the same time led to new forms of inequality and exclusion. I also outline 
the current housing policy framework in the country, in which social housing was one of 
the key components.  
Chapter 3 reviews the evolution of housing policy in Mexico. The predominant 
form of housing access during the State-led, Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) 
period was self-help informal housing, although a small-scale social housing development 
was also used as a tool of political corporatism. After the 1982 Debt Crisis, a general 
neoliberal transformation in the country restructured the housing policy, in which the 
primary public housing agency INFONAVIT was transformed from a leader of housing 
construction to a facilitator to the private investment in housing development. In particular 
I summarize the key roles of the public sector in triggering a mortgage boom among the 
low-income urban working class in the 2000s. The last section of the Chapter compares 
the trajectories of social housing policy in China and in Mexico and I argue that the 
different approaches to industrialization and different post-revolutionary state formation 
processes led to the variation in housing policy in these two countries. This variation, in 
turn, posed powerful structural and institutional constraints that led to the different 
approaches to social housing in China and in Mexico.       
Chapters 4 and 5 are two case studies of the social housing policy in the Prefecture 
of Nanjing (Chapter 4) and in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara (Chapter 5). Here I 
document the urban and housing development in the city, housing options for the low-
income urban population, the land regime, as well as the scale and model of social housing 
development. In these discussions I highlight the urban agenda promoted by the local 
authorities, as well as the structural constraints within which they operated (such as 
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political regime, central-local governmental relationships, governance, etc.) in order to 
better understand what motivated the local authorities to promote social housing 
development in their jurisdiction. I also attribute the different roles that local authorities 
play in urban development to the different land and political regimes in China and in 
Mexico.     
Chapter 6 takes a community and household grassroots perspective to explore the 
conditions in the social housing projects in each city, as well as the dwellers’ experience 
based largely on my fieldwork in the two sites. Comparison of these broad features allows 
me to argue that, despite their different approaches, social housing development in both 
Nanjing and in Guadalajara is based on various forms of exploitation and abuse. It 
represents more of accumulation by dispossession rather than a genuine advance in housing 
rights.  Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the key analytical lessons of the research and 
discusses its policy implications of the research as well as some avenues for future research.  
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Chapter 2. Housing Policy in China: 1950-2015 
 
In this chapter I will review the evolution of housing policy in China from 1950 to 
2015.11 Between the 1950s and the 1980s, a housing regime dominated by public rental 
housing was established and consolidated, while the private housing sector was largely 
limited and reduced. By 1985, the public rental housing counted for about 75% of the 
country’s urban housing stock. However, severe housing shortage persisted. The Chinese 
government launched a market-oriented housing reform in the 1980s and 1990s. This 
reform not only significantly increased housing production, but also began to reshape the 
meaning of housing: from a non-productive consumption good for the reproduction of 
labor force to a commodity and a stimulus to the national economy. Meanwhile, new forms 
of housing inequality and exclusion emerged.  
This chapter will also summarize the most recent frameworks of housing policy, 
which mainly consists of three components: government intervention in the commercial 
housing market, housing provident fund and social housing development. Here I will focus 
particularly on the political economy of the housing policy: how is the housing policy 
embedded in the regime of accumulation and the role of the State in the regime of 
accumulation? In the recent two decades, housing policy has been dominated by the central 
government’s concern over macroeconomic performance. The recent social housing 
development, while used to fix the market failure, is primarily a stimulus plan in response 
to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. That said, in order to make the housing regime more 
inclusive, structural changes should occur to enable the central government to redefine 
housing in its policy agenda.  
 
                                                          
11 For major historical events in China since the 20th century, please see Table 2.1. For a brief 
timeline of the urban and housing development in China between 1950s and 2010s, please see 
Table 2.2.   
23 
 
2.1. Housing Policy under the Planned Economy (1949-1979)  
 
This section will examine how the China’s housing policy under the planned 
economy was related to the country’s development model of the time. The three main 
components of the housing policy in this period consist of the expropriation of private 
rental housing, self-building and slum upgrading, as well as public rental housing. I will 
also discuss how this policy model went into crisis by late 1970s.  
When the Communist Party of China took power in 1949, the priority of the new 
regime was to restore the political and social stability in the city and recover the economy. 
Following this transition period (1949-1953), the communist government launched its First 
Five-Year Plan (1953-1957), which established a new accumulation regime that was based 
on public ownership, command and economic plans. The goal of the planned economy was 
to achieve a complete and independent industrial system for the country, in which the heavy 
industry was considered as the priority. During the First Five-Year Plan, China launched 
156 large industrial and infrastructure projects with aid from the URSS, as well as a 
“socialist transformation campaign” that converted the private sector into state or collective 
ownership. The domination of public ownership was achieved largely through confiscating 
the properties of the old regime and buying out private companies (not without coercion). 
By the end of 1956, 99% of the entities in the private industry sector and 82.2% of the 
entities in the private commerce sector had been bought out (Huang 1994).    
Severe urban housing shortage and dilapidation persisted as an urgent issue to 
address.12 The existing urban housing stock had already been severely damaged during the 
Japanese invasion (1937-1945) and the civil war (1945-1950). To make it worse, although 
China was predominantly rural at the time (with only 11.8% of the total population 
classified as urban [UNDP 2014]), urban population increased rapidly with the influx of 
refugees who fled wars and famines in the rural area, or migrants who were attracted by 
                                                          
12 Li (2016), Wang (2015), Zhang (2009a, Chapter 4), and Zhao (2012) discussed in detail the 
precarious urban housing condition when the Communist Party took power in 1949.  
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job opportunities in the city when the industrialization initiated. 13  While the total 
population of the country increased by 2% between 1950 and 1955, the urban population 
increased by 5.21% (UNPD 2014). 
 
Table 2.1: Major Political and Economic Events in China since the 20th Century 
Year Event  
1911 The Chinese Revolution of 1911 (end of the monarchy and the 
founding of the Republic of China) 
1937-1945 The Japanese Invasion during the WWII  
1945-1950 Chinese Communist Revolution 
1949 Proclamation of the People's Republic of China 
1950s-1980s Planned economy: industrialization that prioritized heavy industry; 
market and the private sector largely eliminated. Annual GDP growth 
rate between 1960 and 1980: 5% (constant 2010 US$)  
1958-1961 The “Great Leap Forward” (a radical industrialization and rural 
collectivization campaign) and the Great Chinese Famine 
1966-1976 Cultural Revolution  
1980s- Mixed economy with the State controlling key economic sectors; a 
more diversified economy; insertion into the global market. Annual 
GDP growth rate between 1980 and 2015: 9.7% (constant 2010 US$). 
1978 “Reform and Opening Up” 
1989 Tiananmen Square Protests  
1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
2001 The admission of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
2003 SARS epidemic 
2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(Source: the author’s own elaboration; GDP data: World Bank Open Data) 
 
Table 2.2: Evolution of Urban and Housing Policy in China: 1950s-2010s 
1950s-1980s  • Public rental housing as the predominant form of housing 
provision in the city;  
• Expropriation of private rental housing;  
• Tolerance of existing self-built housing in the urban area 
                                                          
13 For example, the population of Wuhan increased from 900,000 to 1.3 million between 1937 and 
1952, but the housing stock was reduced by 10,177 buildings, and 38% of the urban population 
lived in slums in 1952 (Zhang 2009a: 92, 93).  
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1958-1980s Strict restriction against rural-urban migration through the 
household registration (Hukou) system 
1960s-1970s De-urbanization  
1980s-1990s Housing reform: commercialization of housing development, 
privatization of the socialist public housing stock; rapid 
urbanization under the “economic reform and opening up”.    
1982 The new Constitution eliminated urban private land. Since then, all 
urban land is of public ownership in China. 
1988 Modification of the Land Management Law that allowed the local 
government to lease out the land-use rights in urban area  
1991 Creation of the Housing Provident Funds (HPF) 
1998 Public-sector work units no longer allowed to allocate housing to 
their employees  
2000s-2010s  Commercial housing development prioritized; Government 
rigorously regulates the real estate economy; social housing first 
marginalized but then significantly expanded after the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis; rapid urbanization continues.   
2003  Real estate sector declared as the backbone of the national 
economy, in response to the 2003 SARS epidemic   
2008 Social housing development as part of the stimulus plan after the 
Global Financial Crisis 
2011-2015 The 12th Five-Year Plan established to construct 36 million social 
housing dwellings nationwide.  
            (Source: the author’s own elaboration) 
 
2.1.1. Expropriation of Private Rental Housing  
 
Private rental housing was the predominant form of housing access when the CPC 
took power (Shen et al. 2012). By 1955 private housing still counted for 54% of the urban 
housing stock in Beijing, 66% in Shanghai, 78% in Jinan, 61.3% in Nanjing, and 86% in 
Suzhou. In Shanghai, 70% of the private housing was for rent, 75% in Harbin and 72% in 
Qingdao (Secretariat of the Communist Party of China 1956). Rental housing was mainly 
operated by private real estate companies, big landlords or regular urbanites who owned 
extra rooms. Tenant-landlord conflicts became increasingly tense. 14  The new regime 
                                                          
14 In Nanjing, between June and December of 1949, 38% of the civil lawsuit cases (1,094 cases) 
had to do with disputes between tenants and landlords (Zhang 2009a: 94).  
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enforced measures such as rent control to alleviate the housing crisis and gain the support 
of the mass of the population (the tenant sector). Many expected that the Party would 
simply expropriate and redistribute the private rental housing following the example of the 
land reform in the rural area (People’s Daily 1949; Zhang 2009a: 95-99). However, though 
landlords and brokers were viewed as exploiters and the new government promised to 
regulate the rental housing market in favor of the tenants (Zhang 2009a), private property 
and the private rental housing market were preserved during the first years under CPC’s 
rule, as the new regime lacked resources to produce large amount of new dwellings, and it 
was still seeking alliance with the national and the petty bourgeoisie.15 Tenant-landlord 
relationship continued being tense and chaotic, and private landlords were unwilling to 
produce new housing or repair the existing one.     
The government extended the socialist transformation campaign to the urban 
housing sector in 1956. According to the authorities, direct government control could 
improve the efficiency of the use of the existing housing stock, particularly when new 
housing production was lagging. Private real estate companies were converted into public 
or collective ownership. Landlords whose rental property were larger than a certain floor 
area were asked to keep only a certain floor area16 for their own use and to hand in the 
rental property to the municipal government. The latter then turned the property to public 
rental housing, and the former landlords got share of the revenues (often 20-40% of the 
monthly rent – see State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1964). Unlike the 
socialist transformation campaign in industry and commerce, which was complete in less 
than a year, the socialization of private rental housing met fairly strong resistance in 
numerous cities. By 1960, 14% of all the cities and two thirds of the counties had not 
                                                          
15 On August 11, 1949, less than two months prior to the proclamation of the People’s Republic of 
China, a communique in People’s Daily made it clear that the new regime would recognize and 
protect private property in the city. Citing the volume III of the Capital, the communique carefully 
distinguished the nature of the urban housing (a product of labor) from the rural land (an organic 
[or natural] thing). 
16 This floor area was established by local government and thus varied according to cities: in general, 
150 sq. m. in large cities, 100 sq. m. in medium cities, and 50-100 sq. m. in small cities and towns 
(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1964).   
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launched the campaign yet (Zhang 2009a: 100). However, the campaign was radicalized 
in the 1960s, such that by 1964 a total of 100 million sq. m. of private rental housing had 
been converted to public rental housing (State Council of the People’s Republic of China 
1964). During the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), many urban 
private homeowners were sent to villages for political accusations or in the ideological 
campaigns, and their dwellings were confiscated (or expropriated with little compensation) 
and converted to public rental housing (Zhang 2009a).17 
 
2.1.2. Self-built dwellings and slum upgrading   
 
Self-built dwellings and slums prevailed in many Chinese cities when the CPC took 
power. They were often located in vacant land, trash dump, river bank, or along the railway. 
Shanghai had a population of 4.14 million in 1949, and 1.15 million lived in shacks built 
with provisional materials such as straw and bamboo (Chen 2007, General History of 
Shanghai 2005). In Wuhan, by 1952, 38% of the population lived in shacks (Zhang 2009a: 
93).  
Since the 1950s, local governments had attempted to relocate the slum dwellers to 
newly-built housing projects. However, as the government never invested sufficient 
resources in formal housing production, this approach did not prevail. Rather, local 
governments assisted in slum upgrading by providing infrastructure and essential services 
such as public hygiene, running water, street light and street pavement (Wang 2015). 
Occasionally, they also encouraged and assisted slum dwellers to acquire construction 
materials within the economic plan or from the market, though the market had been 
significantly reduced under the planned economy (Zhao 2012, Li 2016). Some of the slum 
upgrading cases have been widely reported to showcase the socialist government-mass 
                                                          
17 Not until the early 1980s had some of these properties been returned to their original owners by 
the state; even so, many occupiers did not move out as they could not find any place to live either 
(Zhang 2009a).  
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relationship,18 and many slums survived the period of planned economy and were, to a 
certain degree, integrated into the city. In Shanghai for example, the floor area of the 
dwellings considered “provisional” or “shacks” had not substantially diminished until the 
1980s (Figure 2.1), although a lot of them had been consolidated and replaced with 
permanent construction materials, and even had been developed into buildings of several 
floors to accommodate the need of family expansion (Chen 2007).  
The government took an ambivalent attitude towards self-building. On one hand, 
the authorities’ general attitude was to restrict it and prevent the formation of new slums. 
Yet, new slums were occasionally formed (Li 2016), particularly where the restriction 
against internal migration was effectively enforced, or when construction materials were 
freely available in the market. However, as the government tightened its control over 
population mobility through the household registration regime (the Hukou regime),19 and 
over access to construction materials and urban land, new slums did not proliferate in most 
cities. On the other hand, self-building was considered as a pragmatic solution to the 
housing deficit among the registered urban residents (Li 2016) or employees of the public 
sector (Zhao 2012). Since the 1950s, work units 20  (especially factories) occasionally 
organized cooperatives among employees to self-build dormitories or apartments, and 
                                                          
18 Long-xu-gou (“Dragon Beard Ditch”), one of the most renowned Chinese dramas of the 1950s, 
presented the transformation of a neighborhood called Long-xu-gou in Beijing from a miserable 
slum before the revolution to an example of reconstruction under the leadership of the CPC.   
19 The household registration (Hukou) system, analogous to a “domestic passport” system, has 
existed in China since 1958. It basically categorizes citizens into “rural” and “urban”. Access to 
social services and welfare programs are associated with the status of one’s household registration. 
There are channels to change one’s household registration category, such as higher education, 
investment in real estate, military service etc. Nevertheless, it is difficult to reach these 
requirements, especially for the socioeconomically disadvantaged groups such as rural migrant 
workers (see Fan 2008). 
20 In the Chinese context, work unit (Danwei) is a form of work organization. It can be a factory, a 
school or a government agency, among others. A work unit “functioned as a social ‘unit’ in the 
system dominated by the redistributive state” (Wu 2013). Work unit members usually carry out 
their domestic and social activities within the work unit. Under the planned economy, the majority 
of the urban population was organized in their work unit (Bjorklund 1986). 
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provided assistance in land, funding and construction materials. This approach proved to 
be less costly than government-built public rental housing (Zhao 2012).  
Thus between 1950s and the 1980s, self-building was an important alternative to 
the production of government-led new housing production. However, the scale of self-
building was restricted by government policy and the availability of resources. In the 216 
cities of the country, only 2.8% of the newly-constructed dwellings in 1979 were self-built 
in terms of floor area (General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China 1981), and served to accommodate the housing need of urban registered residents or 
work units employees, rather than migrants who came under strong restrictions during this 
period.   
 
Figure 2.1: Urban Housing Stock in Shanghai: 1949-1995 (floor area, in 1,000 sq. 
m.) 
(Source: General History of Shanghai [Vol. 27], 2005) 
 
2.1.3. Government-led housing construction  
 
The government-led housing construction created a significant public housing 
sector from 1950s to 1990s. Public housing was constructed and managed by either work 
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units or the municipal housing, and then assigned to workers as rental housing. In 1978, 
33.4% of the country’s urban housing stock was rental housing built and managed by the 
municipal housing bureaus, 46.1% by work units, and 20.5% was owned by individuals 
(Barlow 1988, p. 6). Under this housing regime, rents in public rental housing were heavily 
subsidized: urban residents rent payment as a proportion of income dropped from 2.1% to 
1.1% from 1956 to 1985, not even enough to cover the cost of maintenance (ibid). Public 
rental housing at the time not only provided housing access, but also produced a form of 
social organization that placed emphasis on self-sufficiency and social control within the 
work-units. These public housing projects often sought to reduce the separation between 
the work place and home (Chaichian 1991), and had facilities such as school, community 
activity room, post office, or even a public library.  
The fact that the public sector became almost the sole agent in housing provision is 
largely the result of the accumulation regime of the time: a Soviet-type planned economy 
that prioritizes heavy industry (see Figure 2.2).21 Because the heavy industry is generally 
capital-intensive and capital is usually scarce in pre-industrial countries, the communist 
regime employed a variety of strategies to guarantee that a maximum amount of resources 
(especially capital and materials) was invested in heavy industry (Liao and Lin 2013). 
Under State control the allocation of resources is not based on market mechanism, but on 
command and economic plans. The government also intended to minimize the cost of the 
social reproduction of labor. Social reproduction of labor was done through direct State 
provision (but only at its minimum level). Wages and consumption were suppressed to 
satisfy only the workers’ basic needs and to complement what the State provided (Lin et 
al. 1999). Between 1952 and 1981, the average productivity of employees of state-owned 
enterprises increased by 183%, but the average salary in real terms increased by only 29.4% 
(author’s calculations based on China Statistical Yearbook 1981: 5-11, 426). 
                                                          
21 The sectors that received the most investment between 1953 and 1980 include the metallurgical 
industry, the coal industry, the industry of electric power, the chemical industry, and the machine 
industry (China Statistical Yearbook 1981: 299-300).   
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Figure 2.2: Heavy Industry as Priority in Capital Construction Investment, 1953-
1980 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1981: 299-300) 
The industrialization and the increasing rural-urban inequality triggered a rapid 
growth of the urban population during the first half of the 1950s, as had happened in other 
developing countries. China’s urban population increased 42 million between 1949 and 
1957 (from 57.65 million to 99.49 million), and it is estimated that 25 million were 
migrants from the rural areas (Zhang 2003). This exacerbated the already widespread 
shortages in the city. From the late 1950s the rural-to-urban migration was significantly 
reduced by the creation of a household registration system and by collectivization programs 
in the rural area. Moreover, when the public sector was not able to maintain even the 
minimum level of social provision in urban area, the government sent large amount of 
urban residents to villages, using coercion or ideological campaigns. 22 Through the 1960s 
                                                          
22 In the aftermath of the Great Famine (1959-1961), more than 18 million workers in the city were 
ordered to leave the city (most of them were hired by factories during the Great Leap Forward 
[1958-1960] and returned to their home village) from 1961 to 1963 (Li 2001). Later, between 1967 
and 1980, the CPC launched an “Up to the Mountains, Down to the Villages” Movement. During 
these 13 years, about 16.5 million urban dwellers (most of them were youth) were sent to the rural 
area (the urban population of 1980 was about 134 million). They lost their urban household 
registration, and were supposed to settle and work in the people’s communes or state farms (Bonnin 
2005). Though at the time the CPC portrayed the movement as an ideological campaign aimed at 
encouraging the urban youth to “learn from the peasants” and constructing an egalitarian society, 
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and 1970s, the country’s degree of urbanization remained low; in fact the country was less 
urbanized in 1975 than in 1965 (Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4). 
 
Figure 2.3: Degree of Urbanization in China, 1950-1980 (%) 
(Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division [2014], World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM 
Edition) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Annual Growth Rate of the Total Population and the Urban Population 
in China: 1950-1980 (%) 
(Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division [2014], World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM 
Edition) 
                                                          
many believe that it was the government’s response to its inability to continue the full employment 
policy and social provision in the city, in a context of rapid population growth and the political and 
economic turmoil during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) (Bonnin 2005, Ren 2003).    
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In this context, housing was seen by the regime as a consumer good in the “non-
productive sector”. 23  The urban housing sector was marginalized in state investment 
(Barlow 1987, Lalkaka 1984). The housing supply was determined by the state’s financial 
capability to allocate capital for housing projects, not by the forces of demand (Chaichian 
1991), and the proportion of capital construction funds allocated to housing was never 
higher than 8% between 1958 and 1977 (Figure 2.5). For the same reason, although self-
building and co-operative housing seemed appealing housing options, they were restricted 
under planned economy and under the State’s firm control over funding and construction 
materials (Zhao 2012, Li 2016). In sum, the communist regime deals with the housing 
shortage not only by investing in new housing production, but also by minimizing 
construction standard, restricting rural-to-urban migration, eliminating housing and land 
market, a forced housing redistribution and intensifying the use of the existing housing 
stock.  
 
Figure 2.5: Housing Investment in China: 1950-1978 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1981: 309) 
 
                                                          
23 Until 1992, the China Statistical Yearbook still classified investment in housing production as 
“non-productive investment”.  
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As a result, the outcome for housing was rather poor and the deficit worsened 
throughout the period of planned economy. Overcrowding was common: the national 
average per capita living space dropped from 4.5 sq. m. in 1952 to 3.6m sq. m. in 1978, 
and in 1978 some  6.89 million urban households, or 35.8% of the urban households were 
classified as living with “insufficient floor space” (Lee 1988). In Wuhan, around 40% of 
the dwellings in 1979 was considered “dilapidated”, “dangerous” or “poor” (ibid.). The 
bulk of urban housing lacked basic facilities such as kitchen and bathroom and a 1985 
National Housing Survey showed that apartments with exclusive use of kitchens and toilets 
accounted for only 26% of the total   housing (Barlow 1988). Despite its egalitarian 
appearance, the housing regime under the centrally planned economy generated 
considerable inequality (Lee 1988), and most applicants to public rental housing were on 
a waitlist for a long time, and conflicts and struggles during the housing allocation were 
notorious. The access to housing was largely determined by seniority, by the organizational 
characteristics of the work units and by one’s household registration status.  
 
2.2. Housing Reform during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
Section 2.2 and 2.3 will discuss the market-oriented housing reform in China in the 
1980s and 1990s. This reform was initiated by the central government as a pragmatic 
response to the severe housing crisis at the time, but it was also an indispensable component 
in the economic reform and opening. I will highlight the gradualist character of the housing 
reform in China.    
In the late 1970s, it became apparent that the public sector alone was unable to 
reduce the housing deficit. Between 1976 and 1980, adding to the natural increase of the 
urban population (around 1% annually), more than 10 million former urban residents who 
had been earlier sent to settle in the villages returned to the city where they previously lived 
(Bonnin 2005: Table 2). The 1980s witnessed the beginning of the rapid urbanization of 
China: the urban population grew annually 4.87% between 1980 and 1985, then 4.75% 
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between 1985 and 1990. Although the urban population growth has slightly decelerated 
since then, currently it is still growing at above 3% annually, much higher than the total 
population. The proportion of the total population residing in the urban area increased from 
19.4% in 1980 to 55.6% in 2015 (see Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7).  
Initially, policy makers sought housing solutions within the framework of the 
planned economy: that is to increase government housing investment (Figure 2.8); 24 
increase the production of construction materials; to reduce the costs of construction; and 
to reinforce government control over housing production and allocation (State Council of 
the People’s Republic of China 1978, National General Bureau of City Construction 1980).  
 
Figure 2.6: Degree of Urbanization in China: 1970-2015 (%) 
(Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division [2014], World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM 
Edition) 
 
                                                          
24 Figure 2.5 showed a surge in housing investment in both relative and absolute terms between 
1980 and 1985. Investment in housing production was above 20% of the total investment in fixed 
asset, except for 1984 (18.1%). This was in a sharp contrast to the previous period (1953-1978), 
where housing investment never exceeded 8% of the total investment in fixed assets.   
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Figure 2.7: Annual Growth Rate of the Total Population and the Urban Population 
in China: 1970-2015 
(Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population 
Division [2014], World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision, CD-ROM 
Edition) 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Housing Investment in China: 1953-1991 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1981, 1992) 
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In 1980, Deng Xiaoping urged that the construction and the housing industry could 
become a pillar of the national economy, that the population should be allowed to purchase 
their dwelling or self-build, and that differential ground rent should be allowed 
(Construction Economy 1985). This triggered a heated debate in the country, often 
ideologized (General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1981), 
and Deng’s proposal marked the beginning of the housing reform. The core components of 
which came to redefine the meaning of housing and the role of the state in housing 
provision. In other words, the government intended to solve the severe housing deficit by 
diversifying agents in housing production, to relieve the public sector from the financial 
and administrative burden of housing production and management, as well as to recognize 
housing as a commodity and a potential stimulus to the economy. 
While this section does not intend to focus on the technical details of these policy 
initiatives, it is nevertheless important to discuss their broad features. The housing reform 
was gradual in nature, and was similar to reforms in other spheres during the 1980s and 
1990s.25 Instead of dismantling the old system overnight and replacing it with a market 
economy through a shock therapy, the Chinese reform first creates a market tier that is 
allowed to coexist with the old system (or government plan). While the authorities 
restructured the old system in a somewhat precautious manner, they also actively fomented 
the new market tier which when sufficiently large and sound would replace the old system 
(Naughton 2007: 91-93; Wang 2009). While this type of reform is widely criticized for 
                                                          
25 The housing reform drew on experiences from both abroad and local pilot projects. Chinese 
embassies were asked to brief on the housing development and housing policy of their host country 
(Bao 2015). The housing privatization and commercialization in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe, as well as the gap in housing condition between China and advanced capitalist countries, 
enhanced the legitimacy of a market-oriented housing reform. The commodification of land-use 
rights was introduced from Hong Kong (which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4). Pilot 
projects of housing voucher, rent increase and sale of public rental housing at subsidized price were 
first launched in a few cities. They were promoted to the country if they turned out to be successful. 
The housing provident fund is another good example: it was first experimented in Shanghai in 1991 
based on the Singaporean model, and then promoted to all the country in 1994. 
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encouraging rent-seeking behaviors, it does allow some extent of trial and error, and 
reduces the resistance from those with a vested interest in the old system.  
In the housing sphere a new tier of commodity housing was created. Local 
governments’ offices of housing construction were converted to become “urban 
development companies” which engaged in urban development and housing construction 
as independent accounting enterprises (not as government branch) (Zhang 2008). The 
commodity housing units that they constructed were no longer assigned directly as public 
rental housing as in the past, but were sold to individuals or to work units.26 Several 
important official documents, such as the 1984 Government Work Report and the Political 
Report of the 13th CPC National Congress (1987) confirmed the necessity of promoting the 
commodification of housing and establishing a real estate market (Zhang 2008). Two legal 
frameworks implemented in this period were of particular importance: first, the revision of 
the Constitution and the Land Administration Law in 1988 that allowed the 
commercialization of land use rights,27 and second, the establishment of the Urban Real 
Estate Administration Law in 1994 that regulates the real estate development.  
By the 1990s, important institutional and financial infrastructures for the 
commercial housing market had been established, including the housing provident fund, 
property transaction registries and home mortgages, etc., although a lot of these 
institutional arrangements were still highly premature and weak (Xie 1993). In this context, 
the nascent Chinese real estate sector hit its first boom in 1992 when investment into the 
real estate sector increased by 117% from the previous year (216% in Hainan Province, 
and 211% in Guangdong Province [Chen and Yang 1993]).28 Similarly, the number of real 
estate companies increased from less than 4,000 in May 1992 to about 30,000 by the end 
of 1993 (Zhang 2008). The main products of this real estate boom were high-end residential 
                                                          
26 That being said, many work units bought these commodity housing and assigned them as public 
rental housing to their employees. In 1988, only 28.3% of the commodity housing units produced 
in that year were directly sold to individuals (Zhang 2008).  
27 Chapter 4 will discuss the land regime in China in detail.  
28 Foreign investment and investment from Hong Kong played an important role (Pan 1993) 
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dwellings and office buildings, but this supply was not sustained by the housing demand 
of the majority of the urban population.29 In the following year, the central government 
realized the speculative nature of the boom and its disruptive effects on the macroeconomic 
stability, and decided to enforce tighter control over investment. The real estate bubble 
quickly burst, leaving a wave of bankruptcy among developers and widespread abandoned 
construction sites. The 1992 real estate boom showed the government the enormous 
potential of the real estate sector in attracting investment, but the government also learned 
the importance of a rigorous regulatory framework for the healthy development of the 
sector.     
The government encouraged self-building or housing cooperatives, particularly in 
secondary and small cities where land supply was not as tight as in large cities. In 1995 
local governments launched a campaign of affordable housing targeting the middle- and 
low-income urban population living in housing deficit and forms the precursor of the 
current social housing system in China.   
Regarding the old housing regime, the government intended to reduce subsidies in 
rent in the expectation that this would allow better funding for maintenance of the existing 
housing stock. The government also encouraged state employees to buy their rental home 
at a subsidized price. However, the reform did not advance smoothly (Chen 2010): people 
remained un-enthusiastic about obtaining private housing ownership, given that public 
housing was still heavily subsidized and cheap. After three decades of the communist rule, 
people had taken for granted the long-term commitment of the public sector in housing 
provision. More importantly, incomes were so low that very few could actually afford to 
purchase a dwelling. On occasions the sale of homes was often so heavily subsidized that 
the central government had to cease in order to curb the loss of state assets (Chen 2010, 
                                                          
29 The real estate boom in early 1990s mainly targeted foreign or overseas Chinese investors. In 
some cases, work units purchased commercial dwellings and allocated them to employees as public 
rental housing. A commercial dwelling at the time was way beyond the purchase power of the 
majority of the urban population, and institutions such as home mortgage had not been fully 
developed.  As Figure 2.7 shows, in 1991, only a third of the commercial housing was sold to 
individual buyers.  
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Ministry of Urban-Rural Development and Environmental Protection 1986, Ministry of 
Construction 1988). 30 
In sum, the housing reform in the 1980s and 1990s created a two-tier housing 
regime. It was formed by a tier of commodity housing (including regular commercial 
housing and affordable housing), and a second tier of the old public rental housing. During 
the transition in 1980s and 1990s the role of “work unit” in social provision was reinforced 
(Zhu 2007), creating a grey zone between the two tiers in which many these work units 
bought commodity housing and assigned them to employees as public rental housing. In 
other words, the practice in the old system (public rental housing) was introduced and 
reproduced in the new market tier. Bian and his colleagues (1996) estimated that during 
the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980-1985), 60% of the investment in the construction of 
residential housing came from work units’ own funding. This not only produced 
considerable financial burden for work units, but also exacerbated the housing inequality 
that had already existed based on the characteristics of the work units.  
 
2.3. Completing the Housing Reform: 1998-2003  
 
In 1987, a research institute affiliated with the then Ministry of Urban-Rural 
Construction and Environmental Protection estimated that the commodification of the 
entire housing regime could be achieved by 2030 (China Institute for Economics of Urban-
Rural Construction 1987). However, it actually occurred much sooner. In this section, I 
will document how the housing commercialization in China was consolidated by 2003. By 
then, macroeconomic concerns had predominated central government’s housing policy 
agenda. I will discuss how the market-oriented reform in China in the 1980s and 1990s is 
                                                          
30 For example, in 1982, the government launched a pilot project in four provincial cities (Siping, 
Changzhou, Zhengzhou and Shashi). Public rental housing was sold to dwellers under a tri-party 
scheme (the government, the work unit and the dweller each pays a third of the construction cost). 
Yet, in reality, dwellers only paid between 12.32% and 23.4% of the construction cost, which was 
much lower than the goal (Liu 1985). 
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embedded in a general transformation of the State’s role in the regime of accumulation, as 
well as in the social reproduction of labor. Finally, I will also identify the main 
consequences of the housing policy reform.   
 
2.3.1. The Hegemony of Commercial Housing and the Residualization of Social Housing: 
1998-2003 
 
In July 1998, the central governmental issued the Circular of the State Council on 
Further Deepening the Urban Housing System Reform and Accelerating Housing 
Construction, which ordered work units to end housing allocation for their employees. 
Banks were also forbidden from issuing loans to work units for housing construction (Chen 
2010). Restrictions on home mortgages were further loosened, and a market of used 
housing sales was created. Following the reform the old public rental dwellings were 
cheaply sold to occupants at a much faster pace. Now, individuals were expected to obtain 
housing finance from one of the following options: mortgage loans, loans from the housing 
provident fund, monetary subsidies from their work units, or from reselling the current 
home that they own. In sum, the 1998 reform pushed the urban population to seek their 
own housing on the market: in 1991, only a third of the commodity dwellings were sold 
directly to individuals, and in 2003, almost all were sold to individuals (Figure 2.9; State 
Council of People’s Republic of China 1998; Zhu 2007). The reform essentially ended the 
“dual track” housing regime and created a considerable stock of private property. 
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Figure 2.9: Sale of New Commodity Housing in China: 1991-2003 
 (Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2004, Table 6-48) 
 
Xie Jiajin, a former high-ranking official in the then Ministry of Construction and 
key participant in the housing reform, in her memoir provides a valuable account of the 
policy-making process in 1998 (Xie 2009). She explains that by the end of 1997 the central 
government was desperately seeking new economic growth poles since the country’s 
economy was in a critical situation: the reform of the state enterprises resulted in 
widespread bankruptcies and mass layoffs,31 and the demand for exports was significantly 
reduced due to the Asian Financial Crisis.32  She notes that Zhu Rongji,33 then the Vice-
                                                          
31 By the end of 1998, 8.92 million former public-sector workers were unemployed (Ministry of 
Labor and Social Security 1998).  
32 To make the matter more delicate, Hong Kong’s economy was severely hit by the Asian Financial 
Crisis in October 1997, three months after the British Government transferred its sovereignty to the 
Chinese government.     
33 Zhu Rongji served as the First Vice-Premier from 1991 to 1998 and Premier from 1998 to 2003. 
He was a key figure in economic management and policy-making from mid-1990s to early 2000s. 
He led reforms in various aspects: state enterprises, the banking system, higher education, fiscal 
arrangement, housing, pricing mechanism, government structure etc.   
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Premier in charge of economic policy, led the housing reform and that he insisted that the 
single most important goal for the housing reform was to trigger effective demand for the 
housing market and to stimulate investment. For the first time ever, the central government 
explicitly used the housing sector as a tool to expand investment and to meet the goal of 
GDP growth.  
“[Zhu said in a meeting in December 15, 1997] I’m not quite sure where we can 
find new growth poles! One possible growth pole could be the housing sector, and 
maybe we should add the IT sector… You probably want to challenge me: what if 
we are not able to sell out all the new dwellings? But we have to risk. If not, it’s 
going to be very troublesome next year”. (Xie 2009: 10) 
 
“[Zhu said in a meeting in January 14, 1998] ‘I’m not interested in discussing 
how to sell out the public rental housing stock or rent increase for public 
housing… The purpose of the housing reform doesn’t lie in the housing sector; 
otherwise I won’t be here talking with you guys. My focus is new economic 
growth poles for this coming year’… We [officials of the Ministry of 
Construction] suggested that economical housing should be rental housing, since 
this was what other countries do to provide housing to their low-income 
populations. Zhu responded with some anger: ‘I said economical housing will be 
for sale, not for renting! I don’t want to discuss this issue any more. It takes a long 
time for rental housing to recover the investment, which means it can’t serve as a 
stimulus to the economy. I only care about how to stimulate the economy. Other 
issues can be left to address in the future.’” (Xie 2009: 43) 
 
“[The Minister of Construction said in a meeting with provincial housing 
authorities in March 1998] we want to increase the housing investment by a 10% 
for this year, so that the housing sector can contribute 0.5-1 percentage point to 
the GDP growth” (Xie 2009: 55) 
 
Thus one key question for policy makers to address through the 1990s was that if 
commodity housing was to replace the old system, what does “commodity housing” exactly 
mean? In other words, what role will the government play in the new housing regime? How 
will the majority of the urban population obtain access to housing?  
44 
 
Interestingly, both in 1994 and more explicitly in 1998, the central government 
conceived a mixed housing regime that consisted of commercial housing and social 
housing. The commercial housing was supposed to target only the high-income group and 
the housing price would be subject to market forces. Social housing was supposed to target 
the majority of the urban population (middle and low-income groups).The government 
would offer preferential land and tax policy for social housing development, and would 
enforce price control to ensure its affordability. For example, unlike in the case of 
commercial housing, the government would not charge social housing projects for land-
use rights(State Council of the People’s Republic of China 1998). Social housing was thus 
roughly divided into two categories: economical housing and public rental housing. For 
economical housing the profit margin was set to 3% of the construction cost (State Council 
of the People’s Republic of China 1998) and the ownership is shared between the 
homebuyer and the government, and certain restrictions are imposed on its resale to the 
market. Public-rental housing was supposed to go to the lowest-income urban households 
living with housing deficit as a form of social assistance, with governments being 
responsible for making plans of social housing development according to the housing 
demand, and to subcontract the project to developers in public auction (State Council of 
People’s Republic of China 1998). In theory, this model sought to reconcile the conflicts 
between “housing as commodity” and “housing as a social right” (Bao 2015).  
However, since 1998 both the central government and local governments 
prioritized the promotion of commercial housing development. For the central government 
the new housing regime aimed to continue playing a role as a powerful stimulus to GDP 
growth. From the 1990s, local governments also became increasingly entrepreneurial to 
promote urban development, and had extracted enormous fiscal revenues from real estate 
development (Xie 2009: 115). 34  These revenues were critical resources for local 
governments to finance their infrastructure projects (discussed later in Chapter 4). In 
contrast, local authorities could not obtain the same economic benefits from developing 
                                                          
34 Chapter 4 will discuss this issue in more detail.  
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affordable housing. In the first years following the 1998 housing reform, government 
overlooked issues such as housing accessibility, equality and affordability, as its housing 
agenda was dominated by the macroeconomic and the fiscal concerns, and as the 
government largely reduced its role as social provider. Policy initiatives that could have 
better addressed the housing affordability issue, such as housing cooperatives, self-building 
and affordable housing projects were marginalized.  
In 2003, the central government issued the Circular of the State Council on 
Promoting the Continuous and Healthy Development of the Real Estate Markets, which 
finally discarded the mixed housing regime and claimed that the commercial housing 
should be the predominant form of housing provision. Most families are now expected to 
purchase or rent commercial housing, and document defined the real estate sector as the 
“backbone industry of the national economy” (State Council of the People’s Republic of 
China 2003). Similar to 1998, the 2003 housing policy had much to do with the economic 
situation: the outbreak of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic in 2002 
was a severe blow to the economy, especially in the service sector, and at the time 
economists anticipated that the SARS epidemics could cost the GDP growth 0.5-1 
percentage point in 2003 (Xie 2009: 120). Meanwhile, the central government also took 
the conjuncture to further trigger the potential effective demand for commercial housing, 
by fostering rapid urban growth and urban redevelopment, and by encouraging household 
demand for improving housing condition etc. [Xie 2009: 125]). 
Social housing (both the economical housing and public rental housing) was 
officially reduced to a form of assistance to the low-income sector living with housing 
deficit. Not surprisingly, from 2002 to 2007, the production of economical housing 
declined both in absolute terms and in relative terms: while 28.2% of the housing units 
produced in 2000 were economical housing, this number fell to only 8.1% in 2007 (Figure 
2.10). By 2006, the public rental housing for the lowest income urban population had been 
established in 512 of the 657 cities, but only covered 547 thousand households in total or 
a mere 1,068 households per city (Ministry of Construction 2007). This was in sharp 
contrast to commercial housing development. 
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Figure 2.10: Social Housing Production in China (Economical Housing): 2000-
2007 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2011) 
 
2.3.2. Housing Reform Embedded in Broad Social Changes  
 
The housing reform that initiated in the 1980s in China should be viewed under the 
larger picture of a shift of the accumulation regime in China. In two decades the old planned 
economy based on command and public ownership was replaced by a mixed economy, and 
the market predominates as the mechanism of resource allocation. While the State holds a 
firm commitment to globalization and industrial upgrading, it no longer seeks to control 
the entire economy via an omnipresent public sector, but rather to control various strategic 
sectors while seeking to make and implement general social and economic development 
plans often around the launch of key investment projects.   
The CPC has converted its source of legitimacy from leading the proletarian 
revolution and defending the national independence to promoting economic development, 
raising the living standard of the mass and nationalism (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005, 
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Ma 2009, Li 2017). In this context, the GDP growth rate soon became an obsession for 
both the central and the local leaderships. Technocrats closely monitored the three 
components of the GDP (expenditure approach): consumption, investment and net 
exportation. Export-oriented industries became an important pillar of the economy in late 
1990s, particularly after China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 after 
which the economy became increasingly inserted into and dependent on the global market. 
Consumption is no longer viewed negatively as previously under the planned economy. 
Investment has been increasingly a useful tool for the government, and thus shows a strong 
countercyclical character: investment went through a big surge when net exportation 
significantly decelerated in 1985, 1993, 2001, 2003 and 2009, so that the annual GDP 
growth rate sustained at a high level (see Figure 2.11). The real estate sector, thus, 
consolidated its role as an economic engine.  
Finally, the State also radically modified its role in social reproduction of labor. As 
the export-oriented industries are labor intensive, internal migration, especially rural-to-
urban migration, was no longer forbidden. 35  However, local governments used the 
household registration regime to restrict its social provision to the registered residents of 
the city and the public sector reduced its long-term commitment in social provision. 
Economic efficiency and competitiveness are prioritized, and work units no longer act as 
                                                          
35 Due to the decreasing role of work units in housing development and allocation, labor mobility 
tied to the public sector declined and became increasingly linked to the private sector. Iyer et al. 
(2009) found that housing privatization explained about 25% of the increase in labor mobility to 
the private sector between 1986 and 2005. Wang (2012) reached similar conclusions.    
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a social provider. Social provision in urban China has changed from one of being somewhat 
superficial and limited but universal, to one of assistance aimed at fixing the market failure. 
 
Figure 2.11: Contribution of Consumption, Investment and Net Exportation to GDP 
Growth (Percentage Points) 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2008, 2017) 
 
2.3.3. Consequences of the Housing Reform  
 
The housing reform since 1980 has generated several important consequences. It 
largely frees the State and work units from the financial burden of housing provision. The 
private sector has actively participated in the real estate economy. The number of real estate 
enterprises increased from 24,378 in 1998 (China Real Estate Statistical Yearbook 2017, 
Table 19-2) to 94,948 in 2016. Among them, 3,087 were joint-stock companies and 40,482 
were private companies of various kinds (calculated by the author, according to China Real 
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Estate Statistical Yearbook 2017, Table 1-2).36 It is important to note that the participation 
of foreign capital in China’s real estate sector was marginalized in recent years as the 
government implemented tight restriction on foreign capital from entering in Chinese real 
estate market in 2006, not least since the domestic capital market was already seen as 
overheated (Junhe Law Firm 2016).  
Housing supply increased dramatically, and general housing conditions were 
significantly improved (Figure 2.10). Per capita floor space increased from 22.36 sq. m. in 
2000 to 30.33 sq. m. in 2010 (not including vacant dwellings, see Liu et al. 2013). The 
meaning of housing was transformed from a public good to that of a commodity and the 
regime of private property rights was established and consolidated. In 2010, 78.95% of the 
urban housing in the country was classified as private (higher than countries like the US, 
Germany or France [ibid]). Housing became the most important asset for most urban 
Chinese households and the real estate sector became one of the major growth poles in the 
national economy, rising from 2.1% of GDP in 1980 to almost 6.5% by 2015 (Figure 2.12).  
 
Figure 2.12: Contribution of the Real Estate Sector to GDP 
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2017) 
                                                          
36 Real estate companies in which the private party holds the relative majority of the capital stock 
contributed 60% of the investment in the real estate sector in 2016 (calculated by the author, China 
Real Estate Statistical Yearbook 2017, Table 2-9).  
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However, the challenges remain enormous particularly given that the housing 
reform in China does not benefit all sectors. Using the 2000 census data, Logan et al. (2009) 
found that the biggest winners in the housing reform were those who were favored in the 
previous system, based on such factors as residence status, education and occupation. 
Wang and Murie (2000) reached similar conclusions that leaders, managers and 
professionals in the public sector benefited the most, while industrial workers saw less 
gains.  
Scholars and real estate professionals in general agree that housing affordability in 
China has deteriorated since the 1998 housing reform. However there is no consensus about 
whether this represents a real estate bubble. Empirical research has attributed the 
deterioration of housing affordability to factors such as economic fundamentals, 
demographic change (e.g. urbanization), structure of the housing regime  especially land 
costs etc., all are seen as partly responsible for the overvaluation of housing. Moreover, it 
is important to take into consideration the significant variation among cities in housing 
affordability: while in first and second tier cities an “affordability crisis” is occurring, in 
many small and medium cities the housing market is characterized as over-supply.  
Housing options for low-income urban population mainly consist of the following: 
first, those who are “registered” in the city may live in a public rental dwelling since the 
pre-reform era (such dwellings may have been privatized or not), and may also qualify to 
apply for housing assistance programs offered by local government, such as social housing. 
The second option is cheap private rental housing. For example, as cities expand fast, some 
former villages are now encircled in the built-up area of the city, and villagers have 
subdivided their dwellings as cheap rental housing (Bach 2010; Hao et al. 2010; Liu et al. 
2011). Third, factories and construction sites often offer temporary accommodation such 
as dormitories.37 It is important to note that, in contrast to most Latin American countries, 
                                                          
37 Migrant workers who are not “registered” in the city usually do not qualify for housing assistance 
and in general they live in precarious housing condition and lack tenure security. According to a 
national survey on migrant workers in 2016, 135.9 million people from rural areas migrated to and 
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self-built housing is not a major housing type in most Chinese cities. The government in 
general does not view informal or self-built housing as a long-term housing solution in 
urban areas; where it exists it has been increasingly the target for resident relocation and 
redevelopment. Marginalized groups, especially rural migrant workers, are structurally and 
institutionally excluded from the housing market and housing subsidies. This situation is 
embedded in the exclusionary economic and urbanization model of the country (Chen 2009, 
Li 2002).38  
 
2.4. Current Housing Policies  
 
Currently, the government actively intervenes in the housing sphere, along three 
main policy lines: i) intervention in the commercial housing market; ii) housing provident 
fund, and iii) through social housing development. This section will outline these three 
policy components.  
 
2.4.1. Government Intervention in Commercial Housing Market 
 
Concerning the commercial housing market, the government does not want to see 
dramatic fluctuations of the real estate sector in terms of investment and housing price. The 
macroeconomic performance is at the core of the government housing policy agenda: a 
sudden fall in the investment in the real estate sector can decelerate economic growth and 
cause a decline in government revenues. On the other hand, the government is clearly aware 
that the speculation in the real estate market and deteriorating housing affordability can 
                                                          
were currently working in the city. Among them, 61% lived in a private rental housing, 13.4% lived 
in the accommodation provided by employer, and 16.5% purchased their own dwelling. Less than 
3% of them had received access to social housing (economic housing or public rental housing) 
(NBSC 2016).    
38 Chapter 4 will discuss the low-income population’s housing access and exclusion in detail, 
through the case study of Nanjing.  
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lead to financial and macroeconomic risks39 and social discontent. Tan and Lou (2012) 
documented how housing policy is made and implemented in China in the 2000s: often, 
several ministries 40  jointly issue general policy guidelines on behalf of the central 
government. Subnational governments are responsible for making and implementing 
concrete measures accordingly.  
The following five categories of measures are often applied to regulate and 
influence the commercial housing market (also see E-House China 2012, Ren 2017): 
• Mortgage and loan policies: government may ask banks and housing 
provident funds to adjust interest rates and down-payment requirements for home 
mortgages. To discourage speculative home buying, mortgage terms are often harsher to 
non-first-time buyers.  
• Fiscal measures: different from many other countries, China has not 
established property tax for private housing (though pilot projects have been launched in 
cities like Chongqing and Shanghai [Xinhuanet 2015]). However, the government can 
adjust tax and fees on housing transactions. Government can also use monetary and bank 
policies will to influence the housing market, though often indirectly.       
• Land policy: since all urban land in China is public, the government 
monopolizes the land supply for urban and housing development. Land policy is a key tool 
with which government can influence housing market. Government not only decides the 
amount of land for housing development each year, but also the relative weight of each 
housing category. For example, in 2006, to promote the development of small and medium 
sized housing, despite the discontent among real estate developers, the central government 
established a “90/70” policy; that is, each year, 70% of the land for construction should be 
destined to housing units under 90 sq. m. (China News Service 2015).      
                                                          
39 Among scholars and policy makers in China, there is a concern that the Chinese real estate sector 
is replicating what occurred in during the Japanese asset price bubble in late 1980s and early 1990s 
(Shao and Wang 2003; Xie and Lai 2014).  
40  These often include the Ministry of Housing Construction and Rural-Urban development, 
Ministry of Land and Resources and Ministry of Finance.  
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• Administrative measures: when housing price rises too fast, some local 
governments impose restrictions on who can buy housing or how many properties that an 
individual can buy. For example, the municipal government of Beijing ordered that 
unmarried individuals with household registration of the city would be forbidden from 
buying a second home, and that bank loans should be denied for any purchase of a third 
home (General Office of the Municipal People's Government of Beijing 2013).  
• Social housing: social housing development is supposed to influence the 
dynamics of commercial housing development as well. Social housing not only has an 
impact on the supply and demand in the commercial housing market, but also intends to 
fix the market failure.  
Some of the policy tools target the demand side (such as loan and mortgage policy); 
while others target the supply side (particularly land policy). These measures often address 
short and medium term policy goals (such as the growth rate of the investment in the real 
estate sector or of the housing price). Whether they are implemented or not, or how 
rigorously they are implemented, are largely at the government’s discretion. For example, 
similar to what happened in the 1997 financial crisis, in response to the 2008 global 
economic crisis the government resorted to the real estate sector to increase investment and 
stimulate the economy. Restrictions on home mortgages and bank loans were largely 
loosened to incentivize the effective housing demand (Yuan 2009, E-House 2012).  
When it comes to improving the housing affordability, the toolkit of housing policy 
has not been effective. Not only a lot of the policies contain loopholes and are thus not 
easily enforceable; but also, housing affordability has to do with a set of structural factors, 
such as the monetary and the land policy, pace of urbanization etc. Ultimately, the 
government holds an ambiguous and contradictory attitude towards housing price: it has 
made some efforts to improve the housing affordability, but it also relies on the real estate 
to achieve its goals in fiscal revenues and economic growth.    
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2.4.2. Housing Provident Fund 
 
The housing provident fund (HPF) program which forms the second major policy 
line examined here was first experimented in Shanghai in 1991 and then promoted to all 
cities from 1994. Under this regime both the employee and his/her employer are required 
to contribute 5-12% of the employee’s monthly salary to the employee’s HPF account. The 
HPF programs are organized locally and cities run their own HPF programs. Employees 
can withdraw the deposit from their accounts or apply for low-interest loans to buy, repair 
or rent housing. They are also allowed to withdraw their HPF savings when they retire 
(Yeung and Howes 2006). By 2016, there were 342 HPF programs nationwide, covering 
about 131 million employees. Besides financing housing buying, in recent years, local 
governments also use the fund to finance social housing development (Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development et al. 2017).  
China’s HPFs were originally established to facilitate the urban population to get 
access to housing finance, and thus, to stimulate housing consumption and foment the 
private housing market (Gu et al. 2015). By 2016, the HPF programs had issued 28.27 
million loans (Ministry of Housing and Rural Development et al. 2017). However, they are 
also widely criticized for low efficiency of governmental use of the funding, and as well as 
its negative impacts on housing inequality (Chen 2010). So far, only 19% of the private 
sector companies are affiliated to the housing provident fund (MOHURD 2013). In 
particular, empirical research has shown that the HPF programs have not improved housing 
affordability. The amount of an HPF loan that a beneficiary can obtain is determined by 
factors such as monthly income, monthly contribution to the HPF, and remaining labor 
years before retiring. As a result, high income populations can obtain larger loan amounts 
and thus, receive more subsidies in interest payment. In fact, rather than expanding housing 
finance to the low-income groups, the HPF program subsidized those who already get 
access to commercial housing, which further raised the housing price (Gu et al. 2015). Not 
surprisingly, in 2016, 64% of loans that year were assigned to beneficiaries whose income 
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was above the local average, and 69% of the loans were to finance dwellings larger than 
90 sq. m. (Ministry of Housing and Rural Development et al. 2017).  
 
2.4.3. Social Housing Development 
 
The 1998 housing reform established a social housing system. Chapter 4 will 
discuss in detail the development of the social housing regime in China, through a specific 
case study – that of Nanjing. In this section, I will present some major features of this 
housing regime, particularly its development process, financing, and some recent policy 
innovations. 
The government plays a major role in social housing development, especially in its 
planning, financing, land allocation and the assignation of social housing units. That said, 
governments do not directly construct social housing projects, though. The construction is 
delegated to developers, mainly through three approaches (also see Zhang 2012):  
• Construction management mode: local government is in charge of obtaining 
finance for social housing project, and subcontract the project to developer. The 
government owns the completed social housing units, and the developer will earn a small 
profit (the profit margin is set to a percentage of the construction cost).  
• Tie-in construction mode: local government establishes that developers 
should construct a certain amount of social housing units (for example, 10% of the floor 
area) in their commercial housing projects. This is usually set as a precondition when the 
government holds public auction of land use rights. In this mode, it is the developer, not 
the government, who has to finance social housing construction, though government still 
offers fiscal and other types of preferential policy.  
• Build-transfer (BT) mode: government holds public auctions to contract the 
social housing project to developers. The developer will need to finance the project, 
although the government provides land and does not charge for land use rights, and 
guarantees to buy the completed housing units at a controlled price.  
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For developers, it is generally agreed that social housing development is much less 
profitable than commercial housing. However, there will still be some indirect benefits for 
developers, particularly by actively engaging in social housing construction, whereby the 
developer can reinforce its link to local government, which will facilitate its future 
commercial housing development in the jurisdiction.  
Social housing development in China can be divided into two phases. In the first 
period (1998-2006), although the 1998 housing reform established that social housing 
would target the majority of the urban population (except the high-income group), in 
practice, the government prioritized commercial housing development. However as noted 
earlier, by 2003 when the government claimed that commercial housing should be the 
major component of the housing system, social housing had been marginalized in the 
government agenda. In 2006, 512 out all 657 cities in the country have established the 
public rental housing, but only covered 547,000 households (Wen 2011).  
In the second period (2007-present), the central government has made considerable 
efforts to seriously promote social housing. This was partly driven by the social discontent 
caused by the deteriorating housing affordability. More importantly, social housing was 
part of the stimulus plan in response to the 2008 global financial crisis. Later, in its Twelfth 
Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), the central government launched an ambitious social housing 
development campaign, and proposed to build 36 million social housing units nationwide– 
a goal that was met according to official statistics.   
In the social housing regime, two important changes since 2007 deserve particular 
attention. First, urban redevelopment usually in downtown areas has been closely related 
to social housing development, which will be discussed in more detail in the case study of 
Nanjing. Second, driven by a critical reflection on the housing policy that has over-
emphasized homeownership, the government decided to diversify the typology of social 
housing, and particularly to increase the weight of public rental housing in the social 
housing regime. Until recently, public rental housing was supposed to target the lowest 
income groups. In recent years, public rental housing no longer exclusively targets the 
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lowest income strata, but has extended to groups such as recent college graduates, young 
professionals and lower-middle income families who do not have the resource to purchase 
a home, as well as migrant workers who are not “registered resident” of the city. However, 
most of these policy initiatives are still in the initial phase of implementation.  
Compared to the affordable housing development in the 1990s, recent social 
housing development has made some advance in terms of diversifying sources of 
investment. Though the government still relies heavily on its fiscal funding and bank loans 
to finance social housing projects, it has also experimented and promoted other funding 
sources, such as social security funds, housing provident fund, municipal bonds, net-profit 
from the leases of land use rights, public-private partnership (PPP), and financial tools 
(such as Real Estate Investment Trusts [REITs] and securitization of public rental housing). 
Even so, these efforts have only produced limited success.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
This chapter has reviewed the evolution of China’s housing development and 
housing policy. It is clear that the housing policy is closely related to the government’s role 
in the regime of accumulation and social reproduction of labor. Under the planned 
economy (1950s-late 1970s), public rental housing predominated in the urban housing 
regime. This was a result of the regime of accumulation that prioritized the heavy industry 
and used command and economic plans as mechanism of resource allocation, as well as 
the role of the public sector as the most important social provider. The housing reform 
through the 1980s and 1990s was originally a response to the severe housing crisis of the 
time, in which the government simply did not have resource to meet the housing demand. 
Yet, the market orientation of the housing reform was consolidated in the 1990s and 
housing reform was embedded in the broad social, economic and political transformation 
of the country. It became an indispensable component for (1) the transformation of the role 
of the public sector in social reproduction of labor, (2) the transformation of the 
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urbanization model of the country to a “growth machine”, and (3) the establishment of 
GDP growth as the development goal of the Chinese government.  
By 2003, when the government finally announced that commercial housing was the 
main component of the housing regime, the commercial housing market had effectively 
ruled out several alternatives, such as housing cooperatives, self-building, work units 
acting as housing provider, social housing, etc. The market and home ownership 
established their hegemony in housing provision as the government successfully turned the 
real estate sector into a machine of economic growth and finance. Housing affordability 
and access soon deteriorated, and has caused significant social discontent. It was not until 
2007 when the government re-emphasized the importance of social housing and the recent 
social housing boom, together with other policy tools such as direct intervention in the 
commercial housing market and housing provident funds, suggests that the government has 
upgraded the real estate sector into what I call a “growth machine 2.0”. In this new housing 
regime, the government use social housing to stimulate the economy, to fix the market 
failure and appease social discontent, to influence the demand side of the commercial 
housing market.  
As in the case of 1998 (when work units as housing provider was ended), 2003 
(which confirmed the domination of commercial housing), and 2008 (with the campaign 
of social housing development), the housing policy agenda in the past two decades has 
been dominated by macroeconomic concerns as the central government seeks to meet its 
macroeconomic goals by triggering or suppressing housing demand and investment. Social 
problems associated with housing, such as housing inequality and access, concentration of 
poverty etc., receded to a secondary place. To make the housing regime more inclusive will 
require structural changes such as reducing the dependency on real estate economy.  
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Chapter 3: Housing Policy in Mexico: 1950-2015 
 
This chapter has two purposes: first, I will review the evolution of housing policy 
in Mexico between 1950 and 2015, and highlight the national-level factors that triggered 
the social housing boom in the 2000s and 2010s. Second, I will compare the housing policy 
in China and in Mexico (1950-2015), and discuss how the historical development of 
housing policy informs us about the variation in policy options at critical junctures. 41 
Mexico’s Housing policy in the second half of the twentieth century was the 
product of the post-Revolutionary state formation project (political corporatism) and the 
industrialization model (import-substitution industrialization, ISI). As the ISI model 
became exhausted in late 1970s, the economy fell into a severe economic crisis in 1982. 
Mexico’s housing policy also went through a paradigmatic shift, as part of the 
reorganization of the economic, social and political pact. The new housing policy centers 
on facilitating the participation of private capital and the expansion of primary and 
secondary mortgage markets, through deregulation and institutional development. The 
mortgage boom in the 1990s and 2000s triggered a social housing boom that mainly 
targeted the low-income working class.         
China and Mexico initiated their State-led industrialization roughly in the mid-20th 
century. In the eve of the State-led industrialization, Chinese cities and Mexican cities 
shared a similar urban housing regime in terms of residential tenures. Housing policies 
during the state-led industrialization reflected the calculation of cheapening the cost of 
social reproduction of labor, as well as to maintain social control over the masses. However, 
the different approaches to industrialization and the different state formation processes led 
to different housing policy approaches in the two countries. In Mexico, self-help informal 
settlements soon became the main form of housing access for the low-income urban 
                                                          
41 For major political and economic events in Mexico since the 20th century, please see Table 3.1. 
For a brief timeline of the urban and housing development in Mexico between 1950s and 2010s, 
see Table 3.2.   
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working class, while a small social housing stock benefited workers in several key 
economic sectors. In China, the socialist public rental housing predominated in the urban 
housing stock.  
Both China and Mexico launched market-oriented housing reform in the 1980s and 
1990s. In the 2000s and 2010s, both reforms led to a significant expansion of social housing 
that targeted the urban low-income housing. However, social housing development took a 
market-centered approach in Mexico, and a government-centered approach in China. This 
chapter argues that the variation in policy options has much to do with the variation in the 
pre-reform housing regime.  
 
Table 3.1. Major Political and Economic Events in Mexico since the 20th Century 
Year Event  
1910-1920 Mexican Revolution 
1929 The founding of the National Revolutionary Party (later renamed 
as the Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI) 
1934-1940 The Lázaro Cárdenas Administration: aggressive agrarian reform, 
nationalization of the petroleum industry 
1942 Mexico joined the Allied Forces in the WWII. 
1940s-1980s  Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI): channeling investment 
to the manufacturing sector by exporting raw materials and 
agricultural products, aimed at eventually establishing an 
autonomous and complete industrial system. The ISI was 
launched with the active state leadership and participation and the 
domestic industry highly protected. Annual GDP growth rate 
between 1960 and 1980: 7.18% (constant 2010 US$).  
1968 Tlatelolco Massacre  
1982 The Mexican 1982 Debt Crisis 
1980s-  Neoliberal transformation, characterized as deregulation, 
insertion into the global market, privatization, stimulating private 
investment. Annual GDP growth rate between 1980 and 2015: 
2.39% (constant 2010 US$).   
1986 The admission of Mexico to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT, later reorganized to become the WTO) 
1988 The creation of the conditional cash transfer program “Solidarity” 
1994 The implementation of NAFTA 
The Zapatista Uprising  
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The Mexican Peso Crisis 
2000 End of PRI's 71-year uninterrupted rule, with the National Action 
Party (PAN) winning the 2000 Presidential Election.  
2008 The Global Financial Crisis 
(Source: the author’s own elaboration; GDP data: World Bank Open Data) 
 
Table 3.2: Evolution of Urban and Housing Policy in Mexico: 1950s-2010s 
Year Event   
1940s-1980s A corporatist approach to housing development: selectively 
tolerating and supporting self-built, informal settlements; rent 
control in certain areas of the city; and supporting formal housing 
development for a small part of the formal working class.   
Large scale rural-to-urban migration and rapid urbanization from 
1940s to 1970s.  
1942- mid 1980s Rent control in certain areas in Mexico City  
1954 Founding of INVI, the country's first agency specialized in 
targeting housing deficit.  
1963 The creation of the Housing Finance Program (PFV), which 
channeled resources from commercial banks and international 
agency to social housing development.   
1971 The creation of CORETT, agency at the federal level that 
regularizes and formalizes informal settlements.    
1972 The creation of major agencies of solidarity funds, including 
INFONAVIT, FOVISSSTE and FOVIMI  
1976 Promulgation of the General Law of Human Settlements.  
1981 The creation of FOHNAPO, agency specialized in supporting 
housing development in the informal sector 
1983 Access to decent housing became a constitutional right.  
1990s- A neoliberal approach to housing development: encouraging 
private investment in housing development, deregulating urban 
and housing development, eliminating anti-market practices in 
housing development, creating new institutional frameworks and 
financial infrastructures for housing investment; expansion of 
housing finance to low-income urban population. 
Rural-to-urban migration declined significantly since 1980s; 
consolidation of metropolitan areas.     
1992 Reform of INFONAVIT, from an agency that led housing 
production to one specialized in housing finance.  
Modification of the Article 27 of the Constitution, which lift the 
ban on the same of the ejidal land.  
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2001 The creation of CONAFOVI (later renamed CONAVI) to 
accommodate diverse housing agencies and programs.   
The creation of the Sociedad Hipotecaria Federal (SHF)  
(Source: the author’s own elaboration) 
 
3.1. 1950-1972: Housing Policy as a Tool of Political Corporatism  
 
This section discusses the initial period of housing policy (1950-1972) for the urban 
low-income working class in Mexico, under the model of Import Substitution 
Industrialization. Although the government established policy regarding rental housing and 
affordable housing, self-help, informal housing was the predominant form of low-income 
housing access to accommodate the fast-growing urban population. I will document how 
political corporatism is the key character of Mexico’s housing policy in this period, and 
what legacy it left for later years.  
During President Ávila Camacho’s administration (1940-1946),42 Mexico initiated 
a wave of rapid industrialization and economic growth that lasted almost four decades. 
Like elsewhere in Latin America, a development strategy called “import substitution 
industrialization” (ISI) was implemented in Mexico. That is, in order to modernize and 
break out the world division of labor, countries that traditionally were specialized in 
exporting primary products and raw materials channeled investments towards 
manufacturing industry, in order to replace the previously imported manufactured goods 
with domestically produced ones, and to satisfy the demand of the domestic market (Baer 
1972). The ISI usually sought to follow an upgrading path from non-durable consumer 
goods to durable consumer goods, and finally to intermediary and capital goods (Aspra 
1977). Annual growth rate of real GDP in Mexico was 5.7% between 1950 and 1960 (6.1% 
                                                          
42 Mexico’s president is limited to a six-year single term, and no re-election is allowed.  
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for the manufacturing sector), and 7.1% between 1960 and 1970 (9.1% for the 
manufacturing sector, see Aspra 1977: Table 1).43 
The industrialization under the ISI led to a rapid rural-urban migration in the 1940s. 
Since then, the country witnessed an unprecedented wave of rural-to-urban migration and 
urbanization. Mexico’s urban population increased from 42.7% of the total population in 
1950 to 59% in 1970 (UNPD 2014). Meanwhile, Mexico City consolidated its hegemony 
in the country’s urban system, and had concentrated a great proportion of the country’s 
industrial, financial and educational resources. It was estimated that in 1970, Mexico 
concentrated 82% of the country’s wholesale business, 54% of the country’s telephones 
and 43% of the investment in manufacturing (Ramírez Vázquez 1978). All this, of course, 
caused an enormous challenge to urban housing, particularly for the low-income 
population for the country’s major cities. Between 1950 and 1972, Mexico gradually 
developed its housing policy, which was based on three main components: policy of rental 
housing, support to self-built settlements and government-supported housing production 
and financing for the working class.  
 
3.1.1. Selective Rent Control  
 
The Post-Revolutionary government took pro-tenant policy as a pragmatic response 
to the increasing urban housing deficit and the deterioration of the housing affordability, 44 
                                                          
43 While in 1950, the primary sector, the manufacturing industry and the service sector respectively 
produced 19%, 17% and 55% of the GDP, in 1982, these numbers changed to 9%, 25% and 57% 
(EHM 2014, Table 8.2, calculated by the author). 
44 Prior to the 1940s, population growth in large urban areas was accommodated mainly through 
the intensified use of the existing urban housing structure, that is, private rental housing (Perló 
Cohen 1979). For example, in tandem with increasing economic and spatial inequalities, the elites 
left their properties in the historical center of the city for the new, suburban neighborhoods. Those 
old elite buildings that they left behind were subdivided into rental units and converted into 
vecindades. These vecindades were often characterized by shared service, precarious conditions, 
deterioration and insecurity, but they were one of the only affordable housing options for the low-
income working class (Eckstein 1990, Quiroz Mendoza 2013).   
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as well as to make alliance with the tenant sector. The most famous and influential case of 
pro-tenant policy was the rent freeze implemented in Mexico City from 1942 when the 
country joined in the Allied Forces in the WWII. This policy was in force until mid-1980s 
(Gilbert and Varley 1991).  
That said, the federal government had no intention to eliminate private property. 
The implementation of the rent control in large cities was selective by only targeting certain 
types of rental dwellings in certain areas, thus achieving to divide, appease and co-opt both 
the landlord sector and the tenant sector (Perló Cohen 1979). By 1961, the rent freeze in 
Mexico City affected 13% of all homes in Mexico, and by 1976, this proportion fell to 1% 
(Gilbert and Varley 1991: 55). The rent control policy was criticized for creating a juridical 
environment that discouraged the private investment in rental housing, which also led to 
further deterioration of the existing housing stock and the underdevelopment of rental 
housing in Mexico (CIDAC 1990, Quiroz Mendoza 2013).  
However, it is important to note that, although homeownership rapidly increased 
with the proliferation of self-built settlements, rental housing in Mexico continued to be an 
important form of housing access. In 1950, among Mexican cities with population over 
100,000, only Culiacán, Matamoros and Merida had a majority of owner-occupied homes; 
in Mexico City, only 25% of the dwellings were occupied by owners (Gilbert and Varley 
1991: 29, 30). Even by 1970, large cities such as Mexico City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, 
Puebla and Veracruz were still predominantly rental cities (Gilbert and Varley 1991: Table 
3.1).  
 
3.1.2. Government-Supported Housing Production 
 
After WWII, numerous agencies of the public sector were established to support 
formal housing development for the working class, namely the National Housing Institute 
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(INVI) and the Housing Finance Program (PFV).45 The INVI was created in 1954 to 
become the first public agency specialized in housing policy for low-income population 
and to coordinate the housing actions of the diverse agencies of the time (ASF 2012: 9), 
although it was not prominent compared to other agencies in terms of the number of credits 
issued. Between 1954 and 1970, the INVI issued about 14,400 credits, or about 8% of the 
total number of credits issued by the public sector (EHM 2014, Table 2.4).  
The PFV was created in 1963 by Mexico’s Secretariat of Finance and Public Credit 
(SHCP) and the Bank of Mexico. It also received a seed money of 30 million US dollars 
from international agencies including the Alliance for Progress, The United States Agency 
for International Development and Inter-American Development Bank (Connolly 1997). 
This financial scheme aimed to channel resources from private commercial banks to 
affordable housing (social-interest housing) development. The PFV defined social-interest 
housing based on its price (FOVI, unspecified year). 46 Under PFV, the Fund for Bank 
Operation and Discount (FOVI) was created. The program offered individual home 
mortgages and bridge loans to developers, as well as technical and financial support to 
social housing development. Compared to previous housing programs, FOVI enjoyed 
relatively wide and stable funding resources (CIDAC 1990: 37). In the 1960s and 1970s, 
FOVI contributed 7.8% of the new housing construction (Patiño 2006: 239, 240). That said, 
although FOVI made serious attempts to promote affordable housing development, 
                                                          
45 The public agency that supported urban housing development was established in 1925, namely 
the Programa de Crédito para Empleados Federales of the Dirección General de Pensiones Civiles 
y de Retiro, which offered its affiliates (mainly public functionaries) loans for housing construction 
and acquisition (Ley General de Pensiones Civiles de Retiro, Article 58-63). It was the only public 
agency that financed housing until 1947, and had issued 9,600 housing loans by then (Perló Cohen 
1979). Later, other agencies participated in supporting housing production, including social 
security agencies (IMSS, ISSSTE and military pensions), development banks (such as 
BANOBRAS), state enterprises (such as Ferrocarriles Nacionales, PEMEX, CFE) and local 
government (Department of the Federal District, DDF).    
46 For example, a social-interest housing project in Zone 1 (including 21 of the 31 states) should 
include 50% of dwellings priced under 118 thousand Pesos, 25% priced between 118 thousand and 
135 thousand Pesos, and 25% priced between 135 thousand and 161 thousand Pesos. Beneficiaries’ 
monthly income should not exceed 8,400 Pesos (FOVI [between 1976 and 1982]: Appendix 4).    
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Connolly (1997: 28) estimated that in general the beneficiaries were from the middle-
income group.  
In total, between 1947 and 1964, 121,200 credits were issued nationwide. Social 
security agencies (IMSS, ISSSTE and military pensions) alone issued 57,002, followed by 
BANOBRAS and PEMEX. The period between 1965 and 1970 witnessed a rapid increase 
in the number of the credits (119,179 credits in 5 years, almost as many as the previous 18 
years). BANOBRAS and FOVI combined to issue 74.4% of all the credits by the public 
sector, whereas the social security agencies almost entirely withdrew from housing finance 
(EHM 2014, Table 2.4).  
Some characteristics of these early policy attempts left deep influence on Mexico’s 
housing development. In terms of forms of support, some public rental housing projects 
were built. For example, the IMSS (Mexican Institute of Social Security) once constructed 
public rental housing for its affiliates and employees (ASF 2012: 8, 9). However, their 
existence was insignificant and ephemeral, mainly due to the impossibility of recovering 
investment. Despite the variations in institutional frameworks and technical details among 
the housing agencies, credit and mortgage became the more preferred and common form 
of government support to social housing development. Although the federal government 
also invested in housing agencies, these agencies obtained resources mainly through 
channeling resources of various origins (such as social security, savings in commercial 
banks, external supports etc.) to the housing sector. The fortune and impacts of these 
agencies largely depends on the abundance and sustainability of the resources that can be 
channeled. The government played a role of the mediator of different class/ sector interests.  
Government support to the formal housing production was under strong influence 
of political corporatism. It never sought to target the urban population based on some 
universal criteria such as income or housing need. Rather, it was organized in a highly 
sectorial and fragmented manner, and gave priority to sectors that were organized and were 
critical and loyal to the official party (including the bureaucrats, the army, and workers in 
key industries such as railway, electricity and petroleum). This was supposed to maintain 
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the political stability and the hegemony of the official party, as well as to create a favorable 
condition for capitalist accumulation and industrialization. Later, the creation of the PFV 
was supposed to extend the government support in housing to the urban middle class 
(CIDAC 1990: 37). That said, the housing demand of the majority of the urban proletariat 
had to be attended by policy of informal housing.  
 
3.1.3. Policy Regarding Self-Built Settlements47  
 
During the Ávila Camacho Administration (1940-1946), informal, self-built 
settlements became an increasingly important housing option for low-income urban 
dwellers (Perló Cohen 1979). When urbanization accelerated in 1940s, although the 
political stability and economic growth opened up opportunities for real estate investment 
(Gilbert and Varley 1991), the construction industry in the country was not apt for an 
industrialized production for the urban mass due to the dependency on the importation of 
construction materials, as well as the lack of mechanisms to finance housing projects for 
developers (Jaramillo and Schteingart 1983).  
In the metropolitan area of Mexico City, the proportion of the population that lived 
in the self-built settlements increased from 2.3% in 1947, to 32% in 1952, and 50% in 1970 
(Coulomb 1992: 92). Villar Calvo (2007: 574) estimated that the “formal sector” (public 
and private sectors combined) produced around 35% of the dwellings in Mexico between 
1951 and 1970, and the informal sector produced 65%.  
It is the informality in the land transactions and in the process of housing production 
that made self-help housing low-cost. Informal settlements were often established on 
public or communal land on the periphery of the cities, mainly through illicit land 
                                                          
47 Given that the focus of this chapter is policy regarding formal housing development for low-
income urban working class, the discussion on informal housing in this section is limited to its 
political economy. For readers who are interested in how informal settlements developed in Mexico 
and specific government policies for this housing sector, please refer to Appendix 1.  
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subdivision or, to less extent, through land invasion (Gilbert and Ward 1985). Such land 
was either unattractive to commercial developers or of little agricultural value (Coulomb 
1992: 91; Jaramillo and Schteingart 1983). The “informality” consists of the fact that these 
subdivisions often lacked proper titles, basic services and failed to meet the planning norms 
(Gilbert and Ward 1985: 86). That said, how the urban low-income population obtained 
land for self-building varied significantly among cities and may change over time, 
depending on factors such as land aptitude, land market dynamics and local state 
interventions (Gilbert and Ward 1985; Gilbert and Varley 1991).  
The rapid expansion of self-built, informal settlements in Mexico resulted from a 
combination of political and economic factors. Amid the crisis of rental housing and the 
almost-non-existence of social housing for the low-income working class, the government 
considered self-building as a pragmatic policy option to tackle the urban housing deficit. 
Indeed, the government was actively involved in monitoring and allocating the land 
(Gilbert and Ward 1981). Politicians saw informal settlements as a venue for clientelistic 
politics and use it to enforce political control over the mass. Demands such as legal 
recognition of the informal settlements and service delivery were often channeled and 
mediated by local political brokers, often in exchange for political loyalty (CIDAC 1990: 
38, 39, Eckstein 1990, Gilbert and Ward 1985, Perló Cohen 1979). The official party 
sought to maintain the settlers’ associations under its control through political patronage 
and denied some radical demands that could threaten the private property of the dominant 
class (Perló Cohen 1979). Although overall, political control over informal settlements was 
fairly effective until late 1960s (CIDAC 1990: 39), it did not offer a structural solution to 
address the deficit in infrastructure and service. Actually, confrontations occasionally 
occurred between the government and some settlers’ associations that took an independent 
position around issues such as evictions and regularization (Perló Cohen 1979). 
 
In sum, the government’s housing development agenda prior to 1972 was 
dominated by two major concerns: how to create a favorable condition for capital 
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accumulation under the ISI model, and how to maintain the political hegemony of the 
official party, the PRI. Since the beginning of State-led ISI, Mexico’s housing policy had 
heavily relied on self-help and informality to accommodate rapid growth of urban 
population. From a structuralist perspective, self-help housing (and the informal sector in 
general) reflects a symbiotic connection between the expansion of the modern capitalist 
sector and the rapid growth of urban population (Portes and Shauffler 1993, Jaramillo and 
Schteingart 1983). That is, the informal sector cheapens the expansion of the modern 
capitalist sector by providing low-cost goods and services for the formal sector. In this way, 
the housing demand of the low-income urban population was reduced to legal recognition 
of the land lot, as well as access to services (CIDAC 1990: 38), and the bourgeoisie takes 
advantage and suppress demand for higher wages (Burgess 1982, Ward 2012).  
Housing policy was also a component of the Post-Revolutionary state formation 
project in Mexico. It represents the State’s efforts in organizing and controlling the mass 
in a sectorial and clientelist fashion, and often emphasized the political loyalty of the 
beneficiaries to the official party. In the next two decades (1970s and 1980s), the 
corporatist paradigm of housing policy would be further consolidated and then go through 
a deep crisis, as the next section will discuss.     
 
3.2. 1972-1992: The Consolidation and Crisis of Political Corporatism   
 
This section discusses the housing policy development in Mexico between 1972 
and 1992, in which the State intervention in housing provision for the formal sector workers 
became more direct and active. I will highlight the roles of INFONAVIT, the major agency 
that led the construction of social housing for formal sector workers. Despite their limited 
scale, the INFONAVIT and other agencies of similar kind marked the consolidation and 
institutionalization of the corporatist approach to social development in Mexico under 
PRI’s rule. Yet, this approach entered into crisis during the country’s economic crisis in 
the 1980s.       
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3.2.1. Housing Policy under “Shared Development” in the 1970s: The Creation of 
INFONAVIT 
 
Since late sixties, the inherent contradictions of the ISI model deepened. Mexico 
kept advancing in industrialization and maintained a rapid economic growth in the 1970s, 
though inflation became a serious challenge (Figure 3.1). Meanwhile, Mexico’s rapid 
urbanization lasted until early 1980s. The proportion of Mexico’s total population 
classified as urban increased from 59% in 1970 to 66.3% in 1980, and urban population 
grew at an annual rate of 3.94%, higher than the annual growth rate of the total population 
(2.88% [UNPD 2014, calculated by the author]). Social indicators such as income 
distribution, life expectancy and infant mortality rates continued improving between 1970 
and 1982 (Rodríguez Kuri and González Mello 2015). That said, Mexico was far from 
achieving an autonomous industrial system as the ISI model originally envisioned. Similar 
to what happened in many other countries in the region, as the ISI advanced from non-
durable consumer goods to intermediary and capital goods, the industrialization also 
became increasingly expensive, and the Mexican economy became increasingly dependent 
on foreign capital and technology (Tutino 2011). Moreover, the global economic context 
of the 1970s was not favorable. External shocks such as the 1973 Oil Crisis negatively 
impacted the performance of the Mexican economy. In 1976, before the end of the 
Echeverría Administration, the Mexican Peso had its first devaluation in 22 years, from 
12.5 Pesos to 1 US Dollar to 24.5 Pesos to 1 US Dollar.  
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Figure 3.1: Mexico's Economic Growth and Inflation: 1961-1991 (%) 
(Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data 
files) 
 
The government prioritized economic growth at all costs in order to guarantee 
social and political stability. However, as the government was not able to implement an 
effective fiscal reform to better capture resources,48 it had to increasingly rely on fiscal 
deficit and foreign debts to finance economic development. As a result, different from the 
previous decade, Mexico kept a double-digit annual inflation rate through the 1970s, and 
the country’s external debt soared, even though the economy maintained a rapid growth 
rate between 1970 and 1982 (Rodríguez Kuri and González Mello 2015). The external debt 
of the country increased from 2.3% of the GDP in 1971 to 16.9% in 1982 (Rodríguez Kuri 
and González Mello 2015: 709).  
While the middle class and the formal-sector workers benefited the most from the 
ISI, the low-income population did not see their condition improved (Escobar Latapí and 
González de la Rocha 1995, Loaeza 2015). Influenced by the Cuban Revolution, the late 
                                                          
48 In 1970, Mexico’s budgetary expenditure was 13% of the country’s GDP, which was much lower 
compared to countries like Chile (22%), Venezuela (21%) and Brazil (20%). In the same year, 
Mexico’s tax collection was 7.2% of the GDP, also much lower than countries like South Africa, 
Peru and Turkey (Rodríguez Kuri and González Mello 2015: 708).  
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1960s and the 1970s witnessed a wave of independent social mobilizations, social unrest 
and urban guerrillas (Bennett 1993). The 1968 Tlatelolco Massacre was a huge blow to the 
legitimacy of the official party. It seems that the previous social and political pact was no 
longer able to sustain the capital accumulation. In this context, the Echeverría 
Administration (1970-1976) sought to expand government intervention in the economy, to 
allow certain extent of political opening, and to renew the social pact by showing a firm 
commitment to social justice and social development.49 The Echeverría Administration 
sought to further reinforce its political corporatism by creating a National Tri-Party 
Commission in 1971 (Echeverría Alvarez 1976). That is, the government acts as mediator 
of class interests, and works together with the capital and the unionized labor to address 
social problems.  
Housing policy was clearly a component of the “shared development” project. In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the housing policy was further consolidated with the implementation 
of several institutional and legislative frameworks, such as the General Law of Human 
Settlements, the National Housing Program of 1978, and the Federal Law of Housing 
(Puebla 2002: 42-46). Compared to previous decades, the public sector became more 
deeply involved in the housing development process: a variety of housing agencies and 
funds were created, and more stable and abundant resources were channeled to social 
housing development. The housing policy in this period showed a more pronounced 
commitment to supporting the low-income urban working class and alternative housing 
options such as self-help housing.  
Regarding policy related to self-built, informal housing, while the PRI was able to 
exercise political control quite effectively in many of the informal settlements in the 1960s, 
independent community organizations that refused to be co-opted by the official party 
gained considerable impetus in the 1970s (CIDAC 1990: 40). While the government had 
tacitly tolerated self-help housing as a pragmatic solution to the housing deficit since the 
                                                          
49 What is called “shared development”, see Alarcón and McKinley 1992, Rodríguez Kuri and 
González Mello 2015.  
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early stage of the rapid urbanization, in the 1970s, the government further institutionalized 
its support to this sector (Gilbert and Varley 1991: 48). This change occurred in a context 
of a general consensus in the academia and among policy makers that self-help housing 
could be a solution to the urban housing deficit and had its potential in consolidation and 
integration into the city.  
In 1972, the Echeverría Administration established two major national housing 
organizations, namely the Institute of the National Fund for Workers’ Housing 
(INFONAVIT) and the FOVISSSTE. 50  Later in 1976, the ISSFAM-FOVIMI was 
created.51 These three agencies, also called “solidarity funds”, are essentially compulsory 
saving programs. They require the employer to contribute a proportion of the employee’s 
monthly salary to the latter’s account (in the case of INFONAVIT, 5%). Affiliates of the 
solidarity funds can apply for mortgages and loans for housing acquisition, construction or 
improvement, or withdraw the savings from the account when retired. The INFONAVIT 
targeted the employees in private enterprises in the formal sector. The FOVISSSTE 
targeted the government employees and the ISSFAM-FOVIMI served the military. In this 
context, housing credits issued by the diverse housing agencies expanded rapidly: 807,691 
housing credits were issued between 1973 and 1981 (89,743 per annum), compared to 
240,979 credits between 1947 and 1970 (10,041 per annum, EHM 2014: Table 2.5). The 
three solidarity funds (INFONAVIT, FOVISSSTE and ISSFAM-FOVIMI) became leaders 
in issuing housing credits.  
 
3.2.2. The INFONAVIT 
 
Soon after its creation, the INFONAVIT became the most important housing 
agency in Mexico. It was established to target the housing deficit among the working class 
in the formal sector, to promote regional development, to stimulate the construction 
                                                          
50 Housing Fund of the Institute of Social Security and Services for State Workers. 
51 Fund for Military Housing of the Institute of Social Security for the Mexican Armed Forces.   
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industry and to create jobs. These goals were consistent with the expansionist economic 
policy of the Echeverría Administration. From the beginning, the INFONAVIT takes five 
lines of action:  
• Line-1 credit: to finance the construction of social housing projects;  
• Line-2 credit: (low-interest) mortgages for housing acquisition;  
• Line-3 credit: to finance self-building on the beneficiary’s own land; 
• Line-4 credit: to finance housing improvement or expansion;  
• Line-5 credit: Affiliates can use an INFONAVIT credit to pay off home 
mortgages contracted with other agencies.  
Although the INFONAVIT was originally established as an institution to finance 
housing acquisition, between 1973 and 1992, the major focus of the institute was to lead 
housing construction for its affiliates. For this reason, the number credits issued to finance 
housing projects (line-1 credits) was never below the 80% of the total number of credits 
issued (Graizbord and Schteingart 1998: 57). This was driven by the urgent need of 
increasing housing production: given the underdeveloped housing industry of the time, 
there were simply not sufficient amount of dwellings for affiliates to purchase with 
INFONAVIT credit (Del Carmen Pardo 2010, Puebla 2006, Silva-Herzog 2009). Acting 
as leader of housing production, the INFONAVIT was deeply involved in housing 
development process, including planning the housing projects, building its own land 
reserve, contracting constructors, providing technical support, promoting environment-
friendly construction materials, and community organization in its social-interest housing 
projects. It even carried out scientific research on construction materials and had its own 
brick factory (Silva-Herzog 2009, Del Carmen Pardo 2012).   
The INFONAVIT led housing construction in two approaches. The first was called 
“direct promotion”: the Institute was responsible for locating the housing compound, 
subcontracting its construction and supervising the execution of the project etc. The 
housing was allocated by random sampling but also took into account factors such as 
income level, housing need of the applicant etc. The other was the “external promotion”, 
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in which a representative of the unionized workers was in charge of the housing 
development process, and the INFONAVIT did no more than financing the project 
(Graizbord and Schteingart 1998). The direct promotion was the main form of housing 
promotion during the Echeverría Administration, but was replaced by external promotion 
in the 1980s, which signaled an increasing interference in the housing development and 
allocation from the (official) labor unions.  
Compared to other agencies of the time such as FOVI or INVI, the INFONAVIT 
succeeded in channeling wider and more stable resources to housing promotion (Del 
Carmen Pardo 2012). From the beginning, the INFONAVIT has four major funding 
sources: contribution from employers (5% of employee’s salary), mortgage repayment, the 
institute’s own investment, and funding support from the federal government. Between 
1972 and mid-1990s, employers’ contribution was the major revenue source for the 
INFONAVIT, while mortgage repayment was marginalized (Puebla 2006).  
Speaking to the corporatist nature of the INFONAVIT, its general assembly is 
formed by representatives from the government, from the entrepreneur sector and from the 
labor sector, so that the decision-making process followed the Tri-Party principle (Silva-
Herzog 2009). That said, as the Institute got deeply involved in housing production and 
allocation, it also became an easy venue for political patronage and corruption (Del Carmen 
2012). The government used short-term goals and statistics to showcase its social 
commitment,52 to make alliance with the organized labor and to reinforce its legitimacy. 
Powerful official unions such as the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers) and the 
CROM (Regional Confederation of Mexican Workers) soon converted the Institute into a 
tool for political patronage (Silva-Herzog 2009: 29, 30). As Vizcaino (1978) documented, 
                                                          
52  According Silva-Herzog (2009: 28), President Echeverría announced that the INFONAVIT 
would construct 100,000 housing units in its first year (He obtained this figure by simply dividing 
the funding that the Institute received that year [5,000 million Pesos] by the construction cost of 
each housing unit [50,000 Pesos], though both numbers were inaccurate). This figure was 
encouraging for the public opinion, given that the housing deficit at the time was estimated to be 
around 1 million units (Del Carmen Pardo 2012: 54). However, this goal was unrealistic: the peak 
of the amount of line-1 credits issued in a year was 77,653, in 1987.     
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the first director of the INFONAVIT, Silva-Herzog favored the “direct promotion” and 
insisted that “union affiliation” should not be a factor in the criteria for granting credit. Yet, 
when representatives of the official unions found that more than half of the Institute’s 
affiliates were either not unionized or members of independent unions, they boycotted 
Silva-Herzog’s policy and requested the housing allocation to favor affiliates of the official 
unions. Both President Echeverría and Silva-Herzog’s successor sided with the official 
unions, and the external promotion (under strict control by the official unions) prevailed as 
the main form of INFONAVIT housing promotion in the 1980s.       
 
3.2.3. The Crisis of Political and Social Pact in 1980s  
 
Although the discovery of an enormous oil reserve in 1976 produced a sudden 
exportation boom and attracted large amount of foreign investment for Mexico, the 
structural deficiency of the economic model remained unresolved. The López Portillo 
Administration (1976-1982) continued an expansionist approach to economic development, 
launching ambitious industrialization and infrastructure projects, as well as social 
programs (Rodríguez Kuri and González Mello 2015). However, the dependency on oil 
exportation and the soaring external debts placed the Mexican economy in a highly 
vulnerable position. By the end of the 1970s, in order to lower the inflation rates, the 
industrialized countries, including the US, tightened their monetary policy and raised 
interest rates, which worsened Mexico’s debt burden (Ocampo 2014). When the oil price 
in the international market dropped in 1982, Mexico ran out of foreign reserve to continue 
servicing its debt repayment obligations, which led to a severe economic crisis.  
Mexico’s economy suffered an enormous setback. Between 1982 and 1987, the 
country’s GDP experienced a negative annual growth (-0.1%), and annual inflation rate in 
this period soared to 113.5% (Graizbord and Schteingart 1998: 24, 27). The working class 
was particularly affected by the decline in real wages, the shrinking of formal sector 
employment and decrease in government social expenditures. Poverty rates in Mexico 
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raised from 52.5% of all the households in 1981 to 62.5% in 1988. The improvement in 
income distribution during the previous decades was lost (Escobar Latapí and González de 
la Rocha 1995). The impacts of the 1982 Crisis also extended to political sphere: the failure 
of the economic policy and the nationalization of commercial banks after the 1982 Crisis 
increased the tension with the entrepreneur sector, and the neoliberal shift of the official 
policy alienated an important sector within the official party, who formed the “Democratic 
Current”. Both the National Action Party and the Democratic Current posted an 
unprecedented challenge to the hegemony of the PRI, although the presidential candidate 
of the official party, Carlos Salinas won the controversial 1988 election.   
In the aftermath of the 1982 Crisis, under the requirement of the international 
financial agencies, Mexico had to discard the ISI model and make a painful transition 
towards a new regime of accumulation. An austerity plan was implemented and public 
enterprises were privatized. Since 1980s, Mexico embraced an export-oriented approach 
to economic growth, originally aimed at generating more hard currency. Maquiladoras 
proliferated in the country, especially in the northern Border States. The new economic 
model was consolidated by the country’s affiliation to the GATT in 1986. However, to 
make the export-oriented industry competitive in the global market, real wages were kept 
low, the union power was significantly reduced, and employment became increasingly 
precarious.  
Since 1980s, Mexico’s urbanization decelerated, with the proportion of the urban 
population increased from 66.3% in 1980 to 71.4% in 1990. The urban population grew at 
a much slower pace than the previous decade, now at 2.8% per annum (UNPD 2014, 
calculated by the author). The economic crisis and restructuring also impacted the 
hierarchy of the cities. The previous centripetal trend towards the primary city (Mexico 
City) was reverted, and new economic poles (such as the border cities where the 
maquiladora factories proliferated) experienced more notable growth (Rodríguez 
Hernandez and Olivera Lozano 2005).     
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Due to the inflation (For annual inflation rates of the 1980s, see Figure 3.2), the 
rapid increase of construction cost and the lower recovery rate, major housing agencies 
were soon decapitalized. In the case of the INFONAVIT, from 1972 to 1987, the credit 
issued by the institute was based on a fixed annual interest rate of 4% and for a period of 
15-20 years; each month, between 14% and 18% of the debtor’s salary would be discounted 
to repay the mortgage (Puebla 2006). However, as the annual inflation rate between 1982 
and 1988 reached 86%, the recovery of the credit was impossible. For example, for a credit 
granted to an affiliate whose earning equaled the minimum wage, the Institute could only 
recover 12% of the real value of its investment (Del Carmen 2010: 71). Actually, between 
1975 and 1986, the INFONAVIT only recovered 12.07% of its investment, and 15.09% 
between 1987 and 1991, which means a subsidy of around 85% (Puebla 2002: 118). The 
economic crisis forced the housing agencies to “rationalize” their operations (often at the 
expense of the target population) or diversify their financial resources. For example, the 
INFONAVIT allowed the floatation of interest rates, and the home prices were 
denominated in times of minimum wage.  
Despite the economic crisis, the number of credits offered by the various housing 
agencies in the country maintained a general trend of increase, from 89,942 in 1982 to 
409,694 in 1991 (Figure 3.2). Between 1982 and 1991, 2.52 million credits were issued 
(252 thousand per annum, EHM 2014: Table 2.5), and products were diversified (e.g. 
FOHNAPO’s support to self-built housing and physical improvement of the housing). This 
shows that there was a clear interest in using the construction sector to stimulate economic 
recovery.   
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Figure 3.2: Number of Housing Credits by Major Housing Agencies, 1973-1991 
 (Source: EHM 2014: Table 2.5) 
 
Regarding informal housing, in the aftermath of the 1982 Debt Crisis, informality 
was seen as a mechanism that could cushion the negative impacts of economic crisis on 
family income (Gonzalez de la Rocha 1994, Roberts 1994). Policy initiatives such as 
progressive housing, lots with service, and land title regularization were incorporated and 
consolidated into the housing policy agenda, as clearly reflected in the programs of 
agencies such as CORETT53 and FONHAPO (CIDAC 1990: 44). However, the funding 
sources of these agencies were not stable.   
 
To summarize, the agencies of “solidarity funds”, to large extent, represented the 
consolidation of the political corporatism in social policy, namely a triparty approach that 
emphasized the negotiation, cooperation and partnership between government, workers 
                                                          
53 CORETT (Comisión para la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra) was founded in 1971, 
and is a federal-level agency that regularizes/ formalizes land tenure for informal settlements. 
Between 1974 and 1994, the CORETT regularized 1.086 million lots nationwide (Villar Calvo 
2007: Table 47).  
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and entrepreneurs to address social issues. The solidarity funds also inherited the sectorial 
character of previous housing agencies, by giving priority to workers of certain 
characteristics (in the case of the INFONAVIT, low-income formal sector workers). 
Official unions exerted a strong influence in the allocation of social housing. That said, 
though not free from political manipulations, formal housing production of the time 
systematically targeted the urban working class in the formal sector, especially the group 
whose income was under two times of the minimum wage. The economic crisis in the 
1980s posted a serious challenge to the financial sustainability of the housing programs, 
due to the inflation and the government budget cutting. As the country’s economic model 
went through a profound transformation from the ISI to export-oriented industries, the 
previous social and political pacts would also be rewritten. This would generate 
repercussions in the paradigm of the housing policy as well, which will be discussed in the 
next section.    
 
3.3. Housing Policy in Mexico: 1992-2015 
 
This section will focus on the market-oriented shift of housing policy in Mexico, 
which is embedded in the general neoliberal transformation of the country since 1980s. I 
will then discuss in detail the reform of the country’s largest public-sector housing agency, 
the INFONAVIT, and identify the national-level factors that triggered the social housing 
boom that took place in the 2000s.  
 
3.3.1. The Context of the 1990s  
 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed a transformation of the accumulation regime in 
Mexico, from the Import Substitution Industrialization based on protectionism and internal 
market, to neoliberalism that pursued free market and integration into the global economy. 
After the highly contested elections where the PRI almost certainly only won after a 
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fraudulent count. The Salinas Administration (1988-1994) took a firm pro-business 
position. In the 1994, Mexico signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
and was further integrated into the US market. Restrictions on foreign investment were 
further removed. The participation of the public sector in investment significantly declined. 
While during the López Portillo Administration (1976-1982), investment by the public 
sector contributed 43.8% of the capital formation, this share declined to 23.4% for the 
Salinas Administration (1988-1994) and 16.7% for the Zedillo Administration (1994-2000, 
EHM 2014: Table 8.20, 8.21 and 8.22, calculated by the author). More public enterprises, 
such as the national railway system and the telecommunications company, were privatized. 
Salinas also tried to replace the country’s subsistence agriculture with a commercial 
agriculture for exportation, though the success was limited (Márquez and Meyer 2015).  
This transformation essentially rewrote the previous social, economic and political 
pact among the collective actors. Driven by the external orientation of the economy, the 
corporatist nature of the State was undermined and the mechanisms of labor protection 
weakened (Roberts 1996). The PRI attempted to repair its legitimacy and political control 
by implementing policies that favored the private capital, extending social program to the 
low-income sector, and introducing some democratic elements in the electoral regime. As 
poverty and inequality increased, the Salinas Administration launched an ambitious 
conditional cash transfer program, the National Program of Solidarity, with the revenues 
obtained from privatization (Márquez and Meyer 2015, Puebla 2002). Rather than a 
comprehensive social policy or general subsidies, the Solidarity Program delivered 
targeted subsidies directly to communities that were organized and to individuals that were 
in need. The program covered a variety of aspects, such as health, education, employment 
and public infrastructure. Though it was praised as an attempt to foment local-level 
participation and citizenship, it has also been criticized for being used as a political tool 
(Escobar Latapí and González de la Rocha 1995, Roberts 2005).   
Yet, the 1990s still witnessed several major political and economic crises in Mexico, 
such as the 1994 Zapatista Movement in Chiapas and the assassination of the presidential 
candidate of the official party, Luis Donaldo Colosio, before the 1994 election. The 1994-
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1995 financial crisis, caused by tremendous trade deficit and an erroneous foreign 
exchange policy, produced a huge setback for the country’s economy. The government had 
to resort to an expensive bailout to avoid a total collapse of the banking system. The 
expansion of exportation facilitated the recovery of the economy (Márquez and Meyer 
2015, also see the trend of annual GDP growth rate in Figure 3.3). Eventually, in 2000, the 
National Action Party, a conservative party that traditionally represented the entrepreneurs’ 
interests, won the 2000 presidential election, and (peacefully) ended the 71-year 
uninterrupted rule of the PRI.    
 
Figure 3.3: Mexico's Economic Growth and Inflation: 1992-2012 (%) 
(Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data 
files) 
 
3.3.2. Market-Oriented Housing Reform in Mexico: 1990s and 2000s  
 
The evolution of Mexico’s housing policy in the 1990s and 2000s was embedded 
in the general transformation towards neoliberalism and the reorganization of the social 
and political pacts. At the national level, two factors made social housing a profitable 
business and triggered its boom. Firstly, although the economic growth rate never 
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recovered to its pre-1982 level and the 1995 Financial Crisis was a heavy blow to 
commercial banks and to the household sector, by late 1990s, macroeconomic stability was 
restored with the decline of the inflation rates and interest rates (Carballo-Huerta and 
Gonzalez Ibarra 2009). A stable macroeconomic condition improved the certainty and 
feasibility of investment for developers and investors (annual inflation rates have been 
under 5% for most years since 2001, see Figure 3.3).  
Secondly, the development of several key institutional frameworks in the 1990s 
and 2000s helped to channel capital into housing development and created a large pool of 
potential working-class homebuyers with access to housing finance (a quasi-guaranteed 
market for developers). These institutional developments in the 1990s and 2000s consist 
of the following four components:  
(1) De-regularization of urban and housing development: 
Since the 1990s, the government made efforts in reducing the costs, length and 
complexity of the authorization process for housing development (ASE 2012: 28). In 1992, 
the modification of the Article 27 of the Constitution lifted the ban on the sale (and thus 
urbanization) of the ejidal land, which facilitated the developers to acquire land and build 
land reserves. In the same year, the INFONAVIT ended its role as leader in housing 
production and was transformed into an institution of housing finance (will be discussed 
later in this section). Since the 1992 reform, the INFONAVIT had largely reduced its direct 
intervention in the housing production and development. The de-regulation of the housing 
development process, together with the motivation of profitability, has made housing 
production faster, cheaper and in larger scale. However, it also resulted in a significant 
decline in the quality of the housing projects: they are now located in the far periphery 
where land is cheap, not well connected to the city and where job opportunities are located. 
Infrastructure and service are often in deficit in these mass housing projects, which has 
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exacerbated social problems such as the concentration of poverty and the decaying of 
public security.54  
(2) Removal of anti-market practices from housing development:  
Recall that under the previous “external promotion” mode of the INFONAVIT, 
official unions heavily interfered with housing production and allocation. Now, individuals 
could bypass political intermediaries. Homebuyers became directly connected with the 
developers, and are supposed to have more options in housing purchase. The role of the 
collective actors (particularly labor unions) in housing development was largely reduced.55  
(3) Modernization of institutional frameworks and infrastructures for the 
development of financial market:  
In the early 2000s, a national Bureau of Credits was established to collect 
comprehensive individuals’ credit history, so that lenders could better evaluate the risk 
associated with the borrowers (Zanforlin and Espinosa 2008). The lending terms of the 
mortgage loans were standardized. Public housing agencies such as INFONAVIT largely 
reinforced their financial discipline, with much less tolerance of non-performing loans. 
International financial institutions generally held a positive view on the streamlining and 
simplification of foreclosure procedures, seeing it as necessary step for the mortgage 
securitization (Zanforlin and Espinosa 2008). The 2000s saw further institutional changes 
in the housing sphere. In 2001, to better coordinate the diverse housing agencies and 
programs, the Fox Administration created the Comisión Nacional de Fomento a la 
Vivienda (CONAFOVI, later renamed Comisión Nacional de Vivienda [CONAVI], during 
the following Calderón [PAN] Administration).  
  
                                                          
54 This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  
55 Another example of the diminishing role of labor unions in distributing social benefits is the 
pension system. In 1996, with the implementation of a new Ley de los Sistemas de Ahorro para el 
Retiro, the country’s pension regime was transformed from one based on collective negotiation to 
one based on individual contribution (ASF 2012: 27). 
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(4) Creation of new investment and financing opportunities 
While new financial agencies and channels were created, financial products in the 
mortgage market were also diversified. After being reprivatized in early 1990s, commercial 
banks participated actively in the mortgage market, thanks to the introduction of inflation-
indexed mortgages and a favorable international liquidity conditions. However, the 1994 
Financial Crisis interrupted this trend. Due to massive defaults, commercial banks almost 
entirely withdrew from the mortgage market (Zanforlin and Espinosa 2008). In this context, 
an alternative type of mortgage agency, SOFOL, was created in the mid-1990s under the 
recommendation of NAFTA. The SOFOLs (Sociedad Financiera de Objeto Limitado, or 
“financial intermediaries that specialized in real estate mortgages”) are essentially non-
bank banks and intermediaries that channel resources from agencies such as FOVI to 
finance housing development and acquisition. Mortgages issued by SOFOLs increased 
from 45,566 in 2000 to 102,377 in 2005 (CHSM 2006: 50), though it significantly declined 
after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (SNIIV 2018). Different from the commercial banks, 
these mortgages mainly targeted low-to-middle income groups (Zanforlin and Espinosa 
2008). In the 2000s, the INFONAVIT started to issue mortgages jointly with commercial 
banks and other financial agencies, which increased the amount of single mortgage.     
These developments paved the way for the development of a secondary mortgage 
market (Bouillon 2012: Chapter 7). That means, mortgage agencies can securitize their 
mortgage loans in order to broaden access to financial resources and disperse their market 
risks. In 2001, the FOVI was restructured to become the Federal Mortgage Bank (SHF) 
with the purpose to develop secondary mortgage market. The SHF offers partial financial 
guarantees and mortgage insurance, which provides a protection for investors against the 
household sector risks (Zanforlin and Espinosa 2008). Agencies such as the INFONAVIT, 
FOVISSSTE, SOFOLs and commercial banks actively participated in the securitization of 
home mortgages. From 2003 to 2010, the mortgage portfolio as a percentage of the GDP 
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increased from 7.4% to 9.2%,56 and the securitized mortgages increased from 0.1% to 13.6% 
of total mortgages (Bouillon 2012: 196). Official statistics show that from 2003 to 2013, 
1.075 million mortgages were securitized, and this method channeled an investment of 
248,646 million Pesos into the housing sector in total (EAVM 2013: Figure 53).  
These measures led to a significant expansion of housing finance. Between 1992 
and 2012, more than 19.44 million housing finances were granted (around 920 thousand 
per annum [SNIIV 2018]). It is important to note that although increasing number of credits 
have been channeled to the improvement of housing condition since the second half of the 
2000s, over 90% of the investment by housing agencies were to finance complete, new 
dwellings (as indicated in Figures 3.6 and 3.7). 
Since the 1990s, the role of the public sector in housing policy has changed from 
that of leading housing construction and improvement, to that of fomenting the 
participation of the private sector in housing development (Puebla 2002). Government-
sponsored credit institutions played a critical role in real estate lending (Figure 3.5 and 3.6). 
Between 2005 and 2010, for example, the market share of public institutions in real estate 
lending was around 2/3 (Bouillon 2012: Table 7.1). This trend certainly has to do with the 
1994 Financial Crisis, after which the commercial banks almost entirely withdrew from 
mortgage lending. However, it also has to do with the fact that the private mortgage sector 
has preference for higher-income groups to minimize financial risks. Indeed, in countries 
such as Argentina and Brazil, government sponsored institutions also occupied a 
predominant position in real estate lending in the 2000s (Bouillon 2012: Table 7.1). Again, 
after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, SOFOLs and commercial banks reduced their 
securitization activities, it was public lending agencies (mainly INFONAVIT and 
FOVISSSTE) that remained active in the securitization process (Bouillon 2012:196). 
                                                          
56 That said, the housing finance system in Mexico is still very small, compared to developed 
countries like the US and Netherlands, where the mortgage debt can reach over 80% or even over 
100% of the GDP (Bouillon 2012: 193).  
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Figure 3.4: Housing Actions (Credits and Subsidies) by Major Lending Agencies: 
1992-2012  
(Source: EHM 2014: Table 2.5; Data for FONHAPO and SOFOLs are obtained 
from Sistema Nacional de Información e Indicadores de Vivienda) 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Value of Investment in Major Housing Agencies: 1992-2012 (%) 
(Source: EHM 2014: Table 2.6; Data for FONHAPO and SOFOLs are obtained 
from Sistema Nacional de Información e Indicadores de Vivienda) 
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Figure 3.6: Number of Housing Credits Issued Each Year by Type of Program: 
1995-2012 
(Source: EHM 2014: Table 2.7) 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Value of Housing Credits Issued Each Year by Type of Program: 1995-
2012 (%) 
(Source: EHM 2014: Table 2.8) 
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3.3.3. The Reform of INFONAVIT and the Scale of the Social Housing Boom  
 
As the most important lending agency in Mexico, in 1992, the INFONAVIT 
reinstalled its original purpose as a financial institution. It ended leading housing 
construction for its affiliates, and shifted its major focus to financing housing acquisition 
(purchase).  
After the reform, line-1 credits (for the construction of social-interest housing 
projects) eventually disappeared. The mortgage boom is essentially a boom of line 2 credits 
(for housing purchase from a third party). In this period, credits issued to complete housing 
increased more than 4 times, from 164,964 to 688,755. Between 1997 and 2012, investment 
in complete housing was never below 80% of the total investment in housing by private 
and public agencies. In fact, after 2003, this figure never fell below 90%. It is clear that the 
focus of the formal sector (both private and public agencies) in housing is complete housing 
acquired from the market, while the support in housing improvement, self-construction and 
infrastructure is rather limited. Line 3 credits (for self-construction on one’s own plot) 
experienced a considerable expansion in the 1990s, reaching its peak in 2000 with 28,698 
credits, but diminished significantly in the recent decades, to only 2,632 in 2015. Line 4 
credits (for housing improvement) also expanded significantly, from merely 1,044 in the 
year 1995 to 296,242 in 2015, though these credits are often small. Line 5 credits (use the 
INFONAVIT credit to pay off home mortgage from another institution) never occupied a 
major position, and its importance has also been diminishing in the last decade.    
As mentioned in the section 3.2, the INFONAVIT traditionally relied on three 
funding sources: employers’ contribution of 5% of the employees’ salaries, the mortgage 
repayment made by its affiliates, and the Institute’s own investment. Since the 1992 reform, 
the INFONAVIT widened its resources through two major approaches. First, since the late 
1990s, and especially in the 2000s, the INFONAVIT further reinforced its financial 
discipline by subcontracting legal services to the private sector and by elaborating 
approaches to renegotiate the non-performing loans. As a result, the non-performing loans 
rates dropped significantly from early 2000s, to 45% in 1997 to around 5% in late 2000s. 
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In late 1990s, mortgage repayment replaced employers’ contribution to become the major 
revenue sources of the INFONAVIT.57 This significantly widened the resources available 
to the institute, which allowed the INFONAVIT to issue more mortgages. Second, the 
mortgage securitization started playing a significant role in expanding the revenues of the 
Institute. Since 2003, the INFONAVIT started to issue mortgage-backed securities 
(CEDEVIs), and by 2013, this method channeled an investment of 83,095 million Pesos 
into the housing sector (about 1/3 of the investment channeled by mortgage securitization 
to all the lending agencies [EAVM 2013: Table 39]). The revenues from the mortgage 
securitization are translated to more mortgages that the INFONAVIT can issue. Suppose 
the amount of a single mortgage is 200,000 Pesos, then between 2003 and 2013, revenues 
from the mortgage securitization enabled the INFONAVIT to issue 415,475 more 
mortgages.   
While the Institute improved its financial discipline and increased its resources for 
housing finance, it also increasingly biased against lower-income affiliates. As mentioned 
in section 3.2, in most years of the 1980s, more than 70% of the credits of the INFONAVIT 
were allocated to workers earning less than 2 times minimum wages.58 However, the 
weight of this group in mortgage allocation declined constantly during the 1990s, and in 
the year 2002, it received only 5.63% of the credits. This trend was inverted in the period 
between 2005 and 2014: the proportion of the debtors earning less than 2 time of minimum 
wage increased from 8.23% in 2005 to 25.19% in 2014. Moreover, Beneficiaries earning 
less than 4 times of minimum wage in this period received around above 60% of the 
INFONAVIT credits. In other words, the mortgage boom in the second half of the 2000s 
mainly targets the low and lower-middle income working class.  
                                                          
57 In the 1980s, employers’ contribution never fell below 70% of the total revenues of the Institute, 
and credits recovery was only secondary. This situation was reverted in the 1990s. In 2004, credits 
recovery accounted for 49.71% of the total revenues of the Institute, and employers’ contribution 
only accounted for 44.73%. This is a clear evidence that the Institute had reinforced its role as a 
financial institution. 
58 This figure reached its peak in 1987, when 97% of the credits were allocated to this group. 
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Improved lending conditions, rapid increase in the number of mortgages issued and 
the diversification of the mortgage products led to this re-focus on home mortgage for low-
income affiliates in the second half of the 2000s. With the existing conditions in 2000, a 
person applying for a loan of 300,000 Pesos with a 15 year term needed a monthly income 
of over 25,500 Pesos, but by 2006, an income of under 13,000 Pesos is enough (CHSM 
2006: 44). The INFONAVIT also diversified its products. Higher-income INFONAVIT 
affiliates now can combine their INFONAVIT loan with a bank mortgage or a SOFOL 
mortgage, which released more resources for the institute to finance its low-income 
affiliates. More importantly, although public lending agencies always offer implicit 
subsidies (such as below-market interest rates), upfront subsidy offered by federal-level 
agencies (direct transfers complementing borrower’s down payment, e.g. “Tu Casa” 
program or PROSAVI program) significantly reduced the entry barrier to mortgage among 
low-income affiliates. It is reported that in 2004, 302,100 loans (37.1% of the total loans) 
involved certain type of subsidy (293,322 implicit subsidy and 9,800 upfront subsidy). In 
2005, 445,949 loans (65.7% of the total loans) involved subsidy (409,230 implicit and 
36,719 upfront) (CHSM 2006: 48). The income group of 3-4 times minimum wage 
obtained most of the subsidy, followed by the income group of 2-3 times minimum wage 
and of 4-5 times minimum wage (CHSM 2006: 49). 
While in the 1960s and 1970s, the private sector did not quite have the resources or 
incentives to invest in low-income housing and self-help housing in informal settlements 
was the most common housing option for the urban low-income working class. In the 2000s, 
social interest housing became a profitable business. The mortgage boom, triggered by the 
transformation of the INFONAVIT created a pool of potential homebuyers, and increased 
certainty for developers. There was a clear interest in lower segments of the housing market 
in the 2000s. In 2004, the low-income categories concentrated 63.4% of the existing 
housing stock of the country, but contributed 90.4% of the new dwellings built that year 
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(CHSM 2006: 45).59 At the end of the Fox administration (2006), it was clear that the 
“vivienderas” (six largest developers of the country, which were listed and traded on the 
Mexican Stock Market: GEO, URBI, ARA, HOMEX, SARE and HOGAR) were in a 
period of expansion. BBVA’s report in 2004 pointed out that 9 companies individually 
reported annual sale of over 5,000 dwellings. GEO and HOMEX respectively sold 33,200 
and 21,100 dwellings in 2004, and then 37,400 and 31,800 units in 2005 (CHSM 2006: 26).   
The expansion of the housing finance system and the social housing boom 
significantly changed the landscape of urban housing in Mexico. With the boom of large 
social housing projects expansion in the urban periphery, the relative importance of self-
help, informal housing in new housing production has declined (Figure 3.8). Moreover, 
with the economic restructuring, urban poverty became more structural, and the 
conventional view that “informality” could serve as a mechanism for survival and social 
mobility has been challenged. While many of the early informal settlements of the 1970s 
and 1980s have been consolidated and integrated into the city, others also witness the 
deterioration of public security and rampant unemployment (Eckstein 1990, González de 
la Rocha 2001, Ward 2004). The major agency that served low-income population, 
FONHAPO, went through a severe financial crisis in the late 1990s. Even it was not 
dissolved, its share in housing investment has been marginal, usually around 1% -2% 
(Figure 3.5).  
That said, this section does not intend to understate the importance of self-built 
housing and informal housing development as affordable housing option for Mexico’s 
urban low-income population, particularly those who work in the informal economy and 
thus are less likely to obtain a home mortgages with agencies like the INFONAVIT. Self-
built housing remains as the largest segment in the urban housing stock in Mexico. 
According to official statistics, by 2010, in Mexico’s urban area, self-built housing still 
                                                          
59 The Mexican housing market is classified into six segments by housing price: minimum, social, 
economic, middle, residential and residential plus. The low-income categories refer to minimum, 
social and economic housing.  
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accounts for over 56% of the urban housing stock (Rivera Calderón 2014). New needs, 
such as the housing rehabilitation and the generational transfer of titles (Ward et al. 2012), 
have emerged and require the actions of the public sector. 
 
Figure 3.8: Housing Units Produced in Mexico by Sector: 1951-2005  
(Source: Villar Calvo 2007: Table AE-4) 
 
3.4. A Comparison of China and Mexico 
 
This and the previous chapter have discussed the social housing policy in China 
and in Mexico. The question arises as to why social housing development in China takes a 
government-centered approach, while in Mexico it is market-centered approach, at least 
since the 1990s. Here I argue that this variation has much to do with the historical 
development of the housing policy.  
 
3.4.1. Housing Policy, State Formation and State-Led Industrialization  
 
Housing policy is part of the state-formation project, and is deeply embedded in the 
State’s role in social reproduction of labor. During the rapid industrialization, housing 
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policy is often designed to pave the way to industrialization by cheapening the social 
reproduction of labor60 and maintaining political stability.  
Interestingly, as discussed above residential tenures in urban China and in urban 
Mexico in the eve of the state-led industrialization (that is, early 1940s for Mexico and 
early 1950s for China) were quite similar. At that time in most Chinese and Mexican cities, 
private rental housing was the majority of the urban housing stock. But by 1980s, the urban 
housing systems in China and in Mexico differed significantly from each other. In China, 
it was dominated by the public rental housing sector; while in Mexico self-built housing in 
informal settlements prevailed and the government, for the most part, turned a blind eye 
and adopted a laissez faire attitude (Ward 1986). I argue that the variation in the approaches 
to industrialization and the trajectories of the post-Revolutionary state formation will lead 
to different housing policies, and thus, different housing outcomes.   
Regarding approaches to industrialization, in China, the Communist Party sought 
to achieve industrialization by prioritizing heavy industry, and essentially eliminated 
private property and the bourgeoisie sector. In China, the predominance of public rental 
housing reflects a “war-time communism” approach to cheapen the social reproduction of 
labor. This approach heavily suppressed consumption and market activities so that a 
maximum amount of resources could be channeled to heavy industry. The public housing 
sector in China during the planned economy never received sufficient investment. It was 
highly precarious and far from meeting the demand of the urban working class. Moreover, 
it had to be implemented with other measures, such as a strict restriction against rural-to-
                                                          
60 For countries like China and Mexico, one major challenge in the initial period of state-led 
industrialization was the shortage of capital and technology. This implied that the State had very 
limited resources for workers’ welfare. Actually, for the four presidential terms between 1934 and 
1958, social expenditures as a percentage of the public investment at federal level never exceeded 
15%; bulk of the public investment was channeled to infrastructure and industrial development 
(Villar Calvo 2007: 339). Moreover, the reliance on capital-intensive modern corporations means 
that the ISI had a limited capacity in creating a large amount of formal employments that could 
incorporate the growing urban population. The concentration of investment and resources in a few 
large cities not only increased the regional inequality, but also exacerbated the urban problems in 
these cities, particularly Mexico City.  
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urban migration through the household registration system, the expropriation of private 
rental housing, and a tacit tolerance of the existing slums.61  
In Mexico, the post-Revolutionary transformation was much less radical, and never 
intended to abolish private property or the market. Moreover, Mexico’s industrialization 
initiated from consumer goods, and heavy industry was viewed as the final stage of the 
Import Substitution Industrialization. The government left the housing provision to the 
people alone by adopting a pragmatic tolerance towards self-building and informal 
settlements. The very limited public-sector-supported affordable, social housing 
production was reserved for the urban middle class or formal sector workers affiliated to 
official unions.  
Regarding the Post-Revolutionary State formation process, although the post-
revolutionary regime in Mexico enjoyed some level of state autonomy, this autonomy was 
much less compared to the China. Mexico’s official party, the PRI, was essentially a 
mechanism for distributing and organizing power among the revolutionary factions, as well 
as enforcing control over the mass. Thus, political corporatism was a key feature of the 
post-Revolutionary State-society relations, as well as how the political power is organized 
within the new regime. Mexico’s housing policy during the ISI period was characterized 
by its sectorial and corporatist approach.62 Compared to the Mexican case, where the 
                                                          
61 The Chinese government allowed certain extent of slum upgrading; however, unlike in Mexico, 
where large expansion of informal settlements accommodated bulk of the rural-to-urban migrants, 
in China, the expansion of slum was curbed, as rural-urban migration was largely restricted; rather, 
slum upgrading was supposed to accommodate the housing demand of the registered urban 
residents. 
62 Indeed, the ISI model required the Mexican State to take a variety of protectionist measures to 
support its nascent industries, such as import licensing tariffs, exchange controls, cheap loans from 
development banks, infrastructure development, and direct participation of government in certain 
industries (Baer 1972). The State also made considerable attempt to negotiate a social and political 
pact between the government, the industrial bourgeoisie, and the unionized labor to pave the way 
for industrialization. That said, the extent to which the Mexican State was autonomous was rather 
limited. For example, Aspra (1977) documented how some industrial sectors lobbied to maintain 
the protectionist measures, although these measures were no longer necessary. The domination of 
the mass by the official party in Mexico was achieved through a skillful combination of coercion, 
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government used housing policy in exchange for political loyalty of certain sectors, in 
China, such negotiation rarely occurred, as the Communist Party established a far more 
authoritarian regime than the PRI. That being said, the fact that most new urban dwellings 
were public rental housing also created a deep dependency of workers on their work units, 
since alternative forms of housing access such as market, private rental housing, or self-
building rarely exist under the planned economy.  
In sum, China and Mexico shared a similar urban housing system in the eve of 
State-led industrialization. The reasoning behind the housing policy was also similar: to 
cheapen the costs of social reproduction labor and to maintain political control of the urban 
working class. However, the different approaches to industrialization and the different 
trajectories of post-revolutionary state formation led to different housing policy approaches 
in the two countries.  
 
3.4.2. Housing Policy Reform in the Neoliberal Era: A Comparative Perspective (1980s-
2000s)  
 
The market-oriented housing reforms in China and in Mexico since the 1980s 
shared some important similarities. Both reforms were launched in response to the crisis 
that had emerged from previous housing policies, as well as a component of each country’s 
broad neoliberal transformations. In China, as the public sector never invested adequately 
in the urban housing sector by the late 1970s the housing was even worse than in 1949 and 
it had become clear that the government alone was not able to reduce the housing deficit. 
In Mexico, housing agencies were severely decapitalized in an inflationary context after 
the 1982 Debt Crisis. Moreover the “official party” (the PRI) was struggling to organize 
the society in a corporatist way as in the past and was facing increasing challenges from 
other political parties, as well as a quickening in demands for political opening. At the same 
                                                          
concession and cooption. Selective treatment was often applied to create division among the mass, 
to punish the non-conformists and to reinforce the hegemony. 
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time, in both China and Mexico, the transformation of the housing policy is embedded in 
a redefinition of the role of State in economic development and social provision, the 
deregulation of the labor and financial market, as well as the expansion of the market 
relations and the financial capital in the urban housing sector.  
Both in China and in Mexico, housing reform encouraged the participation of the 
private sector, with the purpose of reducing the fiscal and administrative burden of the 
public sector in housing provision, and both reforms sought to eliminate anti-market 
practices and reduce the role of intermediary collective organizations’ role in housing 
provision (official unions in Mexico and work units in China). Yet, the role of the public 
sector was critical to these institutional developments.  
In both countries, while reducing the housing deficit and maintaining political 
control are still desirable policy goals, there has been a more pronounced emphasis on the 
profitability of the housing industry and the real estate sector. Housing has increasingly 
been viewed as a stimulus to the economy. In China, housing was once viewed as a non-
productive consumption and welfare good; but by early 2000s, the real estate sector was 
officially announced as the backbone of the national economy. In Mexico, whereas until 
the 1990s, neither the private capital nor the public sector had the motivation or the 
resources to invest in affordable housing for low-income groups, social housing production 
became highly profitable for developers in the 2000s. In both countries, large developers 
have been listed on the stock market, and a variety of financial products have been applied 
to its finance. The link between housing and the financial capital had become stronger than 
ever before.    
Nevertheless, while the Chinese and Mexican governments have actively fomented 
the housing industry and the real estate sector, they have taken different approaches. In 
China, government intervention in the housing sector takes a macroeconomic approach; 
that is, macroeconomic goals (investment, fiscal revenues, and financial risk) also 
dominate the specifics of its housing policy agenda. This is not to argue that Mexico’s 
housing policy ignores the macroeconomic impacts of the real estate sector but rather that 
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unlike in China the centrality of macroeconomic concerns is not highlighted in Mexico’s 
housing policy agenda. In Mexico today (and since the 1990s) electoral democracy 
prevents the government from undertaking such extensive direct intervention in the 
economy as its Chinese counterpart and where the centralized CPC seeks alternative 
sources of legitimacy, largely through economic growth.    
 
3.4.3. Different Approaches to Social Housing Development in China and in Mexico: An 
Explanation  
 
Housing reforms in China and in Mexico have produced impacts on the low-income 
people’s housing access. While in Mexico a commercialized social housing system rapidly 
expanded, in China the government had to lead the construction of social housing for low-
income urban population. I argue that the different approaches to low-income housing in 
China and in Mexico is a result of the historical development of the policy, or the existing 
structure of the housing regime when the market-oriented housing reform was initiated in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
In the Mexican case, the housing reform in the 1990s mainly targeted the low-
income working class, since at the time, the main public-sector housing agency- 
INFONAVIT- mainly attended the low-income working class (who earned less than 4 times 
of the minimum wage). The mortgage boom, the deregulation of land development and 
innovative financial arrangements converted the social housing sector to a profitable 
business. Yet, middle and upper class’s housing access remained largely untouched. On 
the contrary, in the Chinese case, since the majority of the pre-reform urban housing was 
public rental dwellings, the Chinese housing reform targeted the entire urban sector, which 
included a wide income strata. The product of the housing reform was a commercial 
housing sector, which is far more profitable for developers than affordable/ social housing.  
In other words, the housing reform in Mexico sought to fix the government failure, 
and thus the “market” was seen as a solution to the housing deficit among the low-income 
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urban working class. The housing reform in China also intended to fix the government 
failure in the beginning, but as it targeted the entire urban population (including the middle 
and high income groups), the newly-formed commercial housing market soon became 
“gentrified”, and started to exclude the low-income groups. A profitable social housing 
sector, as in the case of Mexico, does not exist in China. Thus, in China, the market is 
viewed by policy makers as the cause of the low-income housing problem. The implication 
is that, if the Chinese government were to reduce the housing exclusion among the urban 
poor, it would have to directly intervene and fix the market failure. In other words, 
government should take supply-side actions, such as constructing dwellings for the urban 
poor, because the private sector is not interested in it. Demand-side actions may not be 
effective: to subsidize the urban poor so they can afford a commercial housing could further 
raise the commercial housing price, and would be more expensive than construct dwellings 
for them.  
That being said, I do not intend to argue that the existing housing structure would 
automatically lead to a certain approach of social housing development. Rather, I refer to 
possible policy options for the central/ federal government: government-led social housing 
construction cannot proliferate in Mexico, and the commercialization approach to social 
housing cannot prevail in China. It leads us to ask: if currently a commercialized social 
housing sector in China is not feasible, why does not the State encourage alternative forms 
of housing options for the urban working class, such as self-building, workers’ corporative 
housing? In Chapter 2 we offered a partial answer this question: the central government in 
China uses social housing to stimulate investment and economic growth, which was part 
of the stimulus package following the 2008 global financial crisis. Vice versa, if the market 
was viewed as a solution to the housing deficit among low-income urban population, why 
did Mexico not privatize the INFONAVIT? The persisting importance of the INFONAVIT 
reminds us of the critical role that the public sector plays in the expansion of market 
relations in Mexico.    
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3.5. Conclusions  
 
Mexico’s Housing policy since mid-20th century underwent a paradigmatic 
transformation, from one characterized by political corporatism and State leadership, to 
one centering on facilitating the participation of private capital. While in the 1960s and 
1970s neither the private nor the public sector had enough incentives or resources to invest 
in low-income affordable housing (and self-help, informal housing was the predominant 
form for the urban poor), social housing became a profitable business in the 2000s and 
2010s. This chapter identified several national-level factors that led to the social housing 
boom, including a stable macroeconomic condition, several pro-market institutional 
developments, as well as arrangements that expanded mortgages and subsidies to low-
income formal sector workers that created a large pool of potential homebuyers.    
Social housing development took a market-centered approach in Mexico, and a 
government-centered approach in China. In this chapter, I have argued that this variation 
in approaches to social housing has much to do with the existing housing regime when the 
market-oriented housing reform started in the two countries. The housing reform in Mexico 
sought to fix the government failure, and thus the “market” was seen as a solution. On the 
contrary, in China, the market is viewed by policy makers as the cause of low-income 
housing problem, which requires the government to take supply-side actions. Based on this 
comparison, I also highlighted that the historical development of the housing policy 
informs us about the policy options at a particular critical juncture.  
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Chapter 4: Social Housing Development in Nanjing: Local Government 
as Entrepreneurial Landowner 
 
This chapter will discuss the politics of social housing development in China 
through a case study of Nanjing. As Chapter 2 and 3 showed, social housing development 
is a policy created by the central government. Yet, it has to be implemented by the local 
government. This chapter asks: What motivated the local authorities to promote the social 
housing development in Nanjing? What are the structural and institutional constraints for 
the implementation of the policy? Do the local authorities implement the policy as 
established by the central government? Finally, is the social housing development model 
in Nanjing financially and socially sustainable?  
This Chapter will first briefly review the housing development in Nanjing, the 
housing situation among the low-income population, as well as how social housing is 
developed and allocated. Then I will discuss how local government in Nanjing reinterprets 
the social housing policy proposed by the central government and uses social housing to 
promote its urban agenda, which prioritizes the spatial reorganization and land 
capitalization of the city.  
The changing central-local relations in the 1980s and 1990s created a specific set 
of constraints and incentives for the local authorities to reinforce their developmentalist 
character. As I will show, local governments converted land into a finance machine to fund 
their infrastructure projects and to expand their fiscal autonomy. Paradoxically, the 
dependency on the capitalization of land for local public finance today puts the 
sustainability of urban governance into question.  
 
4.1. Housing Development and Housing Deficit in Nanjing: 1990s-2015  
 
As we saw in Chapters 2 and 3, both China and Mexico experienced dramatic 
changes in their political economy from the late 1980s onwards: political and economic 
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liberalization, the rise of neoliberalism, and a major spurt in housing financing in Mexico; 
and, similarly in China, major economic reforms and more capitalist-style development, 
albeit under continued central Communist economic and political control, combined with 
decentralization of some autonomy to the provinces and cities. 63  Here I take up the story 
at the fulcrum of significant change that occurred in China over the last three decades. 
 
4.1.1. Housing Reform in Nanjing in 1990s  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the central government launched a housing reform in 
the 1980s that sought to release the government from the burden of housing production and 
to introduce the market mechanism in the housing sector. The public-sector developers 
actively participated in the incipient commercial housing production (History of Real 
Estate Development in Nanjing: 232). The public sector was the only agent able to carry 
on this task of urban redevelopment, given that the private sector was almost non-existent. 
Since 1981 the prefectural and the district governments, as well as some state enterprises, 
established numerous “urban development companies”, which later became public-sector 
real estate developers. By 1990 there were 22 such developers in the prefecture (General 
History of Urban Development in Nanjing: 14). Although most of these dwellings were 
bought by foreign investors, oversea Chinese, or work units that later assigned the 
dwellings as public rental housing to their employees, 64  the business generated 
considerable revenues for the local government and the public sector developers. The 
experience in the 1980s and 1990s raised the awareness among the local authorities that 
urban development and urban land could potentially become a highly profitable business.  
                                                          
63 In order to maintain comparability with the analysis of the case of Mexico, my focus in this 
chapter is upon urbanization and social housing development in Nanjing from the 1990s through 
to 2015. For the interested reader, at Appendix 2 I include a detailed background description that 
documents the patterns of urbanization and housing provision across the various Five Year Plans 
in China from the 1950s to the 1980s. 
64 In 1996, only 28.5% of the sold commercial housing (in floor area) in the city was sold to 
individuals (Nanjing Almanac 1997: 149).  
103 
 
From 1992, the prefectural government further advanced the market-oriented 
housing reform, following the guidance from the central government. Local authorities 
created the city’s housing provident fund, promoted commodity housing and started selling 
the existing public rental dwelling to its occupier. The supply side of the real estate market 
responded with much enthusiasm. 65 While in 1990 the real estate sector contributed only 
2.6% to the total investment in fixed capital, this figure increased to 23.3% in 1994, and 
has sustained between 20% and 25% since then (Nanjing Almanac 1991-2015).  
Since the 1980s and particularly in 1990s, local authorities subjected the urban 
redevelopment and the urban expansion under increasing government planning, guidance 
and control. From then on, mass housing projects, rather than scattered single residential 
buildings or self-built settlements, became the predominant form of housing development 
in Nanjing. By 1999 38.9% of the urban dwellings (in floor area) in the city were located 
in housing projects of floor area over 100,000 sq. m. (History of the City of Nanjing: 
Volume 2, Chapter 13, Table 13-6; calculated by the author).66 This stands in sharp contrast 
to the urban landscape of many Latin American cities, including Guadalajara.     
 
4.1.2. Housing Policy and Housing Development in the 2000s  
 
As in the rest of the country, the role of the public-sector work units as director 
housing provider was ended in 1998. Since then, housing was rapidly commercialized, with 
the privatization of the existing public rental housing stock and the development of a 
commercial housing market. By 2000 some 424 thousand public rental dwellings had been 
sold to their occupants, which equaled 82% of all the public rental dwellings qualified for 
                                                          
65 A chaotic expansion of the commercial housing in early and mid-1990s resulted in high vacancy 
rates. In 1996, for example, 5.86 million sq. m. of new commercial housing was available for sale 
in the market, but by the end of the year 4.08 million sq. m. remained unsold; most of these 
dwellings were located at the far periphery (Nanjing Almanac 1997: 149). 
66 If the average floor area of the dwelling is 65 sq. m., this means about 40% of the urban housing 
in 1999 was found in mass housing projects of over 1,500 dwellings.   
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sale (Nanjing Almanac 2001: 85). Since these privatized dwellings were also allowed for 
sale in the market, the commercial housing market expanded significantly. The fact that 
individuals now had to acquire housing on their own in the market increased the effective 
demand in the housing market, and thus reduced the stock of the unsold commercial 
housing to 4% in 2003 (Nanjing Almanac 2004: 82).  
In general, between 1998 and 2004 the local authorities’ focus was on consolidating 
and stimulating the commercial housing market. Relevant institutions such as the housing 
provident funds, property registries and commercial housing mortgages, among others, 
were consolidated. Housing and land-use rights became increasingly commodified, and the 
housing market became increasingly competitive. Large developers based in other parts of 
the country entered Nanjing. The real estate sector became a full-fledged engine for the 
city’s economic growth. Between 2000 and 2015, investment in the real estate sector 
increased by 19.5% annually. While in 2000 the real estate sector contributed 4.1% of the 
city’s GDP, this number steadily increased to around 6%-7% in the 2010s, which is similar 
to the national trend (Nanjing Almanac 2001-2016).  
Table 4.1: Forms of Housing Acquisition in Nanjing: 2000 and 2010 (% of 
Total Urban Households)  
2000 2010  
Self-built housing 13.7 8.4 
Purchase new commercial 
housing 
3.5 23.1 
Purchase used housing  - 7.2 
Purchase new economic housing 3.6 9.8 
Purchase previous public rental 
housing  
39.5 25.2 
Rent public rental housing  25.7 2.3 
Rent commercial housing  8.1 19.3 
Other  5.9 4.7 
(Source: National Population Census of the People’s Republic of China 2000, 2010; 
calculated by the author) 
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Regarding the outcomes of the housing reform, the housing production continued 
increasing rapidly after the 1998 housing reform. The annual production of new housing 
increased from 3.1 million sq. m. in 1998 to 13.6 million sq. m. in 2015 (Nanjing Almanac 
1999, 2016). In general, the housing condition has been increased significantly: per-capita 
housing floor area increased from 13.7 sq. m. in 1990 to 36.5 sq. m. in 2015 (History of 
Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 40 [calculated by the author], Nanjing Almanac 
2016). The tenure structure in the city has changed significantly, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Homeowners as a percentage of the urban households increased from 60.3% in 2000 to 
73.7% in 2010.67 Percentage of the urban households that resided in public rental housing 
decreased from about 25% to only 2.3%; in contrast, percentage of the urban households 
that purchased a new commercial dwelling increased from 3.5% to 23.1%. The housing 
demand that was severely suppressed during the previous decades was rapidly released. 
The expectation of a buoyant real estate market and the lack of other reliable investment 
channels also converted housing into a popular investment good.68     
From 2005 onwards, the city government started to intervene in the real estate 
sector in a more systematic fashion. Often the upper-level governments establish general 
policy goals and approaches, and the city government is required to formulate and 
implement concreate measures accordingly. Many of these measures are countercyclical. 
Local government employed land supply, housing finance (mortgage, loans, and housing 
provident fund), 69  fiscal policy (fees and taxes), social housing, and occasionally 
administrative measures to influence housing supply and demand. 70  Sometimes, local 
                                                          
67 Homeowners include those who acquired their housing by purchasing new commercial housing, 
new economic housing, used housing or previous public rental housing. 
68 The average per-square-meter price of new commercial housing in Nanjing increased by 560% 
from 2003 to 2016, while the average annual inflation rate (consumer price index, CPI) in the same 
period was only 2.9% (see Table 4.3).   
69 The housing provident fund is run by local governments in China.  
70 For example, to suppress speculative housing demand, in 2011, the prefectural government 
forbade urban registered households to buy a third property, and forbade unregistered urban 
households to buy a second property (for unregistered homebuyers, they were also required to 
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authorities are required by the central government to address the issue of housing 
affordability. For example, in 2013, the prefectural government in Nanjing established the 
policy goal that the annual growth rate of the average price of new commercial housing 
would not exceed 10%. However, by the end of the year, despite all the measures applied, 
the housing price increased by a 16%. The local authorities received a verbal warning from 
the Ministry of Construction (National Business Daily 2014).71     
That said, although local governments have to concretize the housing policy 
proposed by the central government, local authorities often reinterpret it according to local 
condition and their own agenda. For example, in 2006 the then Ministry of Construction 
ordered that 70% of the land dedicated to new housing development should be dedicated 
to the development of dwellings that measure smaller than 90 sq. m. The purpose of this 
policy is to improve the housing affordability by altering the structure of housing provision 
to favor smaller (thus cheaper) housing. The prefectural government enforced the policy 
with varying degrees of rigor in different zones of the prefecture, so that the most valued 
zones were not quite affected by this policy, and overall the land dedicated to small 
dwellings met the requirement of the central government (Prefectural Government of 
Nanjing 2006). Often, when the real estate market in its jurisdiction was in recession, the 
local government responds with relaxing or lifting those restrictive measures, because the 
prosperity of the real estate market is directly associated with the local fiscal revenues.  
                                                          
provide evidence of having paid social security in the city for more than a year). This policy was 
lifted in 2014 during the recession in the housing market (Xinhua Daily 2014).   
71 When subnational authorities receive a verbal warning, they have to meet officials from the 
central government, discuss the causes of the problem and possible solutions.  
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Illustration 4.1. Skyline of Nanjing from the City Wall (the nearest is a consolidated 
self-built neighborhood dating back to the Pre-Communist era; in the middle can 
be found a cluster of multi-storey former socialist public rental housing; and the 
furthest are the skyscrapers in the downtown CBD; photo taken by the author)     
  
 
Illustration 4.2. Highrise Real Estate Development near a Village in Nanjing (photo 
taken by the author). 
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Illustration 4.3: A High-Income Real Estate Development in Nanjing (photo taken 
by the author). 
 
4.1.3. Housing Access for Low-Income Working Class and Stratification Patterns 
 
While housing production has increased and the general housing condition in 
Nanjing has improved significantly since 1980s, new forms of inequality and exclusion 
also emerged that disadvantage low-income working class to get decent access to housing.  
In general, the housing affordability deteriorated from 2003 to 2015, though 
significant fluctuations also occurred (Nanjing Almanac 2004-2016; Nanjing Statistical 
Yearbook 2004-2016, calculated by the author). 72  This deterioration of housing 
affordability applies to all income groups. That being said, it should be noted that from the 
very beginning, commercial housing was not economically accessible for people in the 
lowest two quintiles: to purchase a new commercial dwelling of 90 sq. m. in 2003 would 
                                                          
72 For a more detailed discussion on housing affordability in Nanjing since the 2000s, please see 
Appendix 3.  
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cost 70 years’ income for the lowest quintile, and 41 years’ income for the second lowest 
quintile; meanwhile it only costed 12 years’ income for the highest quintile (see Appendix 
3).  
High-income groups are in general in better positions in contracting home 
mortgages from commercial banks and the housing provident funds. More importantly, as 
the average housing price rose 560% from 2003 to 2016 (Nanjing Almanac 2004-2017),73 
for those who own additional properties, it is feasible to finance home-buying by selling 
out an old property and taking advantage of its rising value. These strategies, in general, 
are not applicable for low-income groups. They were further disadvantaged by the 
increasing spatial differentiation in the commercial housing market. In 2015, if one plans 
to spend 30 years’ income to buy a new commercial dwelling of 75 sq. m., the only options 
for the quintile of the lowest income are found in the two far-peripheral districts: Luhe and 
Gaochun, while for the quintile of highest-income, they had options in all districts (see 
Appendix 3).     
Viewed thus, commercial housing market is a powerful mechanism to stratify the 
urban space by sorting homebuyers to different locations according to their purchase power 
and excluding the low-income groups. Given the high per-square-meter price of the new 
commercial housing, policies such as “70% of the floor area of new housing development 
should be dedicated to dwellings smaller than 90 sq. m.” simply could not make the housing 
affordable enough for the middle- and low-income population. So, where can they find 
alternative housing options?  
In a sample survey conducted in Nanjing in 2005, Liu and her colleagues (2007) 
found while 61.9% of the quintile of the highest income acquired their housing either by 
purchasing a new commercial dwelling or by purchasing the former public rental housing 
that they resided, this number was only 15.7% for the quintile of the lowest income (also 
                                                          
73 The rising housing price is not due to inflation- actually, between 2003 and 2016, the consumer 
price index (CPI) in Nanjing fluctuates between 0.1 and 6.2 (on average 2.9, see Nanjing Statistical 
Yearbook 2004-2017, calculated by the author), which is much lower than the growth rate of the 
price of new commercial housing.   
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see Figure 4.1). This suggests that the higher income groups were more involved in (and 
benefited from) the commercialization and privatization of housing than groups of lower 
income. Meanwhile, the quintile of the lowest income was more likely to inherit or rent a 
private housing. To my knowledge, this group includes homeowners (often registered 
urban residents) who lived in self-built housing that was constructed before or during the 
planned economy, and low-income migrant workers who lived in cheap private rental 
arrangements.   
 
Figure 4.1: Forms of Housing Acquisition by Quintiles of Income in Nanjing, 2005 
(Source: Liu et al. 2007, elaborated by the author) 
 
Although by 2010 self-built housing still housed 8.4% of the city’s urban 
households (Table 4.1), most of these dwellings were constructed before or during the 
planned economy, whereas currently self-building is mainly a rural phenomenon (on 
communal land). The predominant form of urban housing production in Nanjing since 
1980s has been developer-built housing projects. The current land regime does not allow 
the formation of new self-built settlements in the urban area.    
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Social housing (including economic housing and public rental housing) is another 
option. It is mostly restricted to low-income urban registered residents with housing deficit. 
As we will discuss later in this Chapter, during the 2000s most social housing dwellings 
were reserved to accommodate households whose home was demolished in the urban 
redevelopment or urbanization projects. Social housing projects are reported to concentrate 
large number of population living under the poverty line, as will be discussed in more 
details in Chapter 6. Some social housing dwellers also rent out their properties, at 
relatively less expensive prices.  
Another option, though much less significant regarding its scale, consists of the 
unauthorized commercial housing projects (Li and Duan 2013). They are otherwise similar 
to regular commercial housing projects, except that they were built on communal land at 
the urban periphery, which is not allowed by the land law and thus the homebuyers cannot 
obtain proper title for the property. Often, township/ sub-district governments or village 
collectives built housing projects on rural communal land to accommodate peasant families 
relocated for urbanization or industrial projects (which was legal), but local authorities 
often built many more dwellings than what was needed for the relocation, and sold the rest 
as commercial housing for profit (which was illegal, as commercial housing development 
on communal land was strictly forbidden, see Tiexinqiao Subdistrict Delegation 2014). As 
these housing projects bypassed the procedure of state expropriation (and thus did not pay 
the lease of land use), the housing price was much lower compared to regular commercial 
housing, and thus are popular among low-income urban residents and migrant workers (Li 
and Duan 2013). In Nanjing, in 2004, there were about 200 developer-built housing 
projects that can be classified as unauthorized (Jiangsu Now 2012). It should be noted that 
unauthorized housing development was mainly a phenomenon of the first half of the 2000-
2010 decade. As the government tightened its control over land use and strictly prohibited 
this type of housing development in 2003, new unauthorized housing projects are rare since 
then (China News Service 2007). That said, it remains a sensitive topic of policy debate 
whether the existing unauthorized projects should be formalized or demolished. Until now, 
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in Nanjing, only 10 of these projects were authorized to be formalized after a fee was 
charged (Jiangsu Now 2012).   
A considerable amount of less expensive rental housing options are found in the 
villages located at the urban periphery. Some villages became encircled by the urban built 
area, as the urbanization occurs rapidly. In most cases, the city government may have 
expropriated the farmland and converted it to urban land, but not the dwellings. Villagers, 
now having lost their farmland, subdivided their dwellings and turned them into cheap 
rental housing. By 2005, there were 71 such villages in the city proper of Nanjing (within 
the first ring, see Prefectural Government of Nanjing 2005). The living condition in these 
villages is often precarious, but they have the advantage of being cheap and close to job 
opportunities, and thus became popular housing options for migrant workers who are not 
registered in the city.74 Rent is an important alternative income source for local villagers 
after losing their farmland. That being said, in general the policy approach of the local 
government towards them is slum clearance -- that is, to demolish the village (after 
compensating the native villagers) for urban development (Nanjing Daily 2008, Prefectural 
Government of Nanjing 2012).       
It should be noted that migrant workers formed a particular group in the low-income 
urban working class regarding housing access. The population without the registration in 
Nanjing has stabilized around 1.7 million in the 2010s, or one fifth of the city’s total 
population. According to an official survey (Nanjing Almanac 2015), in 2014, 65.8% of 
the migrant workers live in private rental housing (often found in [sublet] social housing 
dwellings, urban villages or unauthorized commercial housing projects), and 23.4% lived 
in the dormitories provided by their employees. Other surveys show similar results (Zhu 
2009, Hu et al. 2011). The average lower socioeconomic status among migrant workers 
                                                          
74 For example, the three urban villages in Hongshan Sub-district, Xuanwu District combined to 
have 15,709 rental rooms in 2008 and housed 25,371 tenants who were not registered in the city 
(2.8 times the local villagers). These villages, despite their condition, were close to both the Nanjing 
Railway Station and 10 large factories located in the Sub-district (Li 2008). Similarly, in Jiangdong 
Village, Gulou District, by the beginning of the 2000, tenants unregistered in the city were 5 times 
the local villagers (Zhang et al. 2014). 
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has produced a barrier for them to become homeowners in Nanjing. 75  Urban 
redevelopment and the demolition of the “urban villages” has reduced cheap rental options 
close to job opportunities for this group. As unregistered city dwellers, they were excluded 
from the social housing projects, although in recent years the prefectural government has 
made modest initial attempts to extend public rental housing to this group.   
 
4.2. Social Housing Development in Nanjing: 1998-2015 
 
This section offers a comprehensive overview of social housing development in 
Nanjing. I will document in detail the typology, planning, finance, construction and 
allocation of social housing in the city. I will also discuss how the local authorities’ 
attitudes toward social housing changed from 1998 and 2015. As the reader will find, local 
authorities have played a key role in promoting social housing development.  
 
4.2.1. Three Phases of Social Housing Development in Nanjing  
 
The social housing development in Nanjing since 1998 has gone through three 
phases (1998-2001; 2002-2009; 2010-2015). 76  In the first period, the prefectural 
government proposed a social housing development plan according to the national policy 
guideline, but did not implement it. As mentioned in Chapter 2, when the central 
government ended work units’ role as housing provider for their employees in 1998, it also 
                                                          
75 In 2014, 67.9% of the migrant workers in Nanjing work in the commercial and service sector. 
On average, they work 6.32 days a week and 9.32 hours per day, but their monthly salary is only 
3,000 Yuan, while the city’s per capita monthly disposable income was 3,547 Yuan in that year. 
Only 8.6% of them are affiliated to the housing provident fund (Nanjing Almanac 2015) 
76 In the 1990s, the prefectural government also launched a campaign to housing provision for the 
city’s registered residents who lived in severe housing deficit. This campaign was the precedence 
of the social housing development in Nanjing since 2000s. What differed this campaign from the 
previous socialist housing system is that the dwellings are commodity dwellings, not public rental 
housing.  
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proposed a housing system that was formed by economic housing and commercial housing. 
At the time, only 5% of the households in Nanjing were classified as high-income, which 
means that 95% of the households would be eligible for economic housing (Xinhua Daily 
2000). Not only was the prefectural government not capable of leading housing 
construction of this scale, developers of commercial housing strongly opposed this policy. 
Dozens of developers in Nanjing signed a collective petition letter demanding the 
prefectural government to cancel economic housing projects (China Information News 
2000). Between 1998 and 2001, the prefectural government of Nanjing prioritized 
commercial housing development and the privatization of former public rental housing. 
The head of the city’s housing authorities even publicly denied the necessity of the 
existence of economic housing (Yangtse Evening Post 2000). In other words, though it was 
not until 2003 when the central government announced commercial housing as the main 
component of the housing system and reduced economic housing to a role of social 
assistance, the prefectural government of Nanjing had already done so.  
In the second phase (2002-2009), local authorities in Nanjing changed its previous 
rejection towards social housing. Both the prefectural government and the district 
governments played a more active role in social housing development (also see Illustration 
4.4). Since then most of the economic housing dwellings were used to accommodate low-
income households whose homes were demolished in urban development projects. Again, 
this was a policy “innovation” by the local authorities (will be discussed in detail in the 
next section). Though social housing production increased rapidly, most of the projects 
were constructed in a hasty manner to meet the demand for accommodating the relocated 
families. Some early developments did not even fulfill paperwork requisites before they 
were sold to relocated families, which created tremendous obstacles for dwellers to later 
obtain proper titles (interview with district housing authorities conducted by the author). 
From 2003 to 2009, 121,799 units of social housing were constructed (17,340 units per 
year, see Table 4.2).  
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Illustration 4.4. A Social Housing Project Built in Mid-2000s (photo taken by the 
author; the person that appeared in the right corner in this image is Dr. Peter M. 
Ward, who at the time was visiting some of my social housing field sites in Nanjing).  
 
After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, in order to stimulate the economy, the 
central government launched a nationwide social housing development campaign. The 
prefectural government of Nanjing further expanded the social housing production 
(201,060 units of social housing dwellings were constructed from 2010 to 2015, or 33,510 
units per year, see Table 4.2); to the degree that, from 2010 to 2014, over 30% of the 
housing production (in floor area) was social housing production (Figure 4.2).  
In this period the prefectural government reinforced its control in social housing 
development,77 and established a public-sector developer/ financing platform named Anju 
Construction Group. The core task of the Anju Group was to attract and manage 
investments to finance social housing development, which has largely reduced the 
                                                          
77 According to the prefectural housing authorities, district governments had been weak in leading 
housing construction and their social housing projects were notorious for their bad quality and legal 
irregularities (interview conducted by the author). 
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dependence on fiscal resources. Between 2010 and 2013, the prefectural government 
developed four mega social housing projects (namely Huagang, Shangfang, Daishan and 
Maigaoqiao, also see Illustration 4.5) that combined to provide 82,800 dwellings, though 
other smaller social housing projects were developed by the prefectural and district 
governments. Though the majority of social housing dwellings were still reserved for 
relocation households, the prefectural government also extended the target population to 
other groups, including other low-income families with housing deficit, migrant workers 
and young professionals. The proportion of public rental housing in the social housing 
stock increased.     
 
Table 4.2: Social Housing Production in Nanjing: 2003-2015 
Year Social Housing Dwellings Constructed Each Year  
2003 12284 
2004 18858 
2005 12209 
2006 14545 
2007 17541 
2008 19632 
2009 26730 
2010 32967 
2011 26473 
2012 24905 
2013 60408 
2014 27391 
2015 28916 
Total  322859 
  (Source: Nanjing Almanac 2004-2016; Nanjing Real Estate Yearbook 2004-2016) 
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Figure 4.2: Housing Production in Nanjing: 2002-2015 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2003-2016; Nanjing Real Estate Yearbook 2003-2016) 
 
 
Illustration 4.5. Social Housing Project Maigaoqiao, Nanjing (one of the four mega 
social housing projects developed in the 2010s; photo taken by the author) 
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4.2.2. Planning, Land Acquisition and Construction  
 
The prefectural government makes annual social housing development plans. The 
Anju Group is in charge of financing the projects and contracting constructors.78 Between 
2002 and 2009 most of the constructors were locally-based, small-scale developers. For 
the four mega social housing projects, the Anju Group contracted large developers that 
operated at national scale, such as Vanke. They saw social housing as an alternative 
investment opportunity, although the profit margin of social housing is established to no 
more than 3%, compared to 10% for commercial housing projects. Yet since social housing 
is a government project, it involves less uncertainty and risk and higher capital turnover 
ratio, especially when the real estate economy is in downturn (National Business Daily 
2010). For another large developer listed on the stock market in charge of the construction 
of Huagang Social Housing Project, Nanjing Chixia, social housing even became its main 
business and overweighed its commercial housing developments (National Business Daily 
2013). 79  More importantly, through social housing construction large developers not 
locally based can develop good relationship with the local government, which can facilitate 
their future expansion in the city’s real estate market.  
The government allocates land for social housing development. From 2003 to 2009 
the prefectural government allocated 2,563 hectares of land for social housing projects 
(Nanjing Almanac 2003, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, calculated by the author) (Nanjing Real 
Estate Yearbook 2011: 172). Land allocation for social housing development implies an 
opportunity cost for the city government. Unlike commercial housing the government 
                                                          
78 Recently, the prefectural government has also sought to diversify the mode of social housing 
production. In 2017, the prefectural government formulated a policy to make developers to build 
social housing in future commercial housing projects. Specifically, in the public auctions through 
which the government leases out land-use rights to developers, a price ceiling will be established. 
After the ceiling is reached, developers will compete with each other with the amount of social 
housing they promise to build in the future commercial housing project (Nanjing Housing Security 
and Real Estate Management Bureau 2017).    
79 In 2011, 70% of the revenues of the developer Nanjing Chixia came from social housing projects; 
at the end of 2012, 60% of the floor area under construction was in social housing projects (National 
Business Daily 2013).  
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cannot charge land-use rights fees for social housing projects. Also, local government tends 
to locate social housing projects to where it is less costly to expropriate the land.80 These 
concerns lead the city government to allocate the least desirable land for social housing 
development, usually in the periphery or close to industrial projects (See Figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3. Land Allocation for Social Housing Projects in Nanjing: 2002-2010  
(Source: Wang et al. 2010. Note: Circled are the main locations of social housing 
projects in Nanjing) 
 
4.2.3. Financing Social Housing Development 
 
Financing social housing has been an enormous challenge for the housing 
authorities. Between 2002 and 2009, the 65 social housing projects required an investment 
                                                          
80 To build the four mega-social housing projects, the prefectural government demolished 4,003 
residential dwellings and 175 factories (1.35 million sq. m. in floor area). The compensation cost 
the prefectural government 6.56 billion Yuan (Nanjing Auditing Bureau 2014), which was 17.6% 
of the total investment of the projects.  
Peripheral Freeway 
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of 43.3 billion Yuan81 -- while the budgetary fiscal revenues of the prefectural government 
in the same period was only 218.2 billion Yuan. The four mega social housing projects 
constructed between 2010 and 2013 alone required an investment of 37.3 billion Yuan, 
while the budgetary fiscal revenues of the prefectural government in these four years was 
only 217.8 billion Yuan (Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2003, 2010, 2015; Nanjing Bureau 
of Audits 2012). Apparently, the prefectural government has to diversify and widen the 
sources of investment to undertake social housing development of such scale.  
If we examine the circuit of investment, it is relatively easier for the government to 
recover investment from economic housing than from public rental housing, because the 
“beneficiaries” buy these properties, even if the profit margin is narrow.82 For this reason, 
the prefectural authorities have favored economic housing to public rental housing, as in 
many other cities of the country. In general, the construction of public rental housing and 
economic housing are financed separately: the former is mainly financed by fiscal 
resources, and the latter can attract investments of a variety of sources (the author’s 
interview with the prefectural housing authorities). That said, economic housing projects 
also require large initial investments.  
The report from the Prefectural Bureau of Audits in 2012 shows that fiscal 
resources were only a minor part of the funding for social housing projects. Figure 4.4 and 
4.5 show that social housing projects mainly rely on finances from the financial institutions 
(e.g. bank loans), project capital introduced by developers, and the sale of already-built 
housing dwellings (i.e. recovering the initial investment). 
                                                          
81 Approximately US$ 6.4 Billion (in 2010 US$). From 2010 to 2016, the exchange rate of Yuan 
fluctuated between 1 US$= 6.14 Yuan and 1 US$= 6.77 Yuan. See China Statistical Yearbook 2017, 
Table 18-8. 
82 The majority of these social housing buyers are low-income relocated families whose home is 
demolished for urban development projects. These families “purchase” social housing with the 
monetary compensation for the relocation. Usually, the monetary compensation will be funded by 
the developer who obtain the land leases. This circuit means that a large part of the costs of social 
housing construction is transferred back to the new land user.  
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Figure 4.4: Funding sources for social housing development in Nanjing, 2002-2009 
(32 of the 65 projects, in million Yuan)  
(Source: Nanjing Bureau of Audits 2011) 
 
Figure 4.5: Funding sources for social housing development in Nanjing, 2010-2012 
(4 mega social housing projects, in million Yuan) 
(Source: Nanjing Bureau of Audits 2011) 
 
Developers of the four mega social projects are required to bring up to 35% of the 
project capital to initiate the construction (Huatai Securities 2011). The period between 
2010 and 2015 witnessed a diversification of the funding sources for social housing 
development in Nanjing. The central and the provincial governments increased their 
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support to social housing development through transfer payments. The prefectural 
government and its investment platforms obtained loans from the national social security 
funds, the housing provident funds of the prefecture, and banks. The Anju Group has 
played a critical role in diversifying and managing the funding sources for the city’s social 
housing production. As a state enterprise owned by the prefectural government, it is now 
listed in the stock market and issues its own enterprise bonds.83 Finally, the sale of the 
already-built social housing and the commercial facilities in these projects can recover part 
of the investment. It is also expected that, as social housing development will bring 
infrastructure to vacant peripheral land and thus can raise the land value, it can attract 
commercial real estate projects nearby, and thus generate revenues from land leases 
(CEBM Group 2011).  
 
4.2.4. Allocation of Social Housing 
 
The typology of social housing in Nanjing has changed in various occasions. Yet, 
in general, it can be divided into two broad categories based on its ownership: public rental 
housing, 84and economic housing. For economic housing the ownership in general is shared 
by the government and the dweller, and can be resold in the market but under certain 
restrictions. For social housing, the price for sale or rent are established by the government.  
The Directorate of Housing Reform under the prefectural housing authorities85 is 
in charge of social housing allocation, though the applications have to be reviewed by three 
levels of government (sub-district, district and prefectural). In this process, the name and 
                                                          
83 In recent years, the Anju Group has also diversified its business to include commercial housing 
development, slum redevelopment, property management, land development and restoration of 
historic buildings. See the company’s website: http://www.njajjt.com/industry.php   
84 This should not be confused with the public rental housing under the planned economy. The 
majority of the old public rental housing has been privatized during the housing reform of the 1990s. 
Particularly, bulk of the public rental housing under planned economy was run by work units, and 
the new public rental housing in the 2000s is run by local housing authorities.    
85 Its official name is “Nanjing Housing Security and Real Estate Management Bureau”. 
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address of the applicants will be posted in the neighborhood and on local media to avoid 
fake information.  
The prefectural government establishes rigorous criteria regarding the eligibility of 
each type of social housing under the general guideline of the government. Between 2003 
and 2008 economic housing was restricted to families whose homes were demolished in 
the urbanization or urban redevelopment projects. Since 2009 other low-income urban 
registered residents with housing deficit were allowed to apply for economic housing. Yet, 
between 2009 and 2014 only 13% of the economic dwellings were allocated to this group 
(Table 4.4). The predominance of economic housing for relocation purposes is likely to 
continue in the short and medium term. Regarding public rental housing, originally it was 
supposed to target the lowest-income strata of the registered urban families. Since 2010, it 
has been extended to other groups such as migrant workers, recent university graduates 
and young professionals. Yet, compared to economic housing, it was largely marginalized 
in the social housing stock (Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4.3: Allocation of Social Housing: Economic Housing and Public 
Rental Housing, 2005-2015 (units) 
Year Number of economic housing 
allocated   
Number of public rental 
housing allocated  
2005 12308 
 
2006 12270 75 
2007 16681 74 
2008 16562 424 
2009 13074 1134 
2010 18325 443 
2011 20475 435 
2012 13163 862 
2013 27007 2614 
2014 14627 1580 
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2015 19691 2819 
Total 184183 10460 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2006-2016, Nanjing Real Estate Yearbook 2006-2016) 
 
Table 4.4: Allocation of Economic Housing by Type: 2009-2014 
Year Total number 
of economic 
housing 
allocated   
Economic housing 
for relocated 
households from 
urban area 
Economic 
housing for 
relocated 
households from 
rural area 
Economic housing 
for other low-
income 
households with 
housing deficit 
2009 13074 8247 1520 3307 
2010 18325 2978 15347 0 
2011 20475 3140 14279 3056 
2012 13163 1070 11198 895 
2013 27007 1762 18858 6387 
2014 14627 5194 8869 564 
Total  106671 22391 70071 14209 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2010-2015, Nanjing Real Estate Yearbook 2010-2015) 
 
The expansion of the target population to certain degree reflects the changing 
agenda of the local authorities. While the city government always plays a central role in 
promoting urban development and the socio-spatial restructuring of the city, since 2009, it 
has somehow incorporated social welfare and human capital into its development agenda.    
Social housing is much cheaper than regular commercial housing. As mentioned 
before, in contrast to commercial housing the government allocates land for free for social 
housing development. It is also exempt from various taxes and fees. It is strictly subject to 
the government’s control, and often involves government subsidies. For example, in 2003, 
the price for the economic housing was established to 1,450-1,800 Yuan per sq. m.,86 when 
the construction cost was 1,600-2,000 Yuan per sq. m., and the average price for 
                                                          
86 Approximately 175 US$ - 217 US$ (in 2003 US$). 
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commercial housing in the city proper was 4,148 Yuan per sq. m. (Fdc.com 2005). In 2012, 
the price for the economic housing in the four mega social housing projects was 5,200 
Yuan per sq. m. (and low-income population living with housing deficit will enjoy an extra 
discount of 15%, see Modern Express 2012), when the average price of commercial 
housing in that year had risen to 11,214 Yuan per sq. m. (Nanjing Almanac 2013).   
In the case of the four mega social housing projects, homebuyers were required to 
make a down payment of 50% of the apartment price, and pay off the rest 50% within a 
year (Modern Express 2012). Since most homebuyers of economic housing were from the 
relocated households in urbanization or urban redevelopment projects, they could buy 
social housing with the monetary compensation from the relocation. However, other low-
income buyers of economic housing encountered enormous difficulty in contracting home 
mortgage from financial institutions. Very few of them were affiliated to the housing 
provident fund. Commercial banks were in general reluctant to grant mortgages for 
homebuyers of social housing, mainly due to the low income level of the homebuyer, the 
shared ownership and the restrictions on the resale of the property. Though the prefectural 
government negotiated with some commercial banks, most of the low-income homebuyers 
had to use their own savings (or borrow money from relatives and friends). In January 2012, 
among the 2,000 low-income households who were eligible to buy an apartment in the four 
mega social housing projects, 15% of them had to forgo the opportunity to buy economic 
housing (Nanjing Morning Post 2012, Xinhua Daily 2012).  
Economic housing can be resold to the market under certain restrictions: it cannot 
be resold within 5 years after the acquisition; and the government can get a shared revenue 
from the transaction when it is resold. By 2015, 13,555 units of economic housing had been 
resold to the market, which generated a shared revenue of 390 million Yuan for the 
government (Nanjing Real Estate Yearbook 2016: 25). 
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4.3. The Intersections between Local Government, Land, and Social Housing  
 
Social housing development generates an enormous financial and administrative 
burden for the local government. It also implies a short-term opportunity cost, because 
social housing is exempt from land use fees and other taxes, which are important revenue 
sources for the prefectural government. Actually it is for these reasons that the prefectural 
government in Nanjing neglected social housing development between 1998 and 2002. Yet, 
a rapid expansion of social housing occurred in the city since 2002 and this section will 
ask: what factors motivated the prefectural government to change its position and to 
promote social housing?  
Pressure from the upper-level government is one reason. For the social housing 
campaign during the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the central government and the provincial 
governments signed contracts that established the amount of social housing dwellings 
should be constructed in each province. The provincial government then does the same 
with the prefectural governments. Local authorities are evaluated for whether they meet 
the goal of the amount of social housing dwellings and this may lead local government to 
manipulate or fake statistics or build a large amount of substandard dwellings, as has 
occurred in various cities (China Business News 2012, China Youth Daily 2015). However, 
in the case of Nanjing, social housing development is “real”. This section shows that social 
housing development in Nanjing is deeply embedded in political (particularly central-local 
relationship) and land regime of the Chinese cities. Local authorities use social housing as 
a policy tool to promote its agenda, mainly promoting the spatial reorganization of the city 
and the capitalization of the urban land, as well as converting the urban land into a finance 
machine for urban development.  
 
4.3.1. Central-Local Relationship in China: 1994-2015 
 
This section shows how the central-local relationship in China motivates local 
authorities to actively promote urban development and seek finance for infrastructure 
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projects. China went through a wave of decentralization in the 1980s. The current fiscal 
system in China was established in 1994 and under this regime, the tax is classified into 
three categories: central-government tax, local-government tax, and tax shared by the 
central and the local government. Tax collection was recentralized to become a function of 
the central government and thus independent from the local governments’ intervention. 
The 1994 tax reform largely fulfilled the central government’s role of reinforcing its control 
over the macro-economy by securing its share in tax revenues and through the system of 
transfer payment (Zhang 2009b).  
Meanwhile, the division of the expenditure responsibilities among the central and 
the subnational governments remained largely untouched. Subnational governments had to 
face a significant gap between their revenues and expenditures (Kong and Zhang 2013). 
Figure 4.6 shows that from 1995 to 2015 subnational governments received about 45%-
55% of the total fiscal revenues, but also they have to assume around 65%-86% of the total 
fiscal expenditures. In comparison, among OECD countries, in 2015 only subnational 
governments in Canada (76.2%), Switzerland (61.6%) and Denmark (63.7%) contributed 
over 60% of the total fiscal expenditures. Yet, their share in total fiscal revenues was 74.1%, 
60.5% and 65.7%, respectively. Thus subnational governments in these countries do not 
see the enormous revenue-expenditure imbalance as their counterparts in China (OECD 
2018).  
Typically, in countries with a decentralized fiscal system, the central government 
assumes more expenditure responsibility than local governments in income redistribution 
and social assistance (Peterson 1995). In China, however, local governments are required 
to assume both the developmentalist and the redistributive functions (Kong and Zhang 
2013). For example, a national unified social security, health insurance or housing 
provident fund (as in the Mexican case) never existed in China; instead, the prefectural (or 
even county) governments have to run their own social security and housing provident 
funds.    
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Figure 4.6: Fiscal Situation of the Subnational Governments: 1992-2015  
(Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2016: Table 7.1) 
 
Moreover, when the central government launches social or economic development 
plans it often asks the subnational governments to contribute to the finance of the projects 
accordingly. Take the social housing campaign in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) 
as an example (Table 4.5), among the total investment of 8,357 billion Yuan, the fiscal 
resources of the central government only assumed only contributed 12.6% (in the form of 
specific-purpose transfer payment). The subnational governments not only had to 
contribute 21.7% of the total investment with their fiscal resources, but also had to manage 
to find finances from diverse non-fiscal sources for the social housing projects.      
 
Table 4.5: Investment to social housing development by origin in China: nationwide, 
2012-2016 (billion Yuan) 
Year Investment from 
fiscal resources of 
the central 
government 
Investment from fiscal 
resources of 
subnational 
governments 
Investment "from the 
society" (bank loans, 
enterprise bonds etc.) 
2012 186.2 226.7 466.8 
2013 174.9 297.4 564.7 
2014 198.4 361.8 1063.2 
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
90.0
1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
General fiscal revenues of subnational governments/ total fiscal revenues (%)
General fiscal expenditures of subnational governments/ total fiscal expenditures (%)
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2015 254.5 408.8 1372.5 
2016 237.7 517.2 2026.5 
Total 1051.7 1811.9 5493.7 
(Source: National Audit Office of China 2013-2017) 
 
Not surprisingly, between 2000 and 2015 around 38%-47% of the subnational 
governments’ general fiscal expenditure responsibilities in China cannot be fulfilled by 
their general fiscal revenues alone, and subnational governments have become increasingly 
dependent on the transfer payments from the central government. In Nanjing, however, as 
the city is in a better economic condition, the gap between the general fiscal revenues 
retained in the city and the fiscal expenditure responsibilities was much less than the 
national average. In general that gap in Nanjing was smaller than 5% of the expenditure 
responsibilities since 2007 (Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2006-2016; Nanjing Bureau of 
the Treasury 2005-2015) 
The 1994 tax reform profoundly changed these central-local relations, and 
generated specific structural constraints and incentives for local authorities. Table 4.6 
summarizes the current tax classification. As business tax is a local-government tax, which 
is mainly levied on the service (including the real estate sector) and the construction sectors, 
local authorities have strong incentives to develop the real estate sector. Business tax 
surpassed value-added tax to become the most important tax revenues for local 
governments in the 2000s. That said, local governments still promote industrial expansion, 
given that this sector can generate long-term tax revenues (even though the central 
government takes away 75% of the value-added taxes). More importantly, local authorities 
expect that industrialization can further boost urban development. In order to attract 
investment in a context of increasing fluidity of capital, local authorities compete with each 
other by offering preferential tax treatment, cheap land and better infrastructure. 
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Table 4.6: Classification of Major Tax after the 1994 Tax Reform in China 
Central-government tax • Consumption tax  
• Tariff 
Local- government tax • Business tax  
• Urban maintenance and 
construction tax 
Tax shared by the central and the local 
government 
• Value-added tax (75% for the 
central government and 25% for the local 
government) 
• Enterprise and individual income 
tax (60% for the central government and 
40% for the local government) 
(Source: Zhou 2012: 53) 
 
Upper-level authorities hold strong control over the political career of lower-level 
officials. Unlike in a democracy, heads of local governments are not elected in popular 
elections. Rather they are chosen by upper-level governments and then approved by the 
local legislature. Subnational authorities are evaluated by upper-level governments for 
their performance in various issues, including GDP growth, the amount of investment they 
bring to their jurisdiction, social stability, etc. Various authors have pointed out the 
associations between the bureaucratic system and the developmentalist character of the 
local authorities in China (Lin 2007, Zhou 2007, Landry et al. 2017). As local leaders were 
not elected from below, local authorities seem to be not committed to respond to local 
social demands, except when the popular discontent causes widely-reported scandals or 
collective actions. In general, after the 1994 tax reform, though the local governments are 
required to be responsible for both redistributive and developmentalist expenditures, their 
expenditure structure strongly favors infrastructure development and biases against 
education and public health (Sun and Pan 2009, Chen 2010).87  
                                                          
87  Also, local governments had little incentives to extend its service and social programs to 
unregistered urban dwellers (such as migrant workers). Thus, household registration, once used as 
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However, it remains as an enormous challenge how to fund the developmentalist 
expenditures given that the subnational governments do not have taxation power (Zhu 
2013), and until 2009 they were not authorized to issue municipal bonds. To finance 
infrastructure projects (such as industrial parks, metros etc.), local governments usually 
rely on off-budget revenues/ government-managed funds (explained below), program-
specific transfer payment from upper level governments, bank loans or diverse forms of 
debts (Wang et al. 2016). 
Since the 1994 tax reform local governments also eagerly seek to expand off-
budgetary revenues, as local governments enjoy considerable autonomy over its use. 
However, the central government made serious attempts to regularize off-budgetary 
revenues, and in 2011 these were reclassified as government-managed funds and 
incorporated into the budget. That said, local governments still essentially operate on two 
separate budgets (Zheng 2012): a general budget for their regular operation and public 
expenditures (education, healthcare, community affairs, poverty relief etc.), and a 
“developmentalist budget” for large infrastructure projects, which mainly consists of 
government-managed funds (Kong and Zhang 2013).88 In recent years, the two budgets in 
Nanjing are almost of the same size (Table 4.7).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
mechanism to restrict internal migration, remains as a useful tool for local government to deliver 
social assistance and social program only to those who are “registered”. 
88  Leases of the land-use rights is a major source of government-managed funds for local 
governments (Chen and Gao 2012), which will be explained later in this section. 
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Table 4.7: The “Two Budgets” in Nanjing: General Fiscal Budget and Government-
Managed Funds (Billion Yuan) 
 General fiscal 
revenues 
retained in the 
Prefecture 
General fiscal 
expenditures 
Revenues from 
government-
managed funds 
(previously off-
budgetary 
revenues) 
Expenditures from 
government-
managed funds 
(previously off-
budgetary 
revenues) 
2014 90.3 92.1 95.7 92.8 
2015 102.0 104.6 89.3 88.0 
(Source: Nanjing Bureau of the Treasury 2014, 2015) 
Another key approach for local government to finance infrastructure development 
is through debt. By June 2013 the total volume of the outstanding subnational government 
debt was 17,891 billion Yuan (National Audit Office of China 2013), which was about 30% 
of the county’s GDP in that year, and 2.59 times of the general fiscal budget retained by 
the subnational government.89 Note that outstanding gross subnational government debt 
accounted for 23.9% of GDP among the OECD countries by the end of 2014, and 
interestingly the subnational debt-GDP ratio was 31% in federalist countries and 15% in 
the unitary countries (OECD 2016). China, as a politically-unitary country has a 
subnational debt-GDP ratio much closer to the federal countries. Subnational government 
debt in China is highly oriented towards urban and infrastructure development: over 70% 
of the outstanding gross subnational government debt by June 2013 was for urban and 
transportation infrastructure development, land reserve and social housing development 
(National Audit Office of China 2013). In the Prefecture of Nanjing, about 300 billion 
Yuan was invested for urban infrastructure between 2001 and 2010, and only 30% of the 
investment came from fiscal resources, and the rest has to rely on different forms of finance 
or debts (Cai 2011).  
Although local governments in China were not authorized to issue bonds until 2009, 
they often bypassed the ban by setting up public-sector companies that served as financing 
                                                          
89 It is reduced to 1.1 times when transfer payment from the central government and subnational 
government-managed funds are added (National Bureau of Statistics of China, calculated by the 
author).  
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platforms to contract bank loans, or attract investment from the market (Xu and Qin 2014). 
State assets, such as future revenues from the infrastructure or local governments’ land 
reserve, are often used as collateral. In general, these financing platforms are backed up by 
government. For example, for the Nanjing Anju Group, after the dwellings in the four mega 
social housing projects were sold out, the prefectural government was responsible to cover 
the gap between the investment and the revenues from the sale. Moreover, the prefectural 
government also transferred part of its land reserve (885 thousand sq. m., with an estimated 
value of 9.6 billion Yuan -- that is, 10% of the general fiscal revenues of the prefecture in 
2014) to the Anju Group to become the company’s asset -- the company could lease out 
the land-use rights to increase its cash flow when it became necessary for the debt 
repayment. For this reason, although it takes a long time to recover investment for social 
housing projects (and the profit margin is much smaller than regular commercial housing), 
and the debt-asset ratio as well as the capital expenditures have been high, the Anju Group 
improved its rating from AA+ to AAA in 2015, and thus was in a favorable position to 
issue more enterprise bonds (CCXR 2016, Jiangsu Provincial Government 2016).     
The rapid increase of subnational government debt in China (19% annually 
[National Audit Office of China 2013]) raised an alert among policy makers and the public. 
The Prefecture of Nanjing does not publish its debt volume regularly. However, the 
scattered information available suggests that the prefectural government is heavily 
indebted. In 2014 it was estimated that the total volume of outstanding government debt of 
the Prefecture was 407.3 billion Yuan (among this 112.2 billion was the debt of the 
financing platforms, see Liang and Wang 2014, calculated by the author); that is, 46.2% of 
the Prefecture’s GDP and 2.2 times of the Prefecture’s fiscal revenues of that year 
(including both the general fiscal revenues and the government-managed funds, calculated 
by the author) -- much higher than the national average. In January 2014 the new mayor of 
Nanjing cut the proposed new investment in urban infrastructure for the year from 75.5 
billion Yuan to 65.2 billion Yuan, in order to decelerate the expansion of the government 
debt (China Business News 2014). 
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Although the Central Government and some international financial institutions 
view the risk of the subnational government debt in the country as controllable, the current 
model is still exposed to systemic financial risks. There is a lack of transparency and 
adequate regulatory framework that supervises the subnational government debt. Though 
many financing platforms do not generate satisfactory economic returns, as they are 
guaranteed by government, it is still relatively easy for them to obtain loans from financial 
institutions. This not only squeezes out finances for the private enterprises in the real 
economy (Zheng 2012), but also creates soft budget constraints.90 As the next section will 
show, local authorities in China expect to achieve a virtuous feedback loop: to use debt to 
finance urban infrastructures -- to raise the land values -- to obtain more revenues from 
leases of land use rights – and to finance more urban infrastructure. However, when these 
projects fail to generate satisfactory level of revenues, or when the land market falls into 
recession, the local government will be likely to face a fiscal crisis.   
 
4.3.2. Land as the Key Resource for Local Governments 
 
This section, through the case study of Nanjing, will review how urban land in 
China became increasingly capitalized under the tight control of the local government, and 
how local authorities converted land into a finance machine for urban development.  
Since 1978 the rural land in China remains under collective and communal 
ownership, but the land-use right is subcontracted to households for usually a term of 30 
years (Lin et al. 1999). In the urban area, the 1982 Constitution (also the current one) and 
the Land Administration Law abolished the urban private land and dictate that all urban 
land is public. Housing development by any third party on rural communal land is 
forbidden. The only legal approach of incorporating rural land to the urban area is through 
                                                          
90 In Socialist and transitional economies, state enterprises were not allowed to fall into bankruptcy, 
and even when they underwent chronic losses, they could always be bailed out with financial 
subsidies or other instruments (Kornai et al. 2003).  
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the expropriation by local government: the government expropriates rural communal land 
after compensating the community; then converts it to public land and incorporates it to 
the land reserve of local government. In the city, since urban land is of public ownership, 
the government is entitled to reclaim it “for public interest” according to its urban 
development plan, though it is also required to compensate to those whose dwellings would 
be demolished. This arrangement ensures that the government has the monopoly in the 
primary land market for urban development; in other words, the land supply for 
urbanization.91  
Prior to the 1980s, under the planned economy, urban land in China was de-
commodified. Government allocated land to public entities (e.g. state enterprises, 
universities etc.) by administrative orders and with little concern of the exchange value of 
the land (Ding 2003). The idea of rent differential was rejected as it was against the socialist 
ideology, and the city government of Nanjing obtained little revenues from the usage of 
urban land (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 120).   
The 1988 Land Administration Law allowed the government to lease out the use 
right of the urban land for a determined period of time,92 through negotiation or public 
auctions. Under the new urban land regime, the prefectural government of Nanjing 
conducted an evaluation of land values in 1989. The urban area was divided into seven 
zones according to their location and aptitude, and different cadastral values were assigned 
to each zone (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 128). This marked the 
beginning of the commodification of land-use rights in the city.  
From the promulgation of the 1988 Land Law, local governments in China, as the 
sole supplier of land for urban and housing development, increasingly used urban land as 
a development and finance machine. From 1992 to 1999, the government in Nanjing leased 
                                                          
91 Land users can also transfer the land-use rights to third party. In other words, the state monopoly 
is in the primary land market, not the secondary land market.   
92 It is often a one-time payment in exchange for the land-use rights for certain amount of time: 
usually 70 years for land of residential use, 50 years for land of industrial, educational, cultural or 
public health use, and 40 years for land of commercial and recreational use (MNR 2006).   
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out the use rights of 1,072 pieces of land (221 cases for the nascent real estate sector; see 
History of the City of Nanjing, Vol. 1, Chapter 3, calculated by the author). While in 1988, 
the government only received 830,000 Yuan as land use fees (History of Real Estate 
Development in Nanjing: 120), in 1999, the government received 899 million Yuan from 
land leases alone (History of the City of Nanjing, Vol. 1, Chapter 3). Between 1993 and 
1999, as the prefectural government did not have sufficient funding to finance 
infrastructure projects, it offered free land-use rights to developers in exchange for their 
undertaking of the infrastructure projects (ibid.).  
The 2000s witnessed an intensification of the capitalization of urban land-use rights 
and the consolidation of institutional framework of the land market. The goals of the central 
government consists of the following: to maximize the fiscal revenues from the land leases, 
to improve the efficiency of land use, to crash corruption in land transactions, to maintain 
a minimum amount of the farmland for food security, and to reduce social conflicts that 
emerge from land expropriations. To do so, the central government recentralized the land 
governance and sent inspectors to supervise land transactions. In general, the design of the 
institutional framework was to reinforce the government’s monopoly in the primary land 
market. In 2003, the central government established that in the primary land market, 
regarding for-profit land uses (commercial, residential, or industrial), the land-use rights 
had to be granted through public auctions instead of negotiations. Local governments also 
established “land reserve institutes” to manage land expropriations and transactions (He 
2012, Li 2010). There is a quota imposed by the central government on the amount of 
farmland that can be converted into urban land, and the quota is first assigned to provincial 
governments and then to local governments.  
Since 2000s local governments in China became increasingly dependent on 
revenues from the land leases. Between 2008 and 2015, for the country’s subnational 
governments, the revenues from land leases was in general 36% to 69% of the general 
fiscal revenues (Ministry of Finance of China; note that revenues from land leases are 
classified as government-managed funds, and thus are not part of the general fiscal 
revenues). Note that in Nanjing, this ratio is greater than the national average, and in several 
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years (2003, 2007, 2010, 2013), revenues from leasing out land was even greater than the 
general fiscal revenues (Table 4.8). Revenues from the land leases help local governments 
to serve their debts: in 2013, these contributed over 37% of the subnational debt repayment 
(National Audit Office of China 2013). Moreover, land reserves of the local governments, 
as a government asset, often serves as collateral with which local governments (or the 
financing platforms backed up by local government) apply for bank loans or attract 
investment from the financial market to finance infrastructure projects. These factors 
motivate local authorities in China to show great interest in land values. Actually, they 
often engage in speculation in the land market by manipulating land supply (for example, 
by deliberately reducing land supply, see Zheng and Shi 2011).  
 
Table 4.8: Leases of Land-Use Rights in the Prefecture of Nanjing: 2001-2014 
Year  Area of land 
leased out by 
government 
(hectares) 
Area of land 
leased out by 
government in 
public auctions 
(hectares) 
Revenues 
from leases of 
land-use 
rights(billion 
Yuan) 
General 
fiscal 
revenues 
retained in 
the 
prefecture  
(billion 
Yuan) 
Leases of 
land use 
right-
subnational 
general 
fiscal 
revenues 
ratio 
2001 716 33 0.7 11.3 0.06 
2002 2318 768 8.5 14.4 0.59 
2003 3830 2205 22.3 19.2 1.16 
2004 2202 462 0.9 23.8 0.04 
2005 2680 774 13.2 21.1 0.63 
2006 5202 756 20.4 24.6 0.83 
2007 4566 1361 44.2 33 1.34 
2008 1915 432 17.2 38.7 0.44 
2009 3232 389 29.4 43.5 0.68 
2010 3644 682 64.2 51.9 1.24 
2011 3972 719 43.6 63.5 0.69 
2012 4770 663 46.3 73.3 0.63 
2013 3807 1782 86.2 83.1 1.04 
2014 3530 1682 81.1 90.3 0.9 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2002-2015) 
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Local governments have to calculate carefully how they operate their land business. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the land supply of each year for urbanization is not unlimited 
but subject to a quota. Second, local governments have to make trade-off among land 
allocation for different uses. Usually, they can obtain larger revenues from leasing out the 
land-use rights for commercial projects (commercial housing, shopping malls, etc.), but 
such revenues are a one-time thing (since in China there is no property tax for homeowners). 
Meanwhile, industrial development can generate long-term tax revenues, and can further 
boost urban development by attracting investment and population. However, as industrial 
investment is characterized by its fluidity, local governments often have to compete with 
each other with infrastructure (such as industrial parks) and preferential land policies to 
attract industrial investors.  
That being said, the sustainability of this system is questionable: first, land supply 
for urban expansion is not unlimited. Second, the prosperity of the land market is highly 
related to the general economic condition. This partly explains the formation of many 
“ghost towns” in third- or fourth tier cities in the country: these cities may have gone 
through a period of prosperity in certain economic sector (for example, the mining sector) 
and the local governments intend to take advantage of the prosperity to develop the real 
estate economy. However, when the prosperity ends, a lot of the commercial housing 
projects remain unsold. Even in Nanjing, for example, the fluctuation of the revenues from 
land leases were much greater compared to that of the local general fiscal revenues (Figure 
4.7). The low predictability of the primary land market can cause uncertainty for local 
governments’ development and investment plans.   
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Figure 4.7: Revenues from Leases of Land-Use Rights and General Fiscal 
Revenues Retained in the Prefecture of Nanjing: 2001-2014 (in billion Yuan) 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2002-2015) 
 
Finally, as will be discussed in the next section and in Chapter 6, the urban land 
finance machine is established on the exploitation of the households from the relocated 
neighborhood and rural communities. The social conflicts that emerge from land 
expropriations largely delegitimize the current model of the urban land market.   
 
4.3.3. Social Housing: A Tool for Spatial Reorganization  
 
The urban built-up area in Nanjing expanded significantly: while between 1950 and 
1990, on average each year 312 hectares of rural land was converted into urban land 
(History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 139-142), this figure was 3,513 hectares 
each year for the period 2002-2014. Urban development and redevelopment implies a 
spatial reorganization of the city and its rural hinterland, which usually causes displacement 
of households and communities (see Illustration 4.6). This section focuses on how the local 
government in Nanjing organizes the massive relocations and displacement and responds 
to its social consequences.   
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While local government in China is the only agent that can expropriate land, it is 
also responsible for accommodating the relocated households, either by directly building 
new dwellings or offering monetary compensations. However, as the urban redevelopment 
and urban expansion increased its scale in the 1980s and 1990s, the government found it 
increasingly difficult to build sufficient amount of dwellings close to the demolished 
neighborhood to accommodate the affected households.93 More importantly, the urban 
land (in land-use rights) became increasingly capitalized and commercialized since 1990s. 
The government had strong incentive to dedicate land in attractive locations to commercial 
real estate projects for profits, rather than building housing projects for households whose 
home was demolished.   
The deficit of dwellings to accommodate the demolished neighborhoods increased 
to alarming levels in mid-1990s. In 1994, 48,734 families whose home were demolished 
in urban development had not been accommodated. They had to stay with their relatives or 
in other forms of temporary accommodation for a long period of time (Nanjing Almanac 
1995), and this became a threat to political and social stability in the city. It was 
documented that between 1988 and 1990 at least 1,050 households in five of the nine 
districts of the city whose home was demolished and who were waiting for accommodation 
occupied new dwellings without authorization (Nanjing Almanac 1991). The Prefectural 
Government gradually lowered the standard of the dwellings for accommodating the 
relocated families through the 1990s. However, by 1998, there were still 19 thousand 
families waiting for accommodation (Nanjing Almanac 1999).  
In 1999 the previous “in-kind” compensation policy was replaced with a monetary 
one (Nanjing Almanac 2000). Households of the demolished neighborhood would be given 
a monetary compensation based on the location and the size of the property. They were 
supposed to buy commodity housing on their own (since after 1998, work units no longer 
                                                          
93  For example, during the Second Five-Year Plan (1958-1962), local authorities in Nanjing 
demolished about 4,200 dwellings per year. In contrast, between 1986 and 1999, on average, about 
14 thousand dwellings were demolished each year (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 
145; Nanjing Almanac 1987-2000, calculated by the author) 
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assigned public rental housing for their employees). The ideas was to release the local 
government, and other public entities or developers from the responsibility of constructing 
homes to accommodate the demolished neighborhoods, as well as to stimulate the nascent 
market of the commodity housing.  
 
 
 
Illustration 4.6. Demolitions of Old Neighborhoods in Nanjing (photo taken by the 
author) 
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Nevertheless, the compensation is based on the land and home value established by 
the government. As the relocated neighborhoods are often characterized as precarious and 
the demolished properties are often of small-size, the compensation is low and far from 
sufficient for these households to buy a decent dwelling in the city. In 2003, nearly half of 
the households whose homes were demolished received a compensation below 100,000 
Yuan (Nanjing Almanac 2004: 83). Yet a regular new commercial housing of 60 sq. m. in 
that year would cost 182,000 Yuan. 94  When households refuse to be relocated, local 
authorities often employ force or extrajudicial means to evict them. In 2002, the Prefectural 
Government ordered that, for urban infrastructure projects, the authorities were allowed to 
demolish homes by force before conflicts over compensation had been solved (Nanjing 
Almanac 2003: 47). Forced expropriation has become one of the major sources of state-
society confrontation in China since late 1990s. In Nanjing in 2003, Mr. Weng Biao, a 
homeowner from a neighborhood to be relocated set himself on fire after his negotiation 
with the government collapsed before the deadline for forced eviction. This tragedy was 
widely reported in the country (Xinmin Weekly 2003). The social discontent caused by 
this scandal forced local authorities to significantly reduce the cases of demolition and 
relocation in the following years (Nanjing Almanac 2004: 84). Figure 4.8 showed that the 
number of dwellings demolished fell from 24,200 in 2003 to 10,052 in 2004; it was not 
until 2009 that the scale of demolition surpassed the 2003 level.   
                                                          
94 In 2003, the average price of new commercial dwelling in Nanjing was 3,035 Yuan per sq. m. 
(Nanjing Almanac 2004) 
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Figure 4.8: Number of Dwellings Demolished and Social Housing Dwellings 
allocated to accommodate relocated households: 1999-2014 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2000-2015) 
 
The Prefectural Government in Nanjing soon started to see social housing as a 
policy tool that can reduce confrontation and facilitate relocation. Though compensation 
was still based on the pre-relocation land and home value, displaced households can use 
the monetary compensation to purchase social housing dwellings at a highly subsidized 
price. From then on, although in theory, registered urban families with low-income and 
housing deficit would qualify for social housing, in practice “beneficiaries” of social 
housing are strictly restricted to relocated homeowners between 2003 and 2008. Then, 
between 2009 and 2014, 87% of the economic dwellings were allocated to relocated 
families (calculated from Table 4.4). Among the 64,300 economic housing for sale in the 
four mega social housing projects, 49,700 were for relocation purposes (CCXR 2017), and 
this policy is likely to last for a couple of more years. The housing development plan that 
the prefectural government made for the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) established that 
some 150,000 units of economic housing will be built, among which 140,000 units will be 
used to accommodate the relocated families (Prefectural Government of Nanjing 2017). 
Note that restricting social housing for relocation purposes was mainly an invention of the 
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prefectural Government of Nanjing, not the central government (for the latter social 
housing was defined as a form of social assistance).      
Social housing does not eliminate the discontent among the relocated families, of 
course. Chapter 6 will discuss in more details how this mode of relocation represents 
various forms of dispossession for the relocated families.    
 
4.4. Conclusions 
 
In China, the central government and local governments have overlapping yet 
different agenda over social housing: for the central government, it was about stimulating 
investment and economic growth in time of adverse external economic condition 
(particularly following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), as well as a form of social welfare 
to appease the widespread discontent against the deterioration of housing affordability. For 
many local governments, it was more a goal of overcoming a fiscal burden and lowering 
opportunity costs. Yet, the Prefectural Government of Nanjing uses social housing as a 
policy tool to promote its urban agenda.  
This chapter shows that the central-local relationship in China creates a particular 
set of structural constraints and incentives that motivate local authorities to expand off-
budgetary revenues, to promote urban development, and to favor developmentalist 
expenditures over social expenditures. In particular land-use rights were increasingly 
commodified and capitalized in the 1990s and 2000s, as the local governments came to 
monopolize the land supply in primary land markets, and converted land-use rights into a 
finance machine, providing them with considerable alternative fiscal resources (which 
sometimes surpassed local government’s general fiscal revenues). To a large extent, it was 
the capitalization of land that financed the urban development in China since 1990s.  
For this reason, local governments have strong incentives (and the fiscal and 
institutional resources) to lead urban spatial expansion and reorganization, which 
inevitably caused large-scale relocation and displacement among the urban population. In 
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Nanjing, local government uses social housing largely as a tool to smooth out the relocation 
process, and to facilitate the spatial expansion and reorganization of the city. Thus, social 
housing became an indispensable component of the land-driven finance machine of the 
city.  
Yet, given that land values are highly related to factors such as the general 
economic condition and central government’s land policy, revenues from land leasing have 
fluctuated. This makes local governments’ dependency on land revenues and the rapid 
expansion of local government debts an ongoing area of fiscal and financial risks.     
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Chapter 5. Social Housing Development in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara: Local Government as (the Missing) Regulator 
 
In Chapter 3 I discussed the national level factors that triggered the mortgage and 
the social housing boom. In this chapter the focus is on how the housing boom took place 
at the local level through a case study: Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, one of the peripheral 
municipalities of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara that went through a dramatic social 
housing boom in the 2000s and 2010s. What local-level factors triggered the social housing 
boom in Tlajomulco? What roles did the municipal government of Tlajomulco play in the 
social housing boom? Finally, what explains the different roles the local governments play 
in social housing development in China and in Mexico?  
Unlike in China, local government does not lead social housing development in 
Mexico. The government’s role is limited to regulation, urban planning and some extent of 
service provision. Yet, it is precisely the missing urban planning and regulation functions, 
together with collusion between local authorities and the developers that created an 
atmosphere favorable for the chaotic social housing boom. Local government may have 
obtained some short-term benefits from social housing development: revenues from 
construction authorizations and property tax, personal benefits (often associated with 
corruption), and opportunities for political control (clientelistic manipulations in service 
delivery). However, it also has to face the challenge of service provision and the 
widespread social discontent caused by the precarious conditions that emerged in many of 
the social housing projects.  
This chapter will also compare the local governance in China and in Mexico. Under 
China’s current land regime local governments were able to appropriate the wave of 
expansion of real estate and financial capital. Specifically Chinese local governments 
promote the capitalization of land use rights, extract enormous revenues out of the rising 
land value and invest in giant urban infrastructure projects.  In comparison the role of 
Mexico’s local governments in urbanization is less developmentalist and more oriented 
towards regulation and basic service provision. I argue that the key to understand the 
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difference in local government’s role in urban development does not necessarily lie in 
whether the political system is unitary or federalist, but the specific kind of incentive 
structure within which local governments operate, as well as the resources at local 
governments’ disposal.    
 
5.1. Housing and Urban development in Guadalajara since 1990s 
 
This section provides an overview of housing development in the Metropolitan 
Area of Guadalajara since the 1990s. In this period the population growth in the 
metropolitan area had declined; yet, population redistribution and spatial expansion of the 
city accelerated. The consolidation of the metropolitan area, the deregulation of land and 
urban development, as well as the mortgage boom, consist of a context in which social 
housing projects mushroomed in the far peripheries of the metropolitan area. 
 
5.1.1. The 1990s: Deregulation of Urban and Housing Development, and a Resurge of 
Formality   
 
By the 1980s, the population growth of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara had 
decelerated. In this period, the core of the metropolitan area (the municipality of 
Guadalajara) started to experience negative population growth. Population growth also 
decelerated in the first ring, from 8.2% annually in the 1970s to under 2% between 1995 
and 2000 (INEGI, census data). As a result, the population distribution of the metropolitan 
area has changed significantly: while in 1960, the municipality of Guadalajara concentrated 
81% of the population of the Metropolitan Area, this figure decreased to 45% in 2000. 
Since 1995, the first ring concentrated more population of the metropolitan area than the 
municipality of Guadalajara.     
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, ejidal land, as a form of communal or “social” property 
for agricultural and communal use, has an important presence in the rural area. 95 As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, until the agrarian reform in 1992, households have the use rights 
over ejidal land, but in theory are not allowed to sell it to third party (the only legal form 
to incorporate the ejidal land to the city was through state expropriation). Yet, the federal 
government recognized informal housing development as a pragmatic policy option in the 
1970s and established a federal agency -- CORETT (Commission for Regularization of 
Land Title) -- to regularize informal settlements on ejidal land. By the year 2000 699 
settlements (59% of the total) in the Metropolitan Area were associated with some forms 
of informality, comprising some 309,980 lots on 16,337 hectares of land (equal to about 
35% of the urban built area of the Greater Guadalajara). Only 27.5% of the land occupied 
by informal settlements of had been regularized by 1999 (Fausto Brito 2003).        
The reform of Article 27 relaxed the restriction against the sale of ejidal land 
allowing ejido members to petition to the federal agency PROCEDE (Program of 
Certification of Ejidal Rights) to dissolve their ejidos and convert the ejidal land into 
private property.96 By 2000 30 ejidos in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara had applied 
for the disintegration (26,850 hectares, or 54% of the total ejidal land). By 1999 settlements 
of irregular origin in the Metropolitan Area of the Guadalajara occupied 16,337 hectares 
of land (or 35% of the total urban built area of the metropolitan area),97 the large part of 
which (11,528 hectares) was on ejidal land (Fausto Brito 2003).  
                                                          
95 In the post-Revolutionary period ejidos were formed mainly through the expropriation of large 
haciendas and ranchos, and Ayala Castellanos and Jiménez Huerta (2005) estimate that between 
1920 and 1999 some 50 ejidos were created in what is now the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara 
comprising 49,901 hectares of land (almost 500 square kilometers). Most of these ejidos were 
formed in the 1920s and 1930s, and some of them were expanded in later years. 
96 This only applies to the areas designated for settlement, and for the area occupied by farming 
land parcels, not the communal area.  
97 Harner and his colleagues (2009) estimated that housing development of informal origin between 
1970 and 2000 in Greater Guadalajara amounted to 13,374 hectares, which means about half of the 
land developments in this period. 
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In the economic crisis and the structural adjustments, federal housing agencies, 
particularly the INFONAVIT, continued its level of housing actions in the Metropolitan 
Area of Guadalajara.98 Similar to the rest of the country, public housing agencies changed 
their modus operandi in the 1990s. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the INFONAVIT Reform 
in 1992 was oriented towards deregulation and stimulating the participation of the private 
sector in housing production. Actually, 1989 was the last year in which INFONAVIT 
acquired land in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara. 99 After the 1992 Reform, the 
INFONAVIT stopped acquiring land reserves and began to sell its land portfolio to 
developers. Since then it was the developers of social housing rather than INFONAVIT 
who created large extensions of land reserve at the urban periphery. The INFONAVIT 
became the principal finance institution of housing acquisition by granting mortgages but 
without enforcing effective inspection and regulation on developers. Meanwhile, housing 
agencies of the Jalisco State government were in a much more vulnerable position during 
the economic recession and the structural adjustment, as they did not have their own 
resources, and were completely dependent on fiscal resources.    
According to Harner and his colleagues (2009), while new housing development in 
the 1980s was driven mainly by the expansion of informal settlements, in the 1990s, the 
production of all the three housing types (social, informal and high-end housing) increased, 
particularly social housing and high-income housing. In other words, “formality” once 
again dominates housing production in the 1990s (see Figure 5.1).  
                                                          
98 Throughout the 1980s, the INFONAVIT led the construction of 30,471 social housing dwellings 
in the metropolitan area, or roughly 3,000 units per year, although it ceased constructing three-
bedroom apartments as it had in the 1970s in an attempt to reduce the construction cost (Regalado 
Santillán 1995: 104, 105, calculated by the author). In 1987, approximately one tenth of the 
population of Guadalajara lived in a social housing dwelling constructed by the INFONAVIT (Ibid: 
105). 
99 In the first two decades of its operation (1972-1992) INFONAVIT had created its own territorial 
reserves by purchasing private or public land, as well as through the expropriation of the ejidal land. 
In the 1980s, 32 acquisitions in the metropolitan area totaled 282.3 hectares (8.8 hectares per 
acquisition), insignificant if compared to the extension of settlements of irregular origin in the city 
(16,337 hectares mentioned above, INFONAVIT, Informe Anual de Actividades, 1980-1989, 
calculated by the author).  
150 
 
  
Figure 5.1: Housing Development by type in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara: 
1970s-1990s (hectares) 
(Source: Harner et al. 2009; note that here informal housing refers to those of 
informal origin but had been regularized) 
 
5.1.2. 2000s and 2010s: The Social Housing Boom in a Consolidated Metropolitan 
Context 
 
Population growth of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara was under 2% annually 
in the 2000s. Yet, the spatial expansion and intra-urban migration accelerated. The core of 
the metropolitan area continued losing population: between 1990 and 2015, the population 
of the municipality of Guadalajara decreased by 190,000, that is, 11.5% of its population 
in 1990. In contrast, the far periphery (Tlajomulco de Zúñiga, El Salto, Juanacatlán and 
Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos) experienced rapid growth. There, annual population growth 
rate in the far was 8.9% between 2000 and 2005, and 10.6% between 2005 and 2010 
(INEGI, census data). While in 1980, 70% of the population of Greater Guadalajara lived 
in the municipality of Guadalajara, by 2015 this number had dropped to 30%. Meanwhile 
by in 2015 over half of the metropolitan population resided in the first ring, and about 17% 
in the second ring (Figure 5.2).    
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Over the years the earlier self-built housing (1970s onwards) in general has been 
consolidated. Many of these dwellings developed a second floor, or a second house in the 
same lot. In some cases extra rooms were built or made available for renting or commercial 
use. Yet, physical and social decay can also be observed in these consolidated settlements 
of informal origin. In 2009 62% of the informal settlements in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara had not been regularized (Jiménez Huerta and Cruz Solis 2014).    Moreover, 
as the family expands and the first-generation settlers pass away, new forms of informality 
around inheritance emerged years after the original house was regularized (Jiménez Huerta 
and Cruz Solis 2014).  
While the deceleration of the overall population growth in the Metropolitan Area is 
favorable for reducing the housing deficit, housing demand has remained high due to the 
historical housing deficit (both quantitative and qualitative) and the family cycle creating 
new household formation. Jiménez Huerta and Cruz Solis’s case study of Guadalajara 
(2014) documented that the second generation of the original settlers in informal 
settlements may stay in or return to their parents’ home, or leave to self-build/ rent a home. 
Meanwhile both the second and especially the third generation often are reluctant to 
replicate their grandparents’ and parents’ path to homeownership: for some of them, at 
least, social housing became an appealing alternative.    
Indeed, one of the most dramatic changes in the urban and housing development in 
Greater Guadalajara in the 2000s has been the proliferation of social housing projects in 
the urban periphery, which is the focus of this chapter. Homeownership through self-
building has become less feasible and to a certain extent has been squeezed out by the 
social housing boom.  
Developers of social housing projects took advantage of the availability of cheap 
land at the urban periphery of the metropolitan areas. After the market-oriented housing 
policy reform in the 1990s, social housing became a profitable business for developers. In 
an interview in 2002, Julian de Nicolas Gutiérrez, the then general director of Homex 
specified the profile of its clients as “those whose income equals 2 minimum wages” and 
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“could obtain a home mortgage of around 150,000 to 200,000 Pesos” (Mural 2002-Jun-
03).100 Developers acquired low cost land in the urban periphery upon which to construct 
massive social housing projects. In order to make the business profitable and “affordable” 
enough for the low-income working class to purchase with the mortgage available to them, 
developers did whatever possible to thereby minimizing the cost and making the housing 
“affordable” for lower income populations. Developers also reduced production costs by 
failing to provide adequate infrastructure and by skipping on the quality of construction of 
social housing units which often failed to meet the standard specified in the contract.  As 
the next sections will underscore, the lack of effective regulation of housing and urban 
development by the municipal governments facilitated these developer practices and their 
profit seeking. In this sense, the irregularities committed by developers and the municipal 
government in Tlajomulco in the 2000s are not necessarily different from the legal low-
income subdivisions in Guadalajara during the rapid urbanization from 1950s to 1970s. 
What distinguished the social housing boom in the 2000s is its scale- housing development 
has been industrialized and financialized. 
Whereas the population growth in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara 
decelerated since the 1990s, the city’s spatial expansion accelerated. As figure 5.3 
illustrates, the population grew at 1.8% annually between 2000 and 2010, and 1.6% 
between 2010 and 2015, while the urban built-up area grew at 3% (1.2 percentage points 
above the population growth rate) and 4% (2.4 percentage points above the population 
growth rate). This spatial expansion is accompanied by a significant population 
redistribution within the metropolitan area, as well as a transformation of the landscape of 
                                                          
100  In early 2000s, the INFONAVIT in Jalisco financed social housing up to 412,000 Pesos. 
Housing production at time exceeded the capacity of the INFONAVIT in finance- those dwellings 
completed by the end of the year would not been able to be assigned a mortgage (Mural 2004-02-
17). By 2015, there are still dwellings priced around 270 thousand Pesos in the Zona Valle of 
Tlajomulco, according to the information gathered in the first Housing Fair held by the 
CANADEVI, while within the Periferico there was no new housing for sale under 425 thousand 
Pesos. A low-income working class may expect to seek a dwelling with a credit offered by the 
INFONAVIT of 250 thousand Pesos plus a subsidy offered by the federal government (El 
Informador 2015).    
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the rural hinterland.101 Gated communities of different kinds (high end housing and social 
housing) have also proliferated in the metropolitan area accentuating residential 
segregation (Illustration 5.1), and the social-political fragmentation of the city has 
deepened in this period reflecting a general trend of rising inequality (Cruz Solis et al. 
2008). Particularly, in the far periphery, the new urbanizations are far from being integrated 
into the urban fabric (Ayala and Jiménez Huerta 2011).   
 
Figure 5.2: Spatial Distribution of the Population of the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara: 1940-2015 
(Source: INEGI, census data, calculated by the author) 
                                                          
101 By 1990s, the territory of the municipality of Guadalajara had almost been saturated. From 2000 
to 2015, the built-up area of the Metropolitan Area increased by 26,085 hectares: 14,604 hectares 
in the first-ring municipalities (8,424 hectares in Zapopan alone) and 10,975 in the second ring 
(7,703 hectares in Tlajomulco alone, see IMEPLAN 2016: 183, calculated by the author). 
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Figure 5.3: Annual Growth Rate of the Built-Area and the Population of the 
Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara 
(Source: Fausto Brito 2003, IMEPLAN 2016: 183, excluding Zapotlanejo) 
 
 
Illustration 5.1. A High-End Gated Community in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara (photo taken by the author) 
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To summarize, in 1990s, the predominant form of housing access for low-income 
urban working class in Guadalajara was still informal settlements on ejidal or private land. 
Local government worked with federal agencies in the regularization and service provision. 
In the 1990s, and particularly since the 2000s, against the backdrop of deregulation and 
mortgage boom for lower and middle income groups, social housing became an important 
low-income housing option, and to certain extent has replaced self-built housing in 
informal settlements as a path to home ownership.     
 
5.2. The Dramatic Rise of Housing and Population Expansion in Tlajomulco de 
Zúñiga, 2000-2015  
 
5.2.1. The Scale of Social Housing Boom 
 
Tlajomulco de Zúñiga was traditionally an agricultural town at least until the late 
1990s (Vargas Salinas 1997). The municipality has gone through a rapid population growth 
and spatial expansion in the past 15 years: from 2000 to 2015 the population increased 
fourfold (Figure 5.4), and the built-up area tripled (IMEPLAN 2016: 183). This dramatic 
urban expansion was mainly due to the social housing boom, 102  and by the 2000s 
Tlajomulco had become a “dormitory city” of the metropolitan area (Illustration 5.2).  
From 1997, the municipal government started to grant a large amount of 
authorizations for housing projects- both social housing projects and high-end housing 
projects.103 While in the 1990s, the municipal government received only 34 applications to 
build housing projects on 16.1 hectares of land, between 2000 and 2005, there were 210 
applications to build on 3360.81 hectares of land (Cruz Solis et al 2008). Between 2000 
                                                          
102 Between 2001 and 2003, 33 social housing projects (together offering 21,262 dwellings) were 
constructed in the municipality. The population increased from 124 thousand in 2000 to 238 
thousand in 2003. Of the population growth of 115 thousand, 106 thousand was due to the migration 
into the newly-built social housing projects (Municipal Government of Tlajomulco 2004: 23). 
103 For a list of municipal presidents of Tlajomulco and state governors of Jalisco, please refer to 
Table 5.1 and Table 5.2, respectively.  
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and 2009 the urban built-up area of the municipality expanded from 7,553 hectares to 
12,061 hectares and represented about 40% of the total urban spatial growth of the 
metropolitan area in the same period (Ayala and Jiménez Huerta 2011).   
Table 5.1: Municipal Presidents of Tlajomulco 1995- 2021 
Time eriod (3-year term) Municipal President Affiliation of Political Party  
1995-1997 Miguel Guzmán de la Torre PAN 
1998-2000 Ernesto Díaz Márquez  PRI 
2001-2003 Guillermo Sánchez Magaña PRI 
2004-2006 Andrés Zermeño Barba PAN 
2007-2009 Antonio Tatengo Ureña PAN 
2010-2012 Enrique Alfaro Ramírez PRD104  
2012-2015 Ismael del Toro Castro MC 
2015-2018 Alberto Uribe Camacho MC 
2018-2021 Salvador Zamora Zamora MC 
 
Table 5.2: State Governor of Jalisco, 1995-2024 
Time period (6-year term) State Governor Affiliation of Political Party 
1995-2001 Alberto Cárdenas Jiménez PAN 
2001-2006 Francisco Ramírez Acuña PAN 
2006-2007 Gerardo Octavio Solís Gómez 
(ínterim) 
None 
2007-2013 Emilio González Márquez PAN 
2013-2018 Jorge Aristóteles Sandoval Díaz PRI 
2018-2024 Enrique Alfaro Ramírez MC 
 
Almost all of these housing projects were developed by commercial developers.105 
Among all the lots constructed between 2000 and 2006, about 60% were constructed by 9 
                                                          
104 Enrique Alfaro Ramírez later ran as the candidate for the Party of Citizens’ Movement (MC) in 
the 2012 Election of the State Governor of Jalisco.    
105 Some social housing units were offered by the state housing agency/public-sector developer 
(IPROVIDE) and the municipal government. For example, Las Chivas is a social housing project 
developed by the IPROVIDE and the municipal government for relocating the 200 families that 
previously resided in the irregular settlement Arroyo Seco, where flooding was frequent. Between 
2000 and 2006 housing development directly developed by public housing agencies occupied only 
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major developers106 and the rest by some 120 developers (Fausto Brito and Mungia Huato 
2010). Homex, a developer that had close connection with President Vicente Fox (2000-
2006, see Marosi 2017), alone developed 34,782 lots between 2002 and 2006 almost equal 
to the other eight largest developers (Fausto Brito and Mungia Huato 2010).     
 
Illustration 5.2: Scale of the Social Housing Boom in the Zona Valle, Tlajomulco 
(most of the built area seen in this picture are social housing projects; photo taken 
by the author from a fight that he took) 
                                                          
19.77 hectares of land– just over one-half a percent of all the land urbanized for housing projects 
in this period.    
106 These are: Homex, GIG, Dynamica, SIMACO, CADU, Consorcio Hogar, Consorcio Terrenos, 
GEO and DOMUS.  
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Figure 5.4: Population of Tlajomulco: 1930-2015 
(Source: INEGI) 
 
Using the information on the licenses of urbanization issued by the municipal 
government from 2000 to 2015, I reconstructed the trajectory of the proliferation of 
housing projects in Tlajomulco. From 2000 to 2015, the municipal government issued 577 
licenses of urbanization in total. Among them, 362 were for social housing projects, 159 
for high-end housing projects, and 14 for industrial parks and commercial complexes (See 
Figure 5.5).  
Between 2000 and 2013 some 5,591 hectares of land was authorized for 
urbanization in Tlajomulco, and some 109 social housing projects were constructed in the 
municipality107 (approximately 3,528 hectares). In the same period, high-end residential 
housing complexes occupied 1,497 hectares of land, and industrial parks/ commercial 
complexes occupied 341.7 hectares of land (see Figure 5.6).  
 
                                                          
107 This number (109) is smaller than the number of licenses of urbanization issued for social 
housing project (272), because for larger social housing projects, licenses were often issued per 
phase (“etapa”).  
16137 15634 18608 26207 35145
50697 68428
100797
123619
220630
416626
549442
0
100000
200000
300000
400000
500000
600000
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
159 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Licenses of Urbanization Issued by the Municipal Government of 
Tlajomulco by Categories: 2000-2015 
(Source: information provided by the municipal government of Tlajomulco, and the 
author’s own elaboration) 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Land Authorized for Urbanization in Tlajomulco by Types of Land Use: 
2000-2013 
(Source: information provided by the municipal government of Tlajomulco, and the 
author’s own elaboration) 
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Figure 5.7: Land Approved for Urbanization in Tlajomulco: 2000-2013 (Ha)  
(Source: information provided by the municipal government of Tlajomulco, and the 
author’s own elaboration) 
 
Figure 5.5 and 5.7 also showed that both the number of licenses for urbanization 
and the hectares of land approved for urbanization varied significantly from year to year. 
The two administrations in the 2000s, Guillermo Sánchez (PRI, 2001-2003) and Andres 
Zermeño (PAN, 2004-2006), were particularly dramatic in promoting housing projects, 
both in terms of the amount of land authorized for urbanization and the number of licenses. 
In both cases, most of the licenses were issued in the last year of the administration. While 
only 1,551 hectares of land was authorized in the municipality for housing projects from 
1973 to 2000 (La Verdad 2013), in 2003 (the last year of the Guillermo Sánchez 
administration) some 1,538 hectares of land was authorized for housing projects (social 
housing and high-end housing combined). Since 2007 the expansion of social housing 
began to slow, especially in terms of the hectares of land authorized for housing production. 
Section 5.3.2 will discuss the politics of social housing development in the five 
administrations that governed Tlajomulco between 2001 and 2015.  
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Social housing projects varied significantly in their size (see Figure 5.8). Some 
large projects such as Hacienda Santa Fe and Chulavista have 15,853 (451.3 ha) and 14,048 
lots (224.8 ha) respectively, while small projects such as Los Mesquites have under 100 
lots and occupied less than 2 hectares of land.  
 
Figure 5.8: Social Housing Projects in Tlajomulco by Number of Lots 
(Source: information provided by the municipal government of Tlajomulco, and the 
author’s own elaboration) 
 
 
Illustration 5.3: A Social Housing Project under Construction in Tlajomulco (photo 
taken by the author) 
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5.2.2. The Concentration of Low-Income Mortgage Borrower in Tlajomulco: The Role of 
INFONAVIT   
 
As the most of the social housing dwellings are acquired with a mortgage from the 
INFONAVIT, this section will discuss the role of INFONAVIT behind the social housing 
boom in Tlajomulco. Since INFONAVIT’s creation in 1972, the State of Jalisco has been 
one of its major fields of operation. The general trend of credit allocation by INFONAVIT 
in Jalisco closely tracks that of the whole country. A significant expansion of housing 
credits occurred since late 1990s ‘’ an annual increase of 13% from 1998 to 2015, two 
percentage points above the national level.108   
Housing credits granted by the INFONAVIT in Jalisco in the 2000s has been highly 
concentrated in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara and especially in the far peripheral 
municipalities of the Greater Guadalajara (particularly Tlajomulco) which were primary 
targets for INFONAVIT mortgages.109 Figure 5.9 shows a fairly stable pattern of mortgage 
allocation in the Metropolitan Area between 2008 and 2017, on average, 45,000 credits 
were granted in the Metropolitan Area each year, under 4% in the municipality of 
Guadalajara, under 30% in the first ring, and between 65%-70% in the second ring. In this 
period, Tlajomulco concentrated between 32% and 42% of the mortgages allocated in the 
Greater Guadalajara (Indicadores Operativos de Crédito, INFONAVIT, calculated by the 
author).  
After the Mayor of Tlajomulco, Alberto Uribe (2015-2018) announced that no more 
construction of dwellings smaller than 90 sq. m. would be authorized, the boom appears to 
decline in 2017 and in 2018. While the number of INFONAVIT mortgages granted in the 
Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara slightly increased in 2017 from the previous year, 
                                                          
108 Source: Créditos Ejercidos por Delegación: Histórico 1972-2016, Indicadores Operativos de 
Crédito, INFONAVIT. 
109 Juanacatlán and Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos, being the most remote and least populated 
municipalities in the Metropolitan Area, to certain extent replicated the social housing boom in 
Tlajomulco in early 2000s. While prior to 2011, INFONAVIT mortgages were essentially absent 
from Juanacatlán, in 2014, 1,731 mortgages were granted in this municipality (Table 5.9).  
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mortgages assigned in Tlajomulco decreased by approximately 4,000 (Indicadores 
Operativos de Crédito, INFONAVIT, calculated by the author).110   
 
Figure 5.9: Mortgages Issued by INFONAVIT in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara: 2008-2017 
(Source: Indicadores Operativos de Crédito, INFONAVIT) 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, in the 2000s the INFONAVIT mortgages for housing 
acquisition were reoriented towards the low-income affiliates whose income was below 4 
times the minimum wages. Many of the low-income affiliates acquired a new social 
housing dwelling by combining a mortgage and the subsidies offered by the federal 
government. Yet, in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, this trend was translated into 
                                                          
110 It appears that after 2016, while the mortgage boom continues, more were granted in the core 
and the first ring with the proportion of the INFONAVIT mortgages in the municipality of 
Guadalajara and the first ring increasing from 15% in 2015 to 33% in 2017 (Indicadores Operativos 
de Crédito, INFONAVIT, calculated by the author). This may reflect the beginnings of re-
densification urban policy promoted by the Peña Nieto Administration (2012-2018), although the 
mortgage expansion and new social housing projects in the first ring were in the rural hinterland of 
Zapopan suggesting that it was more a switching of supply to the demand. Moreover, within the 
second ring, despite the mortgage decline in municipalities like Tlajomulco, Juanacatlán and 
Ixtlahuacán de los Membrillos since 2015, El Salto appears to be still going through a rapid 
mortgage expansion.     
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an uneven spatial distribution of the INFONAVIT mortgages allocated to the low-income 
workers. The mortgages allocated in Tlajomulco (among other municipalities of the second 
ring) were disproportionately concentrated in workers earning less than 4 minimum wages 
(as well as those earning less than 2 minimum wages), compared to other municipalities in 
the metropolitan area as well as the national level. Take the year 2015 as an example, while 
in the municipality of Guadalajara, 15.7% of the mortgages were assigned to affiliates 
earning less than 2 times the minimum wage, this numbers was 58.2% in Tlajomulco 
(Indicadores Operativos de Crédito, INFONAVIT, calculated by the author).  
Moreover, most of the mortgages that were allocated to workers earning less than 
4 minimum wages (as well as those earning less than 2 minimum wages) were channeled 
to the far peripheries of Guadalajara. From 2009 to 2016, over 75% of the mortgages 
assigned to affiliates earning under 2 minimum wages were channeled to the far periphery 
of the metropolitan area -- in 2012, almost 60% of these mortgages were channeled to 
Tlajomulco alone (Indicadores Operativos de Crédito, INFONAVIT, calculated by the 
author). Similarly, in 2015, 62.7% of the mortgages assigned to affiliates earning under 4 
minimum wages were channeled to Tlajomulco.      
In sum, the fact that most affordable housing options for the low-income working 
class were allocated in the far periphery, combined with the passivity of the INFONAVIT 
(which does not seek to alter the geographic distribution of the mortgages) became a 
powerful sorting mechanism that centrifugally pushed the low-income home seekers to the 
outskirts of the city and beyond. As in other major cities in the country, the social housing 
boom in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara represents a dramatic wave of spatial 
reorganization and stratification of the city.   
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5.3. The Failure of Planning for the Social Housing Boom: a Tlajomulco Case Study  
 
5.3.1. Missing Urban Planning, Corruption and the Social Housing Boom  
 
Tlajomulco has a territory of 70,897 hectares, which is almost one third of that of 
the metropolitan area (Ayala and Jiménez Huerta 2011). Land in the municipality is 
abundant and flat, which has traditionally been used as cropland. Yet, as early as in 1998, 
local newspaper La Verdad (2013) noticed that land owners in the municipality who were 
not motivated in agricultural production often sold their land to developers for housing 
development. These features soon made the municipality, together with Zapopan, a 
desirable target for developers and especially speculators in the land market. These two 
municipalities concentrated about half of the new constructions of the housing projects at 
the time (Mural 2002-09-04). However, compared to Zapopan land prices in Tlajomulco 
were much lower111 and authorizations of urbanization and construction were even easier 
to obtain. While in other municipalities of the metropolitan area it could take more than a 
year for developers to obtain the permission of urbanization, in Tlajomulco, the process 
usually took only about four months (Mural 2002-06-20).112  
This was not the result of a modern, efficient urban governance. On the contrary, 
urban planning and regulatory framework on urban and housing development were 
practically non-existent in Tlajomulco in late 1990s and 2000s when the social housing 
boom started. The Manuel Guzmán de la Torre Administration (1995-1997) developed 
urbanization plans but they never entered into force. The following Ernesto Díaz Marquez 
Administration (1997-2000) did not approve the plan either, but instead made a new plan 
of urbanization, which did not enter into force either: truly an example of “many plans but 
                                                          
111 According to José Luis Cuéllar, director general de Quic Proyectos, in 2002, land sold for 100 
Pesos per sq. m. was still available in Tlajomulco, not so much in Zapopan (without any service/ 
infrastructure, Mural 2002-06-20). That said, this was already much higher than late 1990s, when 
ejidal land was sold at 20-30 Pesos per sq. m. (Martines Macias 2005).  
112 In an interview with Mural (2004-02-17), the former Delegate of the INFONAVIT in Jalisco 
commented that, in Tlajomulco, the developers could start to “mobilize their machines” within 45 
days after they submitted their application for urbanization and construction.  
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no planning” as described by Ward (1990) for Mexico City in the 1980s. The Guillermo 
Sánchez Magaña Administration (2001-2003) did promulgate the plan of urbanization 
made by his predecessor but did not follow it, instead later, formulating yet a new urban 
plan (Mural 2003-10-13). It was not until the Andrés Zermeño Administration (2004-2006) 
when the municipal government had an official urban development plan that in some way 
intended to construct necessary infrastructure to accommodate future urban development 
(Mural 2004-06-18).  
Early urban plans often lacked technical rigidity and failed to adequately address 
certain important aspects. For example, although Tlajomulco has a large extension of flat 
land, it is also prone to flooding: some bodies of water had dried up, but they remained as 
natural water cause during the wet season. Unfortunately, the early urban planning did not 
include a thorough hydrologic study, and a lot of the housing projects were actually built 
on those natural water courses with no proper infrastructure to deal with the potential 
flooding during the wet season, which caused enormous material loss in later years (Mural 
2004-10-07).  
The implementation of the existing urban planning and zoning code was severely 
compromised therefore.  There were also loopholes insofar as the municipality is divided 
into a number of districts (currently 18), each of which is subject to a local partial plan 
established by the municipal government with zoning code. However, in the early 2000s 
when the social housing boom started, developers made their own partial plans without 
consideration of the surrounding area or the municipality as a whole. As one municipal 
official stated to me in an interview: “When Alfaro initiated his administration in 2010, it 
was really a real estate chaos- there were constructions everywhere, and no one knew what 
and how the developers were constructing”.113 
Prior to the 2008 Law of Urban Development, the municipal council members were 
supposed to vote for or against the authorization of urbanization and the change of land 
                                                          
113 Also verified in Fausto Brito and Mungia Huato 2010. 
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use.114 The municipal council members, some with a vested interest in the real estate sector, 
often paved way for developers to expand their business in the municipality (Fausto Brito 
and Mungia Huato 2010).  
Although social housing is often considered as “formal housing development” (in 
contrast to the previous self-built informal housing on ejidal land), the case of Tlajomulco 
reveals that social housing can also be fraught with irregularities of all kinds.  These include 
violation to the land use zoning codes, lack of proper technical study regarding the 
feasibility of the project, failure to pay the required fees or guarantees to the municipal 
government, lack of proper land title, not to mention the often substandard quality of 
construction and the lack of infrastructure (Proceso 2010-01-21).115 Once a housing project 
is completed, the municipal government is supposed to conduct an inspection to give final 
approval. Only when the project is accepted (“municipalized”) can the municipal 
government deliver services to the new housing project.  Some projects were never 
approved, and in theory are not entitled to receive services and are invariably in the worst 
situation (such as the Projects Silos, Providencia, etc.). A study carried out by the Enrique 
Alfaro Administration (2010-2012) found that in 2010 some 109 housing projects (both 
high-end and social housing) presented some form of irregularity, affecting about 350,000 
people. Among these 109 projects, 59 had not been “municipalized”, though people already 
lived there (85,969 dwellings, see Municipal Government of Tlajomulco 2010 and La 
Jornada Jalisco 2010-07-04). By September 2012, the end of Alfaro’s Administration, still 
44 projects had not been municipalized, and while the municipal government made some 
attempt to fix the problems new irregularities were exposed (El Informador 2012-09-13).  
The INFONAVIT did not play an adequate role in regulating housing development; 
nor did it sought to influence the geographic distribution of the mortgages to avoid its 
                                                          
114 Under the current law, this task is delegated to a technical group in the municipal government, 
and the municipal president is given more power in deciding whether or not to authorize the housing 
project (interview with municipal official).  
115 Guillermo Sánchez defended his housing policy that although his administration approved many 
housing projects, but none was irregular settlement (Mural 2004-01-05). 
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concentration in Tlajomulco. Though by early 1990s the Institute had discarded its role in 
leading housing construction for the working class, it could, in theory, boycott the 
developers who did not meet the required standard by denying granting mortgages to those 
housing projects. However, for most of the early 2000s the INFONAVIT Jalisco delegation 
office was more dedicated to promoting the growth of the housing business than 
supervising the quality of the housing projects. No matter whether the housing project was 
approved the INFONAVIT allocated mortgages anyway (El Informador 2012-09-13). 
Velasco Carmona, director of the Jalisco Delegation of the INFONAVIT until 2004, 
commented that INFONAVIT did not impose its own regulatory frameworks upon the 
municipalities but simply went along with municipal governmental decisions. (Mural 
2004-02-17).116  The Subdirector of Finance and Planning of the INFONAVIT, Gómez 
Dorantes, in an interview with Emeequis in 2011 stated the social housing “disaster” in 
places like Tlajomulco was the fault of the municipal authorities, and that the social 
problems observed were the result of poor service delivery, not the housing quality.     
Although the metropolitan area was clearly defined by late 1990s and the social 
housing boom in Tlajomulco was a metropolitan-wide phenomenon, coordination among 
the municipalities or urban planning at the metropolitan level was ineffective. The previous 
Metropolitan Urban Development Plan dated to 1982 which even if had been implemented 
systematically it was out-of-date by the beginning of the 2000s. In 2000 the Metropolitan 
Council and the State Council of Urban Development proposed an updated plan of 
territorial organization at the metropolitan level, and which interestingly called for a re-
densification within the first ring in an attempt to curb further urban sprawl. Yet nothing 
happened to curb housing development, and the metropolitan council focused on traffic 
and highway construction (Mural 2004-11-23; see also Ward and Robles 2012).       
                                                          
116 This attitude of the INFONAVIT made investment in social housing projects in Jalisco almost 
“a guaranteed success” (Mural 2004-02-17), which raised the indignation of the CANADEVI- 
which issued an official complaint against Velasco Carmon. Even the Governor of Jalisco 
Francisco Ramirez (PAN, 2001-2006) requested the citizens to denounce the irregularities 
committed by the INFONAVIT-Jalisco (Mural 2004-02-19).  
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Most of these projects were located by or close to the old townships and settlement 
in order to take advantage of the existing infrastructure of the place (sewage, wastewater 
treatment plant, power grid, running water, road, routes of public transportation, schools, 
etc.), or along the major expressways (such as Guadalajara-Morelia expressway and the 
Guadalajara-Chapala expressway). Yet, little was done to expand the existing secondary 
and tertiary infrastructure to accommodate the housing expansion. The fact that the social 
housing boom was not accommodated by the improvement of infrastructure and service 
provision caused multi-faceted problems, such as the deficits in schools (at all levels), 
hospitals and ambulances, public transportation, water supply and drainage; as well as 
worsening traffic congestion and deteriorating public security. These deficits not only 
affected the new-comers but also the residents of the nearby old townships (Mural 2002-
12-30), which led to numerous protests. 
The municipal government could do little to address the deficit in infrastructure and 
service largely because it had no fiscal resources to satisfy the unmet demand for 
infrastructure and service. At best, the municipal authorities came up with some provisional 
measures such as the dispatch of water trucks to deliver water (Mural 2002-04-27), and 
provide support for the purchase of “provisional (temporary) classrooms” (Mural 2002-12-
31).  
The municipal government requested the State government to channel more 
resources to health, education and public security, as these are shared responsibilities 
between the state and the municipal governments (Mural 2003-01-01). It was not until 2004 
that the Secretariat of Education of the State conducted a field research to quantify the 
demand for school facilities. The municipal governments also attempted to pressure the 
developers to contribute to the provision of service and infrastructure- not only within the 
housing projects (such as schools and police cars), but also the surrounding area (Mural 
2004-04-20, 2004-09-06, 2004-09-20).117  
                                                          
117 In order to extend the Adolf Horn Avenue, which was the only access to the social housing 
projects in the Zona Valle but had only one lane in each direction at the time, the Andrés Zermeño 
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What the successive municipal authorities (in particular the Guillermo Sánchez and 
the Andrés Zermeño administrations) failed to do was to curb the further chaotic expansion 
of the social housing projects and regulate the urban and housing development properly.  
But as the director of urbanization of the Andrés Zermeño Administration explained, the 
municipal government would not have any reason to deny the application of the license, if 
the developer had met all requirements of the regulatory framework (Mural 2004-04-20). 
The Guillermo Sánchez Administration approved an unprecedented number of housing 
projects in the last year of its three-year term (2003), and 2003 saw the single most 
authorizations of urbanization and most land authorized for housing development. Despite 
the opposition from various members of the city council, Guillermo Sánchez claimed that 
“no law establishes a maximum number of projects that we can approve… the municipal 
government is doing no more than what corresponds to its interest, and if the council 
members don’t like it, they can feel free to vote against it” (Mural 2003-12-24).118  
There are many stories of corruption associated with the construction authorizations. 
It was reported that municipal council members received bribe for the licenses of 
urbanization that they authorized, and also documented that municipal functionaries took 
bribes for discounts for the construction authorizations (Martinez Macias 2005). Several 
                                                          
Administration mobilized municipal and state fiscal resources, as well as collaborated with the 
neighboring municipality of Tlaquepaque that shared the avenue. The municipal government also 
convinced several major developers operating in the area to contribute with personnel and 
equipment (Mural 2004-11-11). Similarly a contract regarding the construction of pipeline for 
waste water during the Administration of Antonio Tatengo was signed with several major 
developers. These developers were required to invest 133.4 million Pesos to construct 25,890 
meters of pipeline, which would serve more than 60,000 dwellings, and in exchange the municipal 
government offered a discount of 66.7 million Pesos in license fees (Mural 2009-12-15).  For the 
construction of a bridge over the Canal of Las Pintas during the Enrique Alfaro Administration 
(2009-2012) the municipal government invested 1.8 million Pesos, and some major developers in 
the area contributed the other 3.1 million (Mural 2010-02-10). 
118 A dramatic event occurred in the last week of this administration: although the Director of Public 
Work assured that all the authorizations were issued with full legality (Mural 2003-12-20), a few 
days later, in the last day of the administration, the director himself was removed from his position 
by the municipal president, as the former refused to approve two housing projects (Mural 2003-12-
31). In the last day of the Administration, five housing projects were approved (Mural 2004-03-
18). 
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municipal council members suspected that a housing project was approved because the 
owner of the land was a high-ranking municipal officer, who wanted to sell the land to the 
developer (Mural 2003-12-24). 119  Humberto Rivera Castañeda, a municipal council 
member during the Guillermo Sánchez Administration, was accused of violent 
displacement and expropriation of communal land for the construction of a housing project 
whose developer was also a close family member of the councilman (Mural 2004-07-12). 
Guillermo Sánchez himself was expelled from the PRI in 2004 after the Party lost the 
subsequent municipal election, and because there were multiple accusations of 
irregularities in the authorizations of housing projects (Mural 2004-03-15).120  
The following Andrés Zermeño Administration stopped issuing authorization for 
urbanization during the first months of its first year and promised to review the 
authorizations of urbanization and to fix the irregularities in the housing development in 
the municipality. 121 However, his administration replicated similar irregularities in the 
authorization of new social housing projects, and in 2006, the last year of the administration, 
another 78 licenses of urbanization were issued (56 were for social housing projects), 
which would lead to the urbanization of 1,248 hectares of land (898 hectares for social 
housing projects, see Figure 5.6 and 5.7).  
                                                          
119  Even Guillermo Sánchez himself developed a housing project together with other ex-
functionaries. His predecessor, Ernesto Díaz Márquez, even had real estate business operating in 
California (Martinez Macias 2005). Functionaries of the Guillermo Sánchez Administration 
fraudulently sold land lots that were not suit for housing development to 236 persons for housing 
construction, under the false promise that they would take care of all the paperwork, but only 24 
sales were registered in the municipal government, and buyers did not even have the information 
of the exact location, size or cadastral value of the land they purchased (Mural 2004-09-06).   
120 Another charge was that in the last day of the administration, Guillermo Sánchez and a group of 
council members held a secret meeting, in which each received a considerable sum of bonus- and 
the Mayor received 300 thousand Pesos. Officials from this administration also attempted to 
illegally take certain official documents (construction plans) away from the government building, 
but was found as the truck that carried these documents hit a utility pole and the driver was injured 
(Mural 2004-01-03, 2004-01-28, 2004-03-15).  
121 In 2004 and 2005, only 30 licenses were issued (compared to 83 in 2003), among them 17 were 
for social housing projects (compared to 41 in 2003, see Figure 5.6). 
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The housing boom seemed to slow down during the Antonio Tatengo 
Administration – at least at the beginning (2007-2009). Yet, the irregularities in the 
authorizations of construction persisted, including the arbitrary changes made to the land 
use established by the zoning code (Mural 2009-11-12, Proceso 2010-01-21). Thirteen 
housing projects approved by the Tatengo Administration did not fulfill their payment 
obligations regarding fees for paperwork to the municipal government, which caused a loss 
of 196 million Pesos in municipal fiscal revenues (Proceso 2010-01-21). The most 
notorious case was the approval of the Phase 3-5 of the social housing project Los Silos. It 
was not even clear whether this project was actually located in Tlajomulco or the 
neighboring municipality of El Salto; and to the extent that it was in El Salto the zoning 
was land for industrial use (Ornelas 2012). In December 18, 2009 alone (two weeks before 
the end of the administration) the Antonio Tatengo Administration authorized the 
construction of 2,714 dwellings in 5 social housing projects (Mural 2010-01-12). 
As discussed previously in this chapter, the municipal administrations in early 
2000s were not ready to face the challenge posted by the social housing boom. These 
administrations were led by traditional political families from the municipal seat, and were 
used to govern Tlajomulco as a small agricultural town, not a city of half-million 
population. The municipal government was almost absent there in the newly urbanized 
areas. Moreover, the influx of new residents who did not have previous connections with 
the local political families changed the political configuration of the pre-boom Tlajomulco 
(interview with municipal officials). The frustration and anger about the precarious 
condition of the social housing projects and about poor local governance ended the rule of 
both the PRI and PAN in the municipality. In 2009, Enrique Alfaro was elected as 
Municipal President as a PRD member and later joined the recently formed Party of 
Citizens’ Movement (MC).  
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5.3.2. The End to the Social Housing Boom, but Ongoing Challenges 
 
The MC rules the municipality in the 2010s, and condition in the social housing 
projects has generated a string political support base. 122  The MC’s performance in 
Tlajomulco consolidated Enrique Alfaro’s personal reputation as a capable municipal 
president and he was later (2015) elected as the Municipal President of Guadalajara, and 
then the Governor of the State of Jalisco in 2018. The MC also won elections in the majority 
of the municipalities of the metropolitan area of Guadalajara in both 2015 and 2018. In 
other words, MC’s governance in Tlajomulco after the social housing boom (or disaster) 
was a key element in its rise from a minor party to an actor of national prominence.  
The MC made serious attempts to modernize the urban governance in the 
municipality. A new Center of Administration was built in the seat of the municipality in 
2012, and more administrative offices were established where social housing projects were 
concentrated. The three administrations from Alfaro onwards promoted projects with 
greater transparency, and included participatory budgeting  and social programs as key 
components in their governance, reinforcing their legitimacy among the local electorate 
(Martínez-Páez and Rosales-Rodríguez 2016; Zepeda et al. 2014).123  From 2011, 15% of 
the fiscal revenues from property tax of the municipality was used for participatory 
budgeting, and citizens can vote for the public work they want to carry out from a list of 
possible projects. Regulations over urban and housing development were tightened, and 
from 2010 the municipality has its Municipal Plan of Urban Development and Local 
Program of Ecological Ordering.124  
                                                          
122 For example, in the Zona Valle, area where numerous mega social housing projects are located, 
the municipal government poured a large amount of resources. Local leaders of MC are very frank 
about the fact that the Zona Valle is a solid power base for the Party. 
123 For the municipal government’s review of its policy of citizen participation, see Tlajomulco, de 
la Representación a la Participación Ciudadana (link: https://tlajomulco.gob.mx/noticias/libro-
tlajomulco-de-la-representacion-la-participacion-ciudadana ) 
124 To access to the Municipal Plan of Urban Development:  
https://www.tlajomulco.gob.mx/sites/default/files/transparencia/planes/PMDU_TLAJOMULCO_
2010_documento.pdf  
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Moreover, the economy of the municipality has diversified and paved the way for 
an end of the social housing boom (interview with a municipal official).125 Note that the 
expansion of social housing did not end during the Enrique Alfaro and the Del Toro 
Administrations.126 It was not until 2016 when the municipal president Alberto Uribe 
(2015-2018) finally announced a ban against construction of dwellings smaller than 90 sq. 
m.127 At the same time the municipal government also changed the zoning code in two 
districts of the municipality from residential to industrial and commercial, which was 
believed to impede the construction of large amount of new housing units.128 Stricter 
regulations would also be applied in the application to the authorization of urbanization, 
and developers were required to present a detailed plan of service provision in the housing 
projects. In addition, for each new dwelling constructed the developer was required to plant 
four trees, etc. (Mural 2016-06-21).  
                                                          
To access to the Local Program of Ecological Ordering: 
https://www.tlajomulco.gob.mx/sites/default/files/transparencia/planes/poel_completo.pdf 
Tlajomulco was the first municipality in Jalisco to have specific plans regarding urban development 
and ecology.   
125 According to official statistics, the private investment in the municipality during the Del Toro 
Administration (7,068 million Pesos, 2012-2015) doubled the Antonio Tatengo Administration 
(3,500 million Pesos, 2007-2009). The investment in housing development as a proportion of 
private investment decreased from 67% for the Tatengo Administration, to 43% for the Alfaro 
Administration, and to only 21% for the Del Toro Administration (Municipal Government of 
Tlajomulco 2015). The modernization of the governance, the fiscal incentives offered by the 
municipal government and the passage of several important freeways are factors behind the 
economic bonanza (La Verdad 2013-05-12, Municipal Government of Tlajomulco 2015). Yet, as 
2/3 of the investment was concentrated in the commercial and service sector (Municipal 
Government of Tlajomulco 2015), it is important to take into consideration urbanization- the 
municipality is already a city with more than half million population, and thus, an important 
consumer market. 
126 The Enrique Alfaro Administration actually approved more land for social housing projects than 
his predecessor Antonio Tatengo. 
127 By the time, the sale of social housing as small as 33.5 sq. m. was still going on and dwellings 
of 56 sq. m. were approved by agencies of housing finance such as the INFONAVIT. 
128 According municipal official, with the new housing policy in Tlajomulco, the administration 
reduced 800 hectares of land that was once planned for housing development in 2 districts alone 
(Santa Fe and Totoltepec). These were H-4 area, which allows to construct up to 115 dwellings per 
hectare.  
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In the 2010s governmental coordination at the metropolitan level, as well as the 
coordination between the municipal government and the INFONAVIT has advanced. In 
2008, a new State Law of Urban Development replaced the outdated 1993 version. Under 
the new legal framework, in 2011, three agencies were established: the Council of 
Metropolitan Coordination, which involved the municipal presidents of the metropolitan 
area and the state governor; the Metropolitan Institute of Urban Planning (IMEPLAN), a 
technical institution; and the Citizen Council to uphold citizen participation in the urban 
affairs. In 2016 IMEPLAN and the municipal governments formulated the Metropolitan 
Plan of Territorial Ordering (POTMet), which finally implements a long-term vision of 
sustainable urban development at the metropolitan level. 129  However, to the 
disappointment of many the line 3 metro line that residents in Tlajomulco badly wanted to 
connect the major social housing projects to Guadalajara did not materialize. Line 3 ended 
up serving the neighboring municipality of Zapopan. In 2010 Tlajomulco was the first 
municipality in the country to collaborate with the INFONAVIT to identify the 
permanently abandoned social housing dwellings, with the aim of restoring and reselling 
these properties (Emeequis 2011).  
The challenge today, therefore, is for the municipal government to move from a 
position of curbing the chaotic housing boom in order to improve the conditions of the 
existing social housing projects and to integrate the municipality into the Metropolitan 
Area (rather than remaining as a dormitory city). The end of the social housing expansion 
in the municipality created a favorable condition for the solution of the problems. Yet, the 
accumulated deficit of infrastructure and service during the social housing boom persists, 
despite some improvement. Old aspects of precariousness such as deficit of schools, water 
supply, public transportation, treatment of waste water, public security etc., persist despite 
the efforts made. Not surprisingly, it is extremely difficult to fix the problems such as 
flooding when the social housing projects are located in areas liable to flooding unless 
major work is conducted to restructure the drainage system. Social housing projects that 
                                                          
129 Retrieved from: http://imeplan.mx/sites/default/files/IMEPLAN/POTmet_IIIFB-BajaRes.pdf  
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until today have not been authorized formally due to severe irregularities (such as Silos 
and Providencia) are largely excluded from consolidation and interventions, although the 
municipal government does provide some level of basic service. Similarly, with the issue 
of soaring housing vacancy rates unless the social issues such as public security and 
employment opportunities are addressed, it is questionable to what extent the current policy 
of reselling the abandoned properties can be successful.  
 
 
Illustration 5.4 Municipal Authorities Initiating a Public Work in Social Housing 
Project Chulavista, Tlajomulco (the second from right is the then Municipal 
President of Tlajomulco, Alberto Uribe Camacho [2015-2018]; photo taken by the 
author) 
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5.4. Municipal Governance, Urbanization and Decentralization: A Comparison with 
China   
 
5.4.1. Social Housing Boom in the Context of Mexican Decentralization 
 
Although Mexico has formally been a federalist country according to the 1917 
Constitution, a trend towards centralization became quite notable since the 1940s when the 
federal government intended to reinforce its control over the tax regime. A common 
practice in the 1980s was that the state governments exchanged part of its role in tax 
collection to the federal government for the transfer payment from the latter (Moreno 2008). 
Mexico initiated its wave of decentralization in 1983 with the modification of the Article 
115 of the Constitution that gave municipal government more autonomy, resources, and 
responsibilities. Particularly, property tax became a municipal tax. The municipal 
governments were required to assume more responsibilities in public works and service 
provision (Moreno 2005).130 In this context although municipal governments do not take 
the lead in social housing development, they are in charge of establishing the regulating it 
through zoning code and urban development plans, issuing construction authorization, 
inspecting the quality of the housing project, as well as providing basic services after the 
project is received by the government. In sum, the role of local government in social 
housing development in Mexico is regulator and service provider.  
There is general consensus regarding the main challenges faced by decentralization 
in Mexico: the gap between the resources and the expenditure responsibilities, and the 
insufficient institutional capacity of the local governments (Moreno 2007b). Similar to the 
metropolitan governments in China, municipal governments do not have their own major 
taxation power in Mexico: among municipal governments’ revenue sources, property tax 
is the most important one. Yet, most municipalities are not fiscally self-sufficient, and they 
                                                          
130 Required by the Constitution, the municipal government is responsible for the provision of water 
and sewerage systems, garbage collection and public sanitation; local streets; public lighting; police 
and local transit; civil protection; parks and open spaces; environment; zoning, land use, and urban 
planning; and civic and cultural activities (Rowland 2007). 
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depend more on the transfer payment from the federal government. In 2002, for example, 
68.1% of the municipal revenues was from federal revenue sharing/ conditional grants, and 
only 10% was from local taxes (Rowland 2007). Initiatives that intended to increase and 
institutionalize federal support for municipal government, such as the creation of the Ramo 
33 funds, are not sufficient. Regarding the development of urban infrastructures and public 
works, some are the shared responsibilities between governments of different levels (such 
as the construction of schools). In other cases, resources are a result of the synergy of 
government at different levels, such as the transfer payments (both conditional and general) 
and the metropolitan funds. 
The social housing boom/disaster in Tlajomulco reflects a gap between the 
national-level policy and local political reality. Nationally, the PAN administration led by 
Fox further advanced the neoliberal transformation of public policy, particularly regarding 
deregulation and promotion of the participation of private sector. Government at different 
levels made close alliance with the capital (Fausto Brito and Munguia Huato 2010). In the 
housing arena, the mortgage boom led by the INFONAVIT and the subsidies offered by 
the federal government and the deregulation in the urban and housing development, created 
a favorable environment for the expansion of the real estate capital. It turned the production 
of social housing for low-income population into an almost guaranteed success for 
developers.  
Yet, locally, as this chapter has documented in detail, local actors of the public 
sector (municipal governments, state government, agencies of metropolitan coordination, 
or the state delegation of INFONAVIT) were not prepared for the social housing boom. 
This boom took place in a context in which there was almost no urban planning or 
regulatory framework. The predominant logic that operated behind it was to maximization 
of profit and minimization of cost, to the interest for the developers and the financial 
agencies (INFONAVIT, SOFOLes, commercial banks). The municipal government at the 
time did no more than legitimize the interest of the real estate capital by issuing 
authorizations. While individual officials received bribes, consolidated their vested 
interests in the real estate sector, or expanded its network of favoritism, they left clusters 
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of urban and social problems that were extremely difficult to address for later 
administrations, and it is the social housing dwellers who have to suffer the real 
consequences of the social housing boom/ disaster.    
 
5.4.2. Comparing Urban Governance in China and Mexico: Politics and Land Matter 
 
Compared to Mexico, the mismatch between the (general) fiscal revenues and 
expenditure responsibilities in China is even greater. Yet, Chinese local authorities play a 
central role in leading urban development, not only as planner and regulator, but also as 
constructor, entrepreneur and developer, as the case of the social housing development in 
Nanjing represents. In the Prefecture of Nanjing, between 2000 and 2014, the metropolitan 
and the district governments demolished about almost 200 thousand urban residential 
dwellings (see Figure 4.17). Meanwhile, the local governments constructed and allocated 
a similar amount of social housing between 2005 and 2015, most of them for relocation 
purposes (Table 4.6). The form and degree of government intervention in urban 
development and redevelopment is much deeper in Nanjing. What contribute to this 
stringer exercise of local governance, if we make a comparison with Mexico? The two 
factors that most distinguish Nanjing and Guadalajara regarding urban governance are the 
political regime and the land regime.   
The political dimension matters. Mexico is a democracy in which municipal 
president is elected by the local electorate, while in China mayors and local head of the 
Communist Party are essentially appointed by the upper-level authorities. As the case of 
Nanjing and Guadalajara show, the dominant political regime largely influence the career 
pattern of the local authorities.  In China, local leaders are more likely to respond to the 
expectations from upper-level authorities, which prioritize economic growth and political 
stability, to obtain promotion. In Mexico, local leaders increasingly have to respond to the 
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demand of the local electorate to win the election, which often centers on their performance 
in undertaking public works, providing basic services and ensuring public security.131  
It is true that different political contexts lead local authorities to develop different 
preferences in the fiscal expenditures. Yet, the demand “from above” and the demand 
“from below” are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Although GDP growth is not an 
essential task for municipal authorities, it is wrong to assume that they are limited in 
provision of basic service and some infrastructure. Municipal governments in Mexico have 
increasingly engaged in local economic development. Based on a sample of 898 
municipalities between 1990 and 2005, Rodríguez-Pose and Palvicini-Corona (2012) 
found that 42.3% municipalities had established policies to foster entrepreneurship; 46.8% 
had formulated a long-term development plan based on local economy. The adoption of 
various local economic development strategies is positively associated with the 
performance of human development index. The experience of Tlajomulco in attracting 
private investment and diversifying its economy, as discussed in the previous section, is a 
good example. Bringing investment to and creating job opportunities in the municipality 
will definitely add credits for the next election.132 
                                                          
131 The decentralization in Mexico was carried out in tandem with the democratization process, 
which ended the uninterrupted rule of the PRI for seven decades in 2000. While the decentralization 
was used by the PRI to reinforce its rule in the federal government, some level political opening 
led to the rise of the opposition parties at subnational level (Rodríguez 1997). Democratization has 
a positive impact on local governance. The combination of the deepening of electoral democracy 
in Mexico and the decentralization contribute to the increasing municipal spending on public works 
beyond expanding the current expenditures (Moreno 2007a). With that said, electoral politics 
exercise much influence in the municipal investment in public work and infrastructure. Moreno 
(2005) concluded that municipal spending on infrastructure increased when the election was 
approaching, and when the local mayor belongs to a different party than the state governor. Simpser 
and his colleagues (2016) reached similar conclusion regarding how municipal spending of the 3x1 
Program prioritized electoral interests.  
132 Municipal administrations in Mexico are of 3-year term, and until recently, municipal presidents 
were not allowed to be re-elected. This to large extent became an obstacle to long-term planning 
and the professionalization of the local bureaucrats. The fact that in all the three municipal 
administrations in Tlajomulco in the 2000s approved an enormous amount of housing 
developments in the last year of the administration (or even the last month, last week) is a strong 
evidence of the lack of long-term vision of urban development. Single party rule does not guarantee 
continuity in urban policy either. Cases of unfinished infrastructure projects abandoned by the new 
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However, political regime alone is not sufficient to explain the different roles the 
local governments in the two countries play in urban development. We also need to take 
into consideration the land regime. Compared to their Mexican counterparts, local 
governments in China resemble more the features of a real estate enterprise in leading urban 
development. As discussed in Chapter 4, in the Chinese case all urban land is public, and 
the metropolitan governments monopolized land supply for urbanization. Although the 
prefectural governments in China also face the challenge of mismatch between their fiscal 
revenues and the expenditure responsibilities, and they are also dependent on the transfer 
payment system, they can operate a parallel budgetary system that is primarily based on 
the revenues from land leases to finance their infrastructure and development projects. 
More importantly, the land reserve possessed by local government can serve as collateral 
for the local government to apply for bank loans.    
Historically, municipal governments in Mexico play a much more limited role in 
land compared to their Chinese counterparts. Before the 1992 land reform, the Secretary 
of Agrarian Reform was the only agent that could expropriate the ejido land, and the 
municipal governments had little or no authority over ejidal affairs (except they may refuse 
to provide urban service). The regularization of informal settlements on ejidal land the 
dissolution of the ejidos have been undertaken by federal agencies (CORETT and 
PROCEDE). Municipal governments in Mexico do possess land. For example, in Jalisco, 
developers of social housing projects are required to donate a fixed proportion of the land 
to the municipal government. Yet, the municipal government can only use its land for 
social purposes (such as building schools, hospitals and cultural facilities), not for profit as 
in the Chinese case. 
For the municipal government of Tlajomulco, housing development does generate 
fiscal revenues such as construction authorizations and property taxes. This fiscal 
                                                          
local administrations are not rare in Nanjing and other major cities in the country. Urban 
development is a breeding bed for corruption in Nanjing as well. Both the Mayor (Ji Jianye, 2009-
2013) and the Head of Party (Yang Weize, 2011-2015) in Nanjing during the social housing boom 
were removed from their position and arrested for corruption.       
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dependency explains the momentum for the continuing social housing boom during the 
Alfaro administration. However, the contribution of the construction authorizations and 
property tax to the fiscal condition of the municipal government was not guaranteed. The 
number of construction authorizations varied greatly from year to year. Revenues from 
property tax largely depend on the efficiency in tax collection (Mural 2004-03-22). When 
the Zermeño administration took office in 2004 among the 70,000 persons who were 
supposed to pay property tax, 30,000 were not paying it (or 40,000 lots in housing projects). 
Nor did social housing projects that were not yet approved by municipal government pay 
property tax either (Mural 2004-03-22).133  
More importantly, what the prefectural government in Nanjing earned in urban and 
commercial housing development is the appreciation of land value when it is converted 
from rural to urban, or when the urban land is redeveloped. Government employs strategies 
such as public auctions of land-use rightsto maximize its market value. In comparison, 
construction authorizations and property taxes are only a minor share out of the rising land 
value, and their rate are not as sensitive to the market as land leases.   
In sum, the political and the land regime lead to different roles played by local 
governments in urban and housing development. These political and the land regimes are 
largely the product of historical development of the policy. It should be noted that this 
research does not praise the Chinese model (to finance infrastructure and development 
projects with revenues from the rising land value), as it contains systemic financial risk, 
and it is exploitative in causing the (forced) relocation in low-income neighborhoods. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the Chinese model is neither inclusive nor equitable, and lacks a 
mechanism that can hold the local authorities accountable.   
 
                                                          
133 Also, the previous Guillermo Sánchez Administration did not update its cadastral base for a few 
years- the 2003 cadastral system was based on the land price of 1999; and the cadastral system was 
fraught with errors like a lot of 200 sq. m. being registered with a value of 25 Pesos (Mural 2004-
03-03).    
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5.5. Conclusions 
 
Different from the case of Nanjing, social housing development is commercialized 
in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara. The social housing boom in Mexico was 
promoted by a neoliberal national policy that favored deregulation and the participation of 
the private sector in addressing social demands (in contrast to state intervention and 
political corporatism in the previous era). In this context, local government in Mexico does 
not directly lead the social housing construction, but rather is supposed to regulate its 
development and provide necessary infrastructure and service. Unfortunately, as the case 
of Tlajomulco showed, public sectors at local level (municipal government, state 
government, agencies of metropolitan coordination, delegation of INFONAVIT) did not 
fulfill this role. Rather, they facilitated the expansion of real estate capital by turning a 
blind eye to the irregularities committed by the developers. In other words, the institutional 
failure at planning and regulating the market contributed to profits that the developers could 
make. Local officials advanced their personal interests, and it is the low-income dwellers 
who have come to suffer the precariousness that these social housing projects represent.  
It was apparent that an ordered, sustainable urban development would require the 
synergy and coordination among governments of the three federal levels, developers, 
mortgage agencies and the citizenry, all under a well-designed and efficiently implemented 
regulatory framework. Despite the efforts of the recent administration in ending further 
social housing expansion, modernizing the governance and diversifying the local economy, 
deficits in infrastructure and service in the municipality are still rampant today and affect 
not only the social housing dwellers, but also people from the surrounding towns.  
The different roles of local governments in urban development have much to do 
with the political and the land regime in China and in Mexico. As a result of historical 
development of the policy, local governments in China in the 1990s and 2000s inherited a 
peculiar land regime from the socialist past, and local authorities were able to convert land 
supply for urbanization into a finance machine. Revenues from leasing out land-use 
rightsbecame a parallel fiscal system, which assumed the bulk of the developmentalist 
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responsibilities. For this reason, local governments in China became more entrepreneurial, 
and assuming a more central role, in promoting urban development than their counterparts 
in Mexico.  
As the Chinese and the Mexican cases show, a neoliberal urban policy facilitates 
the increasing capitalization of land by approaches such as de-regularization and promotion 
of the private sector. In a globalized world, the increasing fluidity of capital and the open-
door policy of the national governments have undermined national borders to certain extent. 
In this context, local governments across the world may assume a unique and important 
role- they control or at least regulate the locale for accumulation process (expansion of the 
real estate, industrial, financial capital, etc.). The common challenge faced by policy 
makers and the civil society in both countries, as represented in the social housing 
development, is how to reinforce the institutional capacity of the local authorities, to widen 
their resources but hold the authorities accountable, and to make urban policy more 
equitable and inclusive.   
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Chapter 6. Social Interest Housing Challenges: the Residents’ and 
Community Perspectives 
 
Chapters 2 to 5 discussed social housing development in China and in Mexico from 
a structural and institutional perspective. Particularly, we focused on the government 
agendas in social housing development. This chapter will instead take a more grassroots 
perspective and focus on the conditions in social housing projects, and the experiences of 
the residents, as well as their responses to the dislocation and precariousness of their living 
condition. I will also articulate this with a brief discussion to the literature on housing 
rights/ right to city. Do social housing dwellers see improvement in their living conditions? 
As I discussed in previous chapters, both Nanjing and Guadalajara are going through a 
wave of increasing capitalization of the land and the expansion of the real estate capital. In 
Nanjing it is the local government that plays a central role in leading urban development 
and redevelopment, while in Mexico it is the (private) market that leads urban development, 
with the local government playing a role of regulator and planner in urbanization. Local 
governments in Nanjing and in Guadalajara appear to operate under different institutional 
frameworks and with different resources when it comes to housing development for the 
low-income urban population and in this chapter I will explore how these policy 
approaches lead to different conditions for social housing dwellers in the two cases. And 
more specifically, how far do the current models of social housing development in China 
and in Mexico represent an advance in housing rights.  
This chapter will discuss the social housing projects in Nanjing and in Guadalajara 
separately, presenting the broad features about selection and dwellers occupancy, as well 
as the living conditions and the government-society relationship that evolves or is 
“constructed” in these housing projects. In the final section I will compare the two cases 
and highlight the implications of social housing development on low-income population’s 
housing rights and welfare.   
But before proceeding it is important to note that, as mentioned in Chapter 1, much 
of the data presented in this chapter comes from participant observation at the 
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neighborhood level. Although I do not intend to write a comparative ethnography here -- 
which is a limitation of this dissertation -- the fieldwork nevertheless provided me with a 
solid base to document the broad feature in terms of housing access and living condition in 
social housing projects in Nanjing and in Guadalajara. Particularly, I was able to validate 
the data obtained from other sources, such as archival data and interview with local 
authorities.  
 
6.1. Social Housing Dwellers in Nanjing: Displacement, Dispossession, and a 
Precarious Modernity  
 
This section will discuss how families get access to social housing in Nanjing, and 
the living condition and government-society relationship in the social housing projects. I 
will highlight how the relocation to a social housing project may represent various forms 
of dispossession. Note that in Chapter 4 we mentioned the typology of social housing in 
Nanjing in the 2000s and 2010s. In general, it is classified into two categories according to 
the ownership: economical housing (shared ownership between the government and the 
dweller), and public rental housing (public ownership).134 The public rental housing is used 
to house the lowest-income urban population registered in the city with housing deficit. 
The economical housing is used to accommodate low-income urban population registered 
in the city and living in housing deficit, as well as other relocated low-income urban and 
rural households of the prefecture.  
 
 
                                                          
134 The public rental housing in the 2000s and 2010s should not be confused with the public rental 
housing under the planned economy (1950s-1990s). While the public rental dwellings under the 
planned economy were a universal form of housing provision, most of them had been privatized 
and sold at a highly subsidized price to their occupants. The current stock of public rental housing 
is a form of poverty assistance and mainly targets the lowest-income group of the city’s registered 
population.  
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6.1.1. Relocation and Displacement of Urban Households  
 
In this discussion I will focus attention on urban relocations as part of the land 
development process. As Chapter 4 documented in detail, social housing development in 
Nanjing is promoted by the local government mainly as a policy tool for relocation for 
urbanization or urban redevelopment projects. The majority of the social housing dwellings 
constructed in the 2000s and 2010s in Nanjing were for relocation purposes. 135  The 
families whose homes were demolished for urbanization or urban redevelopment projects 
are able (theoretically) to use the monetary compensation from the local government to 
purchase social housing at a highly subsidized price. However, two further restrictions 
applied: first, the amount of social housing dwellings (often in floor area) that a relocated 
household can purchase is usually determined by the household size or the size of the 
original dwelling; and second actual selection of social housing project designated for 
relocation and housing purchase depends on the government.136  
Given that social housing is often tied to relocation, it represents various forms of 
dispossession and deprivations. As documented in Chapters 2 and 4, the evolution of the 
                                                          
135 Some low-income urban households living in deficient or precarious housing condition but who 
do not face relocation also wish to apply for social housing. Yet, as the local authorities prioritized 
the use of social housing for relocation purposes, social housing for the general low-income urban 
households is far from meeting the demand. The local government skillfully manipulates the 
criteria of eligibility for the welfare-type social housing. The eligibility requirement combines 
income, duration of being registered in the prefecture, as well as assets of the household. The 
limitation of household asset particularly keeps many low-income families living in the city center 
from being eligible, since their home, no matter how precarious and crowded is the condition, is 
usually valued high given the location (and thus the land value). Not only these rules narrowed 
down the eligible population into a reduced group of city residents, some of the eligible population 
does not have enough money to buy a social housing. In general, banks are reluctant to grant 
mortgage for social housing because of the socioeconomic condition of the homebuyer as well as 
the shared ownership of social housing.     
136 The prefectural housing bureau has the authority over social housing allocation. Usually, the 
authorities intend to assign the relocated families to a social housing project that is close to the 
original neighborhood/ community. Yet, this largely depends on the availability of social housing. 
In general, the in-situ relocation is feasible for the relocation of rural communities, since these 
communities were originally located outside the city. For urban relocated households, particularly 
those who previously lived in centric areas, in-situ relocation is impossible since almost all social 
housing projects are located in the periphery.     
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land regime in China since late 1980s reflects the reinforcement of the government control 
and the expansion of the government interest in land market. Local governments 
monopolized the land supply in the primary land market for urbanization, and then use the 
enormous revenues they extract from leasing out the land-use rights in order to finance 
infrastructural and developmentalist projects. This wave of urban expansion and spatial 
reorganization caused large-scale relocation of urban neighborhoods and rural 
communities. Yet, the legitimacy of the relocation process has been highly contested (Fang 
2012). Legal and regulatory frameworks established that a relocation should be for “public 
interest” (Prefectural Government of Nanjing 2010, 2017). However, this term is rather 
vague especially in so far as the “public interest” extends to the construction of a luxurious 
upper-class gated communities (as sometimes happens).  It seems that for the local 
government, any urbanization/ urban redevelopment project that the government approves 
or promotes is for public interest. And what if people simply do not want to be relocated? 
In these cases what compensation can be considered as just and fair? 
The current arrangement of land expropriation and relocation, in both urban and 
rural areas, represent various forms of dispossession and exploitation against the affected 
households and communities. Communities and households who were to be affected by 
relocation saw housing rights reduced, especially in terms of  their power and participation 
in the relocation decision-making limited process (Sun 2010). They cannot negotiate 
equally with the government or the developer to decide whether the land expropriation 
should occur, and under what conditions they want to be relocated. Rather, these are 
imposed by the government. 137  Should a negotiation over the compensation fail, the 
affected households can apply for administrative reconsideration and then the 
administrative litigation. But even in this case, the government can still first demolish the 
                                                          
137 It has been noticed that the local government has concentrated too much power in decision 
making regarding relocation. Some scholars suggested that public hearings, local legislature 
(People’s Assembly) and the court should play more important role in check and balances in this 
affair (Fang 2012).  
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building and expropriate the land during the litigation (see Prefectural Government of 
Nanjing 2001, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2010).138  
As a result, rural and urban households who were to be relocated for urbanization 
and urban redevelopment project are systematically excluded from the rising land value in 
the land market. It is estimated that, in the early 2000s, when the rural collective land was 
expropriated and converted to urban land and leased out for commercial real estate 
development, peasants’ share in the revenues could be well under 10% (Ye 2008: 95; Wang 
2013: 17). Since 2004 government policy in Nanjing established that the monetary 
compensation should take into consideration the market value of the original dwelling by 
reference to the housing price in the secondary housing market (not new commercial 
housing) in the surrounding area (People.cn 2003-12-31). However, this valuation is based 
on the value of the pre-relocation dwelling, not the rising value after the land is redeveloped. 
In short the compensation for a relocation in the urban setting refers to the value of the 
dwelling, not the land upon which the dwelling is set. Although all urban land in Nanjing 
publicly owned homeowners’ usufruct rights are not considered in the compensation.      
Although governments of different levels have implemented regulatory 
frameworks regarding relocation and compensation and make them appear to be “fair” and 
“transparent”, in reality these frameworks only established some general principles and the 
procedures for land expropriation, compensation and relocation. Specific compensation 
decisions are made separately and vary from place to place (for example, among the 
districts). In some occasions, local government failed to keep the compensation values 
updated and in the city proper of Nanjing in 2003 land value appraisals were based upon 
those  established in 1998 and had not been updated (Southern Weekly 2003-09-04). In the 
case of the Dengfuxiang neighborhood, where the tragic self-immolation of Mr. Weng Biao 
took place (mentioned in Chapter 4), the compensation was set to 3,370 yuan per sq. m., 
                                                          
138 Regarding land expropriation in the rural communities, “disputes around compensation should 
not impede the implementation of the development plan on the land” (Prefectural Government of 
Nanjing 2004). This principle was reiterated in 2007 and 2010, and was only partially removed in 
2015 (Prefectural Government of Nanjing 2007, 2010, 2015).    
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which given that many families lived in dwellings as small as 20 sq. m., meant that they 
could at most receive a compensation of 67,400 yuan.  At that time a used housing price in 
that area was around 5,000 yuan per sq. m,139 and social housing at the periphery sold at 
about 2,400-3,200 yuan per sq. m. Thus the monetary compensation was insufficient for 
either option (Xinmin Weekly 2003-09-03, Southern Weekly 2003-09-04). In 2010, the 
Ministry of Land and Resources (2010) ordered that local authorities should update the 
compensation terms every two or three years to keep pace with the local socioeconomic 
condition.  However, as late as in 2018, the compensation levels in the Lishui District 
remained the same as in 2011 (Xinhua Daily 2018-07-23).   
The tragic incident of Weng Biao in 2003 led to several policy changes in Nanjing 
regarding land expropriation and relocation. A minimum amount of compensation was 
established, and for the relocated families who cannot afford a dwelling with their 
monetary compensation, they could apply for social housing. Since 2004, the evaluation of 
value of the original dwelling, which is the basis for the compensation, has been 
subcontracted to external real estate appraisal offices (Jiangnan Times 2003-12-09). This 
is supposed to make the evaluation more “neutral” and reflect the market value of the 
original dwelling. Yet, these external offices have to be approved by the local government, 
and the technical protocols of evaluation are established by the government putting in 
question the independence and neutrality of the evaluations.  
In addition to the small size and the deterioration, some historical factors can also 
lead to a low appraisal of the dwelling’s value and further reduce the monetary 
compensation that a family can receive. Some dwellings were self-built and expanded 
informally without proper paperwork.  This was a common practice under the planned 
economy when private property was expected to disappear and individual full land titling 
was not a serious issue. Yet the area that was not included in the title and was not counted 
in the compensation. In addition, dwellers in old public rental housing (see figure 2-N 
                                                          
139 This was not an isolated case. According to the government’s own research, at that time it was 
common that the compensation for relocation was 500-1,000 yuan per sq. m. below the price of a 
used housing in the surrounding area (Modern Express 2003-10-10).  
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above), were required to remit 10% of the compensation money to the municipal housing 
authorities.  
Not everyone opposed relocation, of course. Some welcomed it as probably the 
only chance for them to move out of the old, precarious shantytowns. Others who obtained 
a relatively large sum of monetary compensation managed to purchase commercial housing, 
and expected to enjoy rising home value in the future. However, low-income 
neighborhoods are most likely to be the target of the relocation actions (see Chapter 4). For 
the majority of these relocated households a social housing project at the periphery means 
a loss to the previous easy access to urban infrastructure and workplace, rising living cost, 
a rupture from their previous social circle, as well as a radical and often undesirable change 
of life-style. All these generate frustration, complaints and social discontent, 
notwithstanding the new dwelling.   
Even after receiving notice of relocation and allocation of social housing it usually 
takes another 3 to 5 years for them to actually move into their new home. Construction 
often lags behind due to delays in land acquisition, and modifications of the construction 
plan.140 In other cases, the project is not accepted by the government due to various forms 
of irregularities that are identified. In the most extreme cases, it took up to 9 years for the 
families actually to move in the social housing assigned to them (Xhby.net 2016-01-03). 
In this process, although the government has the responsibility of subsidizing relocated 
families’ expenditures such as rent, the subsidy may not cover the entire rent. The 
construction of the four mega social housing projects in Nanjing was supposed build a large 
housing reserve and to resolve these delays, but the fact that the government was so strict 
                                                          
140 For example, in a neighborhood in Baixia District that was demolished in 2007, neighbors were 
promised to move in their new dwelling in a social housing project in Lianhua Xincheng in 2009 
yet it was not until 2013 that the construction was completed. In this process, the construction cost 
increased significantly, which translated into an increase of 2,300 yuan per sq. m of the final sales 
price. There was a discrepancy between the district government and the developer over who should 
be responsible for the price increase, which further delayed the move-in date (Yangtse Evening 
Post 2013-06-26).  
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on keeping to the deadline of demolition but generated much sense of injustice among the 
relocated families.  
In most cases, local authorities in Nanjing are able to impose its will over the 
neighborhood that they decide to relocate as well as powers to enforce relocation even 
before the administrative litigation ended. Local government officials employ a wide range 
of tactics to reduce possible resistance. They use co-optation and create divisions among 
the neighbors to impede any possible collective actions. They promise reward to those who 
accept the compensation and move out before the deadline.141 Occasionally, despite being 
forbidden by law, they even use extra-legal means to threaten and force neighbors to move 
out: cutting the electricity and water supply of the neighborhood, hiring thugs to harass the 
neighbors, damaging the built environment of the area and made it unlivable etc. (Boxun 
News 2003-12-05, Modern Express 2010-09-14, YNET.com 2013, also the author’s own 
interviews in the fieldwork). Local officials even wrote a book titled Handbook for a 
Harmonious Relocation to summarize a myriad of methods that local task forces can 
employ to persuade neighbors to relocate. For example, it listed as many as 18 methods for 
the negotiation (Wang and Zhou 2010, Chapter 7, Section 3), and how to observe and 
control the other party’s psyche (ibid. Chapter 6, Section 3). 
Rather than the natural outcome of a neutral bureaucratic/ legal process, relocation 
is often the result of tensions, negotiations and confrontations, which largely reflect state-
society relations at the local level. It is widely documented that village cadres or the director 
of the relocation taskforce committed crimes such as embezzlement of compensation 
allocated by the upper-level government, or receiving bribes to favor some to-be-relocated 
families.142 Communities and households may resort to a wide array of actions to resist the 
                                                          
141 Recently, in Qinhuai District, local authorities divided the to-be-relocated neighborhood into 
groups of 30 families. Each family could obtain an award of 50,000 yuan, if only all the families 
of the group accepted the compensation terms and moved out by the deadline (Nanjing Daily 2016-
02-22).  
142 In the first 6 months of 2012 alone, 26 officials were found to be involved in corruptions 
associated with relocation and combined to misappropriate 8.14 million yuan (Yangtse Evening 
Post 2012-07-06). 
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dispossession or at least to occupy a favorable position in the negotiation over 
compensation. Rumors circulate regarding the rules of compensation, real or fake. As the 
household size and the size of the original dwelling are the key determinants of the sum of 
the compensation, some faked divorce before the expropriation143 and others rushed to 
expand their dwelling with provisional materials before the taskforce came to measure it. 
Some even hired “professional” brokers to negotiate with or pressure local officials for 
better compensation terms (Procuratorate Daily 2005-06-08, Nanfangdaily.com 2010-07-
16, also the author’s interview in the fieldwork). 
Incidents of severe confrontations between the local authorities and the community/ 
relocated families are widely reported nationwide, and relocation of rural and urban 
households for urbanization and urban redevelopment projects has been a foci of 
government-society tension since early 2000s (China Business Times 2003, Ye 2008, 
Wang 2013). However, their lack of rights, the meager compensation received from the 
local authorities, the rising land value after the expropriation, and their relative weakness 
in the process of negotiation reinforces a perception of dispossession and deprivation and 
contribute to the exclusionary tendency of the government-led spatial reorganization of the 
city.   
 
 
 
                                                          
143 This practice has been documented in various former villages in the prefecture. The rationale is 
that it will create a separate household within the original dwelling, and the two households can 
combine to obtain more compensation and will be allowed to obtain more social housing in floor 
area. The divorced couple is supposed to remarry after having obtained the compensation. For a 
village in Pukou District in 2017, villagers can obtain 131 thousand yuan more in monetary 
compensation and 70 sq. m. more of social housing through divorce, and so most of the couples 
got divorced (Nanjing Morning Post 2017-03-02). Similarly, in a village in Jiangxinzhou 
Subdistrict, a couple can obtain 30 sq. m. more social housing through a divorce (Beijing Morning 
Post 2016-09-02, also in the author’s own interview in the fieldwork).       
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6.1.2. The Nature and Relative Quality of Social Housing Projects in Nanjing: 
Modernity, Irregularity and Precariousness.  
 
A sharp contrast between social housing projects in Nanjing and those in 
Guadalajara is the skyline: social housing projects in Nanjing are formed by multi-storey 
buildings or high rises, whereas those in Guadalajara are formed by single-family dwellings 
or, less frequently though, multi-family apartments of less than four storeys. This contrast 
nevertheless reflects the same logic for low-income housing development in these two 
cases: to minimize cost. To reduce the cost of building a certain amount of dwellings, 
developers can either reduce the construction costs or those of land acquisition. In 
Tlajomulco land is relatively cheap, and developers’ main concern is to minimize the 
construction cost, primarily through single-family housing (author’s interview with 
developers). In Nanjing where land is expensive, although the construction cost of highrise 
housing is much higher (e.g. requiring the installation of elevator), it actually reduces short-
term opportunity cost for local government by minimizing the territory occupied by social 
housing projects.144 This is also reflected in the trend that the most recent social housing 
projects in Nanjing are more likely to use highrise than earlier ones (Zhang, unspecified 
year).  
Yet, the high-density built environment often leads to insufficient public space and 
isolation (Illustration 6.1). Particularly in the cold winters dwellings often lack access to 
sufficient sunlight, to the degree that can be detrimental to health, particularly for those 
who live in lower floors.  
Moreover, the construction quality of social housing varies. Social housing projects 
constructed by district government in early 2000s are of the worst quality. Substandard-
quality materials were used to minimize construction costs and wall cracks, falling ceilings, 
and leaking during the rainy season were frequently reported (Yangtse Evening Post 2011-
                                                          
144 As mentioned in Chapter 4, in contrast to commercial housing development, social housing 
projects are exempt from land use fees, which are important revenue sources for the prefectural 
government.  
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07-26, 2013-04-12; Nanjing Morning Post 2014-12-14). This situation is alarming given 
that all social housing projects in Nanjing today comprise multi-level buildings or high 
rises. A structural failure of these buildings can potentially cause damage on a much larger 
scale compared to single-family homes. It is even more disturbing to think that the oldest 
among these buildings has only a history of 15 years.  
 
 
Illustration 6.1. The High Density of Social Housing Project: Project Maigaoqiao, 
Nanjing (photo taken by the author) 
 
Elevators are critical for residents and in peak hours congestion occurs over the use 
of elevator, often made worse by the high failure rate of the elevators. Today, social 
housing projects concentrated the worst elevator failure rates in the city.145 Not only were 
these elevators of bad quality when they were purchased and installed (particularly the 
cables that carry the elevator car and the waterproofing in the elevator well), they are 
                                                          
145 According to official statistics, in 2014, four of the six (and the first three) housing projects with 
highest elevator failure rates in the city were social housing projects. In that year, Project Yinlong 
Huayuan, with 199 elevators, had a record of 55 accidents of trapping users inside (The Paper 2015-
07-30).   
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constantly over-used (as the elevator-dwelling ratio was set too low146), and they lack 
sufficient and proper maintenance.  
As we shall observe below, similar to the situation in Tlajomulco, social housing 
dwellers in Nanjing  have to face deficits in various aspects are reported, including public 
transportation, road network, banks, hospitals, public space, commercial facilities, cultural 
and recreational amenities. Quite often, infrastructure had not been completed (or planned) 
before dwellings were assigned and families moved in.147 Installation of new infrastructure 
is exacerbated by the cumbersome bureaucratic procedures regarding changing the original 
construction plan. For many of the families that were relocated from the urban center, these 
deficiencies clearly marked a downturn of their living standards and a rise of living costs.  
As the city continues to expand fast, some early social housing projects have 
become integrated into the city, and now have access to metro and large commercial 
complexes. In recent years, the prefectural government has sought to expand the existing 
infrastructure of the social housing projects to the surrounding area, and in this way raised 
land values to attract other real estate projects. This is also a strategy by the local 
government to recover its investment in the social housing development, which motivated 
through the delivery of service and infrastructure. Near the Project Huagang, a commercial 
housing project has been constructed to take advantage of the existing infrastructure of the 
social housing project. Leases of the commercial space in the social housing projects are 
                                                          
146 Project Lianhua Xincheng, located in Jianye District, was inaugurated in 2013 May. By the end 
of the year, the high failure rates of the elevators in this project had attracted media’s attention. For 
the high rises, usually approximately 150 families shared two elevators, and the maximum capacity 
of the elevator was 6 persons. If one elevator malfunctioned, the other was even more prone to 
malfunction as well due to over-use. It was found that over 20 of the 58 elevators in the Project did 
not have proper waterproofing in the elevator well, and for this reason the property management 
company in charge of the maintenance of the buildings refused to provide service (Jschina.com 
2013-12-12).    
147 Project Yaoshun Jiayuan, which accommodated over 4,000 relocated families, did not have any 
large supermarket or food market nearby for two years. A commercial space that measured 2,000 
sq. m. were built. As it was state asset, the space had to be leased out in public auctions in which 
at least 3 companies participated; yet, the socioeconomic condition of the project did not appear 
attractive to the large businesses (Vojs.cn 2013-05-24). 
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also supposed to at least partially cover the costs of maintenance of the projects (author’s 
interview with local businesses).  
In the Daishan area where several social housing projects are located providing over 
38 thousand social housing dwellings and home to over 150 thousand people, the social 
infrastructure deficits persisted. By 2014, after large amount of relocated families had 
moved in, there were only two small bank branches in a town several kilometers away, and 
residents often had to travel hours to the more centric part of the city for banking affairs. 
In the public plaza, there was no public toilet (and to build them would require a time-
consuming bureaucratic procedure, since they did not exist in the construction plan). There 
were only community clinics in the area, but not large hospitals. The elderly or those with 
chronic health issues still had to go to large hospitals in the city center should any urgency 
occur. Projects such as Xishan Huayuan are only poorly connected to the city, since such 
connection is intercepted by several traffic bottlenecks and up to 7 railway level crossings 
(Modern Express 2014-04-13, also the author’s fieldwork).  
Not surprisingly, despite the strict government regulation against informal 
economic activities (such as food vendors) prevail in new social housing projects. Some 
have the tacit consent from the local authorities as a practical solution to the deficit in 
commercial facilities. On other occasions local authorities simply do not have enough 
personnel to enforce regulation.   
Relocated rural households often found it challenging having to change their 
lifestyle. In my fieldwork, I heard frequently comments such as “Old peasants do not know 
how to ride the elevator”. “Previously they had a patio in their home, and now they just 
don’t have enough space to have fun”. “Old people relocated from the village died quickly 
after they moved to the social housing project”. Previously, peasants grew their own 
vegetables and got water from their own wells. Now all the aspects in daily life are 
monetized -- “from you open your eyes when you wake up till you lay down at night, you 
have to pay for everything”. Despite the ban, former peasants converted the “modern” city 
gardens in the social housing projects into little urban farms (Illustration 6.2). They gather 
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in the few public spaces and play cards -- indeed card rooms became a quite profitable 
business in social housing projects, since for many dwellers, it is one of the few accessible 
and affordable forms of recreation.  
 
Illustration 6.2. Park in a Social Housing Project Converted to Farm of Vegetables 
(photo taken by the author)  
 
 
Illustration 6.3. A Balcony Converted into a Corner Store and a Dry Cleaner (photo 
taken by the author) 
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Ironically, titling has been an issue for households who were relocated to a social 
housing project. A local official admitted that in the social housing projects constructed in 
early 2000s, it took on average five years to obtain the title after the relocated families 
moved in, much slower than commercial housing. Only in recent years, the titling process 
speeded up (Modern Express 2015-08-19). A few of the older social housing projects 
cannot be properly titled despite the fact that they are government projects. Developers 
were found to have illegally modified the construction plan or failed to meet the standard 
established in the regulatory framework, such that the Land-Management Bureau of the 
Prefectural Government refused to issue land-use title to homeowners.148 Often, as the 
district government that was in charge of these projects rushed to meet the goal of 
construction, it bypassed the proper procedure of land expropriation and sales. This can be 
further complicated if the developer became bankrupt or the construction of the project was 
transferred to a different developer.149 The titling problem affects thousands of families for 
years, and many cases still remain unresolved. These families cannot update the household 
registration to their new dwelling, which caused further problems (for example, their 
children’s access to school). Another problem is that although owners are allowed to sell 
after 5 years from acquisition, the lack of final title significantly affects their market value. 
                                                          
148 In Project Yinlong Huayuan, the developer illicitly constructed more dwellings than established 
by the construction plan in order, hoping to sell these extra units for profit. As this was discoverd, 
the Land-Management Bureau refused denied land titles to the project. Note that those extra units 
for sale did not have proper titles either, which coincide with the concept of “unauthorized 
commercial housing development” that was discussed in Chapter 4. Similar was the case of the 
Project Longpan Heyuan, the developer illicitly modified the original construction plan of two 
buildings for relocated families from 13 storeys to 27. The developer also intended to sell the extra 
dwellings. However, as the metropolitan government did not approve such practice, the 275 
families who were allocated dwellings in these two buildings could not move in. They had to find 
other accommodations on their own account for up to 4 years after their original home was 
demolished (Nanjing Morning Post 2014-05-22).  
149  This is the case of Project Chunjiang Xincheng, which housed over 7,000 families. The 
construction of the project was transferred twice to different developers, and some debt issues 
between these developers remained unresolved for years. The original construction plan was 
modified without authorization (for example, commercial facilities were constructed on land that 
was established for green space), and the project failed to meet regulation regarding daylighting 
and the distance between buildings (the author’s interview. See also Jinling Evening News 2014-
11-14).   
200 
 
Many families that intended to sell these properties (because they urgently needed money 
or wanted to buy a better dwelling) had to sell them cheaply (People.cn 2015-12-28). The 
repeated false promises from the government have particularly damaged the credibility of 
the local governments, further triggering social discontent among social housing dwellers.  
 
6.1.3 Governance and Administration Challenges 
 
Social housing became a sorting mechanism that largely concentrates low-income 
relocated urban families and former peasants. Moreover, most of the social housing 
projects are located in peripheral districts (such as Yuhuatai and Qixia) that are traditionally 
poorer compared to the more centrally located ones (such as Gulou and Xuanwu). District 
and sub-district governments have to deal with the consequence of the influx of the low-
income social housing dwellers. Tiexinqiao Sub-district, for example, had a registered 
population of between 20,000 and 30,000 before the construction of two major social 
housing projects, Chunjiang Xincheng and Jingming Huayuan. These two projects 
combined to home 60,000 to 80,000 people relocated from all the districts of the Prefecture. 
By 2005, 60% of the households in these two projects were recipients of social assistance, 
and 80% were classified as low-income (interview with local officials).  
Usually housing projects in Nanjing (both social housing and commercial housing) 
are maintained by real estate/ property management companies. Homeowners are expected 
to form a committee and decide which company to hire. Homeowners are required to pay 
a maintenance fee to the company that is determined by the condition of the complex and 
the floor area of the dwelling, and this is also supposed to be the case in social housing 
projects. However, the collection of the maintenance fees in social housing projects is often 
very poor, to the degree that no private company wants to serve these projects. In this 
scenario, the sub-district government has to step in and take responsibility. This will remain 
a major challenge for the future, since the maintenance of highrises is very costly.  
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Illustration 6.4. Subdistrict Authorities Installed Some commercial Locals at the 
Project Jingming Jiayuan and Leased Them to Low-Income Dwellers (photo taken 
by the author) 
 
 
Illustration 6.5. Entrance of a Social Housing Project in Nanjing (Some low-income 
dwellers were allowed to put their small business at the social housing project, and 
they were also expected to keep an eye on the entrance of the project; photo taken 
by the author) 
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The deficiencies in and around social housing projects are translated into rising 
living costs, worse living standard, exhaustion and stress. People’s previous social 
networks were torn apart, and new arrivals had to go through a great change in their life 
styles. There is in general a lack of identify of the place and social cohesion is low. Not 
surprisingly, public security in social housing projects is more problematic than 
commercial housing projects. Conflicts among neighbors occur quite frequently and petty 
thefts are widespread. Illegal businesses such as pyramid schemes found social housing 
projects an ideal place to operate and expand, taking advantage of the availability of cheap 
renting opportunities, lack of policing, and weak neighborhood social cohesion. It was 
reported that in 2016, over 10,000 people were involved in pyramid schemes in Qixia 
District, particularly in the social housing projects. It took the local authorities 19 months 
to eradicate these illegal businesses (Yangtse Evening Post 2018-04-19).150  
Political and social stability in social housing projects is among the top priorities 
for local authorities.151 As in other places, local authorities are evaluated for the political 
and social stability in their jurisdiction (Prefectural Government of Nanjing 2010b). 
However it is more challenging in social housing projects given that many of the dwellers 
moved in already discontented over the relocation and local public security is often 
problematic. Occasionally collective actions occur on issues such as compensation terms 
for relocation, demolition of unauthorized expansion of the dwellings, removal of informal 
transportation etc. In other cases, individuals go to make a complaint on relocation to 
upper-level government (even to the central government in Beijing). These cases affect 
                                                          
150 Instead, a lot of the pyramid scheme businesses now operate in Daishan, another area that 
concentrate a large amount of social housing projects (JSTV.com 2017-08-18).  
151 The tragedy of Mr. Weng Biao and the nationwide attention on the scandal not only forced the 
prefectural government to revise its relocation policy and to reduce the relocation actions in the 
following months, but also reminded local officials the power of news media. Ye Hao, the head of 
the prefectural publicity department of the Communist Party, wrote a book on the so-called 
“government journalism studies”, in which he lamented the fact that the “fake news” affected the 
progress of relocation city-wide and thus the urban development (Ye 2006). According to Ye Hao 
(2009), negative news reports as a percentage of all news reports in Nanjing fell from 45% in 2004 
to 10% in 2008. 
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negatively local authorities’ evaluations, and the response of is increasing surveillance, 152 
particularly on sensitive dates such as the national day and the New Year, or when 
important events are held in the city.  
Local authorities made attempts to organize the social housing projects by 
highlighting the participation of the local communist party members and fomenting 
volunteer groups. Cultural events are hold to foment local identity. They also provide some 
limited assistance to low-income families, for example, constructing commercial space and 
renting them to the low-income families, who then operate small businesses such as food 
places; and assigning some temporary low-paying jobs such as community guards and 
janitors (Illustration 6.4, Illustration 6.5). Nevertheless the impacts of these minor scale 
operations are limited and the improvement in social housing projects still requires the 
reduction of service and infrastructure deficits and job creation in or close to the social 
housing projects.  
 
In sum, the fact that social housing allocation is closely related to urbanization-
related relocation reflects the paternalistic nature of the social housing policy in Nanjing. 
Relocation and the compensation terms are imposed by the local authorities and relocated 
families have very limited negotiation power in the process. Moving into a social housing 
project often means a loss of previous access to urban infrastructure and service, as well as 
one’s social circle, which leads to rising living cost and a sense of alienation. Fomenting 
social cohesion, reducing deficits in infrastructure and service, dealing with concentrated 
poverty and long-term maintenance of the projects remain highly challenging 
commitments for the local government.   
 
                                                          
152 For example, cameras and entrance control were installed. To eliminate the pyramid schemes in 
the social housing projects, sub-district authorities built a large data-base to register the tenants’ 
information, if the social housing dwelling was leased out by the owner (Yangtse Evening Post 
2018-04-19).  
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6.2. Social Housing Dwellers in Guadalajara: Mortgage Debt, Precarious Living 
Condition and Informality 
 
This section focuses on how social housing dwellers in Guadalajara obtained their 
property and their experience of living in a social housing project. I highlight that they 
were driven to live in a social housing project by structural forces. In the 2000s, the 
mortgage system reduced its entry bar for the low-income working class and converted this 
group into its new target of expansion. Nevertheless, it also disproportionately imposed a 
variety of risks to low-income borrowers. I also document several major deficits that many 
social housing projects are exposed to, and how dwellers and local authorities respond to 
the deficits.   
 
6.2.1. Housing Acquisition: a Relocation Driven by Structural Forces  
 
In contrast to the Chinese case where relocated households were assigned to social 
housing by the local government, in Guadalajara, the acquisition of a social housing 
dwelling takes place in a formal but segmented housing market. Unlike self-built housing 
between 1950s and 1980s that mostly accommodated rural migrants working in the 
informal economy (see Chapter 2), social housing targets low-income urban population 
working in the formal sector. The social housing boom in the 2000s is also closely 
associated with intra-urban migration (note that the population growth rate of the 
Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara is only moderate, around 1.5% to 2% in the 2000s and 
2010s, see Figure 5.3). Most of the social housing dwellers in Tlajomulco were from the 
rest of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara.  
I argue that the social housing boom in the 2000s is closely associated with family 
dynamics and household living arrangements among the urban working class. In particular 
these are the second or third generation of the original settlers in informal settlements who, 
thirty or forty years later, are forming their independent household or seeking to improve 
their living conditions (sometimes even fleeing the violence of the previous neighborhood). 
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In many Latin American cities, residential mobility and turnover rates in self-help informal 
settlements built in the 1970s and 1980s remain low, due to its high use value and the 
original settlers’ inheritance expectation (Jiménez Huerta and Padilla Etienne 2007, Ward 
et al. 2011, Ward 2012). Based on her observation in Mexico City and Guadalajara, Varley 
(2017) argued that unless the location is of exceptional commercial value, in general, 
consolidated self-built settlements are not appealing to the real estate capital for 
gentrification. In Mexican cities, we have not seen the same kind and scale of government-
led urban redevelopment that is common to Chinese cities in the 2000s. That said, self-
built homeownership, while offering tenure security and stability to the urban poor, also 
leads to a high level of immobility which may hinder the socioeconomic mobility of this 
sector (Gilbert 1999).  
In the 2000s, of course, other housing options remain valid: renting, the expansion 
and remodeling of the existing dwelling of the family, and self-building (in this way 
reproducing first-generation settlers’ path to homeownership). However, the social housing 
boom offers a fast-track alternative of residential mobility for the urban working class. 
Home seekers purchased a social housing dwelling to leave a patrimony for their offspring 
or to invest in an extra asset. Many of them no longer want to follow their parents’ approach 
to homeownership through the hardships of self-building in peripheral environments with 
limited or no services. This change in housing preference is largely due to two reasons. 
First, self-building takes relatively a long time span to consolidate and requires investment 
in one’s own labor and mobilization one’s social network, while social housing is an 
already-made home. Second, the fact that developers obtained large land reserves in the 
periphery for social housing development, together with stringer planning restrictions on 
informal settlements, somehow squeezed out self-building as an affordable housing option.   
On the daily and micro level, in the metropolitan area of Guadalajara, propaganda 
of social housing is to be found everywhere -- advertisements painted on public 
transportation, information kiosks of the developers in the street market, posts pasted on 
electricity poles, etc. These publicities promote the idea of “build your own patrimony”, 
“housing with formality and modernity”, “independence from the extended family (or from 
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the in-laws)”, and “no need to pay rent anymore” (Illustration 6.6). Salespersons promote 
their product by highlighting the modernity that the social housing project represents. 
Social housing projects are portrayed in commercials as fully-equipped with schools, 
public space, greenspace, public transportation and easy access to the major road network 
and commercial complexes etc., often with varying level of exaggeration. This type of 
promotion speaks effectively to the aspiration of potential homebuyers (formality, financial 
security, independence etc.).   
The salespersons of a social housing project can assist home-seekers to identify the 
form of housing finance and the amount of the mortgage they can contract from the 
financial agency.153 If the home seeker works in the formal sector (and is thus affiliated 
with INFONAVIT), the eligibility and amount of a mortgage is calculated with a formula 
that take into account factors such as the affiliate’s age, duration of employment, salary, 
and the current INFONAVIT account balance.  (The employer is supposed to deposit 5% 
of the employee’s monthly salary into the latter’s INFONAVIT account.)154 Low-income 
homebuyers can also obtain a subsidy from the federal government on first-come-first-
served basis.155 This can also be done through a local INFONAVIT branch where the 
                                                          
153 Some social housing homebuyers contracted mortgages with other housing finance agencies, 
such as FOVISSSTE, commercial banks and SOFOLs.   
154 The INFONAVIT has a score system to determine the affiliate’s eligibility of mortgage. The 
total score is calculated by adding up the scores assigned for (1) age and salary, (2) current balance 
in the individual account, and (3) the duration of being employed. The score for each of these items 
is established in a table, which is also available on the official website of INFONAVIT 
(http://portal.infonavit.org.mx/wps/wcm/connect/11ad3211-f5e7-4674-aee4-
735e466fd7cb/Tabla+de+puntuaci%C3%B3n.pdf?MOD=AJPERES). An affiliate is eligible for a 
mortgage if his/her total score is over 116. For example, an affiliate aged 26 who earns 2 times the 
minimum wage (60 points) and has stayed employed for two years (38 points) will have a balance 
that equals 2.4 times minimum wage in his/her INFONAVIT account (2 times minimum wage*24 
months*5% = 2.4 times minimum wage, which earns him another 31 points). This person’s total 
score will be 61+38+31=130, which is sufficient for him/her to qualify for a mortgage. Although 
the amount of mortgage is unlikely to be large, the entry barrier is low.       
155 The eligibility and amount of subsidy depends on the income of the homebuyer, as well as the 
quality and value of the dwelling. In 2013, the maximum amount of subsidy was 33 times of the 
monthly wage of Mexico City (SEDATU 2013), which roughly equaled 64,000 Pesos (calculated 
according to STPS 2013). This amount could be over 20% of the price of a social housing dwelling 
in Tlajomulco.   
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affiliate can find out his/her possible housing options. Usually, for the mortgage they can 
contract the only options they have are the social housing located in the far periphery, 
where homes valued under 300,000 Pesos (approximately 16,000 dollars) were still 
available in the 2010s.156 Salespersons get commission based on the number of properties 
they sold, which motivate them to engage in a very proactive commercial campaign. They 
distributed flyers with their name and phone number printed on them and posted on social 
media the information of the properties on sale.157  A woman shared with me her story: 
  “We used to live in my parents’ home and a sales manager knocked at our door to 
promote their project. I said well this place looks great but I do not have the money for the 
5,000-peso down payment. The manager offered to personally lend us that sum of money so 
we could buy the property. And we did. That’s how we came to live in this neighborhood”. 
 
                                                          
156 For example, around 2008, a social housing dwelling was sold at around 280,000 Pesos in 
Project Silos. Silos became one of the most problematic projects in the municipality, but yet, it was 
what low-income urban class could afford with their INFONAVIT mortgage (or combined with a 
federal subsidy).      
157 I also heard stories such as salespersons obtained a list of INFONAVIT affiliates from insiders 
and went to knock at people’s door to promote social housing. Some salespersons intended to 
persuade the home-seekers that they should use their INFONAVIT credits; otherwise they argued 
it would be their loss (inaccurate since even if they do not apply for an INFONAVIT credit they 
can still withdraw the money from their account when they retire). 
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Illustration 6.6 Typical Commercial Flyers of Social Housing on the Street (photos 
taken by the author) 
 
Although social housing in Mexico is commercial, social housing dwellers were 
brought into the social housing projects driven by structural and ideological forces, as well 
as techniques of commercial promotion that is unknown to housing transactions in informal 
settlements. The structural factors consist of the lower entry-barrier and the availability of 
mortgages, as well as the fact that social housing projects have, to certain extent, squeezed 
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out other affordable housing options such as self-building. To a certain degree, social 
housing represents a “realistic” and tangible option to fulfill one’s aspiration to 
homeownership. Meanwhile, the ideological campaign on homeownership and housing 
finance also lure people into the social housing system. In quite a few cases, potential 
homebuyers were misinformed regarding their INFONAVIT credit and the condition of 
the social housing project.  
Some social housing homebuyers modified, remodeled or expanded their current 
dwelling by adding an extra room, fences for protection, a garage or a second floor. Others 
even converted part of the dwelling into a business space (such as corner store, food place, 
real estate agency, or even a gym). This is also similar to the progressive consolidation in 
the self-built informal settlements. That being said, I argue that what fundamentally 
distinguishes social housing projects from informal settlements is the financial experience 
of the homebuyers. In informal settlements, settlers self-built their homes when one’s own 
resource is available (or one can mobilize from his/her social network).158 
In social housing projects, the acquisition of social housing is done by contracting 
a mortgage with financial agencies. Traditionally, one of the major barriers for the low-
income population to obtain access to formal housing was their disadvantaged position in 
the market of housing finance. The mortgage boom in Mexico since late 1990s reduced 
that barrier and mainly targets low-income population for whom commercial banks had 
little interest. Yet, this mortgage regime is exploitative mainly for three reasons. First, in 
the long term the mortgage is not as affordable as it appears at first glance, if we take into 
account that repayment period of an INFONAVIT mortgage is up to 30 years. Homebuyers 
can be trapped into a long-term debt-servicing commitment while the property is poorly 
built and served.   
                                                          
158 Note that although agencies such as INFONAVIT also offer mortgage for self-built housing on 
one’s own lot, this line of mortgage has never been the mainstream.  
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Second, the system deliberately and disproportionately impose risks on 
homebuyers, rather than developers and the financial agency.  It does so in several ways: 
• While the financial system assumes that the low-income urban working 
class can fulfill their monthly payment obligations, in reality, the labor market in which 
this sector is situated is highly (and increasingly) volatile. In events such as a job loss, the 
mortgage holder is very likely to miss monthly payments and generate interest payments. 
The system is highly punitive against late payments and non-performing loans.  
• Until recently, the INFONAVIT mortgage was indexed into times of 
minimum wages. While this practice minimized the risk for the financial agency, it is the 
borrowers who pay the price of the macroeconomic fluctuations. For those who contracted 
a mortgage with a private lending agency such as a SOFOL, their situation can become 
worse as the mortgage is denominated in units of investment (UDIs), and thus transfers the 
cost of inflation completely to the borrower.159  
• The employer has the obligation to deposit a sum of money that equals 5% 
of the employee’s salary into employee’s INFONAVIT account every month. If the 
employee contracts a mortgage with the INFONAVIT, the employers’ deposit will be used 
as part of the monthly payment. The employee has the right to report to the INFONAVIT 
if the employer omits a deposit. Yet, in many cases, the employee may not be aware of 
such omission. This results in missing payment and will generate further interest payment 
for the borrower.    
To further complicate matters, many low-income mortgage borrowers do not 
possess full knowledge of the legal terms when they signed the mortgage contract. 
Developers and financial agencies often take advantage of this vulnerability. For example, 
HOMEX made homebuyers in Project Hacienda Santa Fe to sign a contract which stated 
                                                          
159 In April 4, 1995, a UDI was set to value 1 peso. The nominal value of UDI increased to 2.67 
Pesos in January 1, 2000, 3.54 Pesos in January 1, 2005, 4.34 Pesos in January 1, 2010, and 5.27 
Pesos in January 1, 2015 (source: Banco de México, Sistema de Información Económica, 
http://www.banxico.org.mx/SieInternet/consultarDirectorioInternetAction.do?accion=consultarC
uadro&idCuadro=CP150&sector=8&locale=es ). This means that the balance of the mortgage that 
a homebuyer contracted in early 2000s can increase after years of monthly payment.    
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that all the legal affairs regarding their dwelling should be resolved in the court in Culiacán, 
Sinaloa (the headquarters of the developer). In other words, homebuyers will have to travel 
from Guadalajara to Sinaloa should any legal issue arise (see La Jornada 2006-05-18). 
When non-payments lead to legal litigation, the low-income borrowers often do not have 
the resources to complete the legal process, or are simply not aware of what is happening 
and the consequence of each step. Mortgage agencies, including the INFONAVIT, 
subcontracted the legal service such as foreclosure to external, private law offices. The 
threat of foreclosure is real:  these external legal offices are frequently reported to harass 
the mortgage borrowers who are in legal trouble by repeated phone calls and threats 
(interviews with mortgage borrowers, also see Spiller 2010, Proceso 2013-12-14).    
The volatility of the labor market, the exploitative and punitive terms of the 
mortgage as well as the misinformation, combine to generate a huge financial risks for the 
homebuyers of social housing. The long-term cost of the mortgage stands in sharp contrast 
to the precarious condition in the social housing projects. Quite a few homebuyers have 
resold or leased out their property. Some have abandoned their dwelling, and others lost 
their home (and their investment in the property) in foreclosure. In other words, the so-
called formality does not automatically mean tenure security.  
For the social housing homebuyers who fail to fulfill their monthly payment 
obligations, many actively seek to protect their property by resorting to the different 
institutions. The INFONAVIT has an office that helps mortgage borrowers to deal with the 
non-payment problem. In the event of a job loss, the borrower can apply for a grace period 
of non-payment for up to a year. However, this generates higher interest payments for the 
borrower in the future and thus only temporarily postpones the debt repayment obligation. 
In certain scenarios, mortgage borrowers in financial hardship can also negotiate with the 
INFONAVIT to restructure their debt. Some lawyers provide service to apply for an 
“amparo” (legal injunction) on behalf of the mortgage borrower in order to avoid or 
postpone foreclosure. Finally, civic organizations such as El Barzón use collective actions 
to pressure on the mortgage agencies, in order to restructure the mortgage terms and 
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eventually secure the title of the property. The Barzón movement has a partisan background 
and requires the affiliates to pay a monthly fee to the organization (the author’s interview).  
 
6.2.2. Deficiencies, Precarious Dwelling Condition and Informality in Social Housing 
Projects 
 
In Chapter 3, we discussed how the official housing policy expansion of mortgages 
towards low-income population and deregulation in urban and housing development made 
the recovery of investment in housing production more secure. Meanwhile, developers 
sought to minimize as much as possible the construction cost and speed up the construction 
process. As a result, the quality of construction material and quality is often poor.160 In 
addition social housing projects are located at far periphery where large extension of land 
is available and cheap.  
Such land is sometimes in areas of geological hazard or close to polluting industrial 
areas. The infrastructure, if provided, is far from meeting the demand. All these factors 
contributed to the vulnerability of the social housing projects in extreme weather conditions. 
A heavy rain can result in severe flooding in many social housing projects due to their 
location along old natural water causes and the deficiencies of the drainage system. Yet, 
properties in these projects were sold with misinformation. As one interviewee commented: 
“homebuyers came to visit the project, if it is not raining you won’t notice that it is located 
at a place prone to flooding. And regarding the pollution and why the place smells funny, 
the homebuyers are told that ‘it’s just today, usually it is not like this’”. The chaotic housing 
boom further exacerbated the ecological decay. For a long time, wastewater that has not 
been properly treated was allowed to flow into main water bodies such as El Ahogado and 
                                                          
160 For example, in the Project Robles, 26 homes were reported to have structural failures (e.g. 
foundation subsidence) that were beyond repair; the municipal government had to order them to be 
demolished and homeowners relocated (Mural 2010-09-22). 
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Lake Cajititlán, and the surrounding neighborhoods have to live with the consequences 
such as the bad smell (Mural 2011-04-19). 
Deficient infrastructure and services in and around the social housing projects is 
enormous, in almost all aspects of daily life: schools, public transportation, water supply, 
sewage system, policing, health service, and garbage collection. Table 6.1 shows the 
uneven distribution of the health care resources in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara. 
In 2010, while in the municipality of Guadalajara, there were 4.25 medical personnel per 
1,000 population, in Tlajomulco this number was only 0.19. Neighbors living in the Project 
Hacienda Santa Fe vividly recalled the first years after they moved in -- only one major 
avenue (one lane on each direction) and one bus route connected the housing complex to 
the city. To certain extent, some of the deficits can be reduced over time, particularly when 
the private sector identified profitable business opportunities. For example, commercial 
service in the social housing projects was rare, especially in the initial years after the project 
was developed. Yet, the influx of the urban working class creates a considerable consumer 
market and large commercial chains such as Chedraui, Aurrera and Soriana extended their 
branches to the area.  
There are deficiencies in other aspects such as water supply, drainage system, 
clinics, and schools, and which are more difficult to resolve. These are often areas of 
collective consumption in which the private sector is less willing to invest, although in 
some cases the municipal government has pressured developers to contribute (see Chapter 
5). The provision of these services and infrastructure requires not only the fiscal and 
administrative resources of the municipal government, but also the collaboration among 
municipal governments of the metropolitan area, as well as with the State government. For 
example, with the support from the metropolitan funds and the collaboration with 
developers and the State government, some major public works (amplification of Avenue 
Adolf Horn, extension of Avenue Jesús Michel González etc.) were conducted to expand 
the road network and make the municipality better connected to the city center.  
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Table 6.1: Distribution of the Resources of Health Care in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, 
2010 
Municipalities Medical 
units 
Medical 
personnel 
Number of Medical 
personnel per 1,000 
habitants 
Percentage of the 
population with Deficit 
in access to health care 
(%) 
Guadalajara 92 6212 4.25 35.6 
Zapopan  66 1738 1.27 33.8 
Tlaquepaque 31 260 0.38 32.5 
Tonalá 22 160 0.29 41.7 
Tlajomulco 22 113 0.19 46 
El Salto 12 51 0.25 36.7 
Juanacatlán 2 6 0.36 23.6 
Ixtlahuacán de 
los 
Membrillos 
10 9 0.17 43.6 
(Source: SEDESOL 2014, Informe Anual sobre la Situación de Pobreza y Rezago 
Social) 
 
That said, the deficit in social infrastructure are cumulative and severe. The 
shortage of classrooms in the municipality remains rampant until today. In 2002, when the 
social housing boom started, it w.as reported that almost half of the classrooms in 
Tlajomulco were provisional (Mural 2002-01-26). In 2013, many students still had to take 
classes in a mobile classroom, a provisional classroom converted from unoccupied 
dwellings in the social housing project, or even on the floor. In that year, the municipality 
still concentrated about almost one sixth of the provisional classrooms in the entire State 
of Jalisco (250 out of 1,600; El Informador 2013-04-10). Due to the deficit in classrooms 
and school capacity, around 400 students in Project Los Cantaros had to be waitlisted when 
the school year of 2013-2014 started (El Informador 2013-01-05, La Verdad 2013-08-
26). 161  In the Zona Valle, where most of the large social housing projects of the 
                                                          
161 According to the current municipal president, Salvador Zamora (MC), when the school year 
2018-2019 started, the capacity of the public schools in the municipality could receive about 90% 
of the school-age population, and the rest (12,000 out of 124,000) have to attend a private school 
or a school outside the municipality, otherwise will remain waitlisted. Moreover, some of the 
provisional classrooms presented risks and cannot be used. The social housing projects located in 
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municipality are located (Hacienda Santa Fe, Chulavista, Lomas del Mirador, Villas de la 
Hacienda, etc.) and where more than 300,000 people live (65,000 of high school age), it 
was not until January 2018 when the first public high school was inaugurated (Canal 44, 
2018-01-26).       
Regarding running water, Tlajomulco had not been integrated into the system of 
the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara (SIAPA) until recently.162 The usual approach of 
water supply for the social housing projects is through the water wells drilled near them. 
Many of these projects were built without considering whether the water supply would be 
sufficient for future dwellers. By 2011, approximately 150,000 residents (over one third of 
the population of the municipality in that year) in the municipality suffered shortage in 
water supply, particularly those living in social housing projects in the Zona Valle and 
along the Guadalajara-Chapala highway (Milenio 2011-04-04). By 2018, some 70,000 
residents in the municipality (about 12% of the municipality’s population) still have to rely 
on the water truck provided by the municipal government for water supply, a number much 
higher than other municipalities in the Metropolitan Area (Metro-Guadalajara 2018-06-19). 
Currently in many projects running water is still only available two or three days a week, 
or only for a few hours a day; and not everyone can afford to install a cistern at home. 
Moreover, the quality of the water is poor due to the minerals contained in the water and 
the lack of maintenance of the pipeline. In the 2000s, Tlajomulco did not even have a water 
treatment plant, and the water treatment was limited to chlorination (Ochoa-García 2012). 
Some water wells were detected to contain excessive level of minerals such as arsenic and 
                                                          
the Zona Valle and alone the Freeway Guadalajara-Chapala still concentrate considerable deficit 
in schools (La Verdad 2018-10-17).   
162  The municipal government insisted that the municipality would join SIAPA only after it 
improved its administration and transparency, as well as the State government invested in 
infrastructure in the municipality. An agreement for cooperation was signed between the municipal 
government and the SIAPA in 2017, which was to increase water supply by 1,000 liters per second, 
and would benefit more than 30,000 people in the municipality (Reporte Indigo 2013-12-03, 
Municipal Government of Tlajomulco 2017).  
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manganese, or coliform bacteria (Metro-Guadalajara 2013-12-11).163 Dwellers constantly 
complained about the detrimental effects that the water has caused to their health (itchy 
skin, falling hair etc.), particularly to children. They have to buy purified water for drinking, 
and use tap water only for bath and washing clothes and dishes.    
Although social housing projects are often labeled as formal housing development, 
in reality they are often also fraught with a variety of irregularities. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the municipal government conducts an inspection on the quality of the 
housing project, and only after the quality meets the regulations can the project can be 
received by the government, after which the latter is in charge of service provision (garbage 
collection, policing, water, etc.). The process can take some years: for example by 2016 
there were five housing projects in the municipality that had not been legally approved by 
the municipal government for years and the developer had never fixed the problem. Some 
of them were involved in chronic legal conflicts leaving projects are in the precarious and 
vulnerable situation, since they are not entitled to receive the service provision by the 
municipal government and dwellers are left alone to deal with their daily needs. The current 
municipal administration does deliver some essential services to these complexes, but 
meanwhile also keeps track of the fees that have been generated.  So that any third party 
that wants to invest in the housing project has to first pay off the debt of owed by the project 
(interview with official of the municipal government).  
As formal and well-paid employment opportunities are scarce in Tlajomulco, most 
of these social housing dwellers still have to work in the centric area of the city. Commuting 
can take up to three and four hours a day,164 and for many social housing dwellers in 
                                                          
163 In 2013, the State public health authorities detected that a well that supplied water to Project 
Nueva Galicia contained arsenic (0.679 mg per liter) that is 27 times higher than the acceptable 
level (0.025 mg per liter). This hazard could affect 30 thousand people. The water well was closed 
by the municipal government (Reporte Indigo 2013-12-03, Mural 2013-12-24).    
164 In a typical weekday, people have already formed lines at the bus stops by 5am. In the evening, 
people returning home from work formed lines up to two blocks near the Aranzazú Temple (the 
center of Guadalajara, for bus 171 and 176) or at the metro station Periférico Sur (for the various 
bus routes of 619).  
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Tlajomulco it is one of the most stressful experiences. This also affects family life: 
educators complained that children spent considerable time of the day unaccompanied by 
their parents, not least since public schools in the municipality is half-time.  
The informal economy proliferates in many social housing projects, targeting the 
deficits (and demand) such as petty commerce, food places, transportation, barbershops. 
Households use self-employment as a coping mechanism during economic hardship, and 
some businesses were even able to achieve a moderate level of prosperity. People also seek 
to develop their informal support network. For example, families sometimes rent a social 
housing dwelling in the same social housing project to take care of the kids. In this sense, 
a social housing project resembles some of the features of an informal settlement. This is 
not surprising, given that many social housing dwellers previously lived in informal 
settlements and their relatives and friends still live there. Many practices that are common 
in an informal settlement are reproduced in the social housing projects.  
Although the majority of social housing dwellers in Tlajomulco are low-income 
working class, it should be noted that most of them do not live in extreme poverty either. 
Ultimately, most of them (except tenants or squatters) were employed in the formal sector 
in the first place to qualify for a mortgage. Currently various socioeconomic indicators of 
the municipality have shown some improvement since the social housing boom in the 
2000s and 2010s.165 The poverty rate of the municipality fell from 39.6% in 2010 to 32.0% 
in 2015, and the rate of extreme poverty fell from 5.8% to 2.1% (CONEVAL 2015a). Of 
course, this does not mean that poverty had been eliminated in Tlajomulco, rather, it 
reflects a transformation of the nature of poverty in the municipality from a rural one to an 
urban one. What the urban low-income working class faces in social housing projects 
consists of a series of risks and vulnerabilities: volatility of the job market, risk of losing 
                                                          
165 For example, from 2000 to 2015, the illiteracy rate of the population aged above 15 in the 
municipality fell from 7.06% to 2%; the percentage of population aged above 15 that did not 
complete basic education fell from 63.34% to 30.64%; the percentage of the population with no 
access to health care system fell from 54.16% to 18.75%; the percentage of housing units with a 
dirt floor fell from 8.86% to 0.62% (CONEVAL 2015b).   
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one’s property to foreclosure, poor construction quality, deficits in infrastructure and 
service, false promises from the developers and the authorities, among others. Particularly, 
the improvement in relate and quantitative terms does not cancel the qualitative deficits 
that households experience and they remain particularly dependent on the provision from 
the public sector, since they cannot afford private education or health care (although many 
qualify for IMSS coverage albeit rarely proximate).  However, the gap between the demand 
and the supply is huge due to the unplanned nature of the social housing boom, the 
insufficient investment from the public sector, as well as the institutional capacity.  
 
6.2.3. Social Cohesion and Governance in Social Housing Projects 
 
Public security in social housing projects is a serious problem. In 2017, 137 persons 
were murdered in the municipality (about 24 homicides per 100,000 habitants, while it was 
about 15 per 100,000 habitants in the municipality of Guadalajara and 14 in Zapopan, see 
El Informador 2018-01-17).166 While insecurity is a general feature of many Mexican cities, 
in social housing projects three major factors further complicate the issue. First, the rapid 
growth of the social housing projects has overwhelmed the institutional capacity of the 
municipal government in policing. Second, in contrast to the traditional small towns in the 
municipality, where extended families had resided for generations and everyone knows 
each other, in social housing projects, people came from all over the metropolitan area and 
lacked previous connections or a local identity. Third, service and infrastructure deficit also 
damage social cohesion. The lack of education and employment opportunities in many of 
the social housing projects impeded the upward mobility among the youth. In the beginning 
of the 2010s, about a third of the population aged 15-19 neither held a job or went to school. 
As a consequence some 48 youth gangs operated in the municipality (Reporte Indigo 2013-
08-12). Moreover, the deficits in sewage and water supply created not only hardship for 
                                                          
166 The situation continues deteriorating in the current year. According to official statistics, 197 
homicides have been registered in the municipality throughout mid-October (La Verdad 2018-10-
15).  
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households, but also tensions between the natives in the old towns and the new-comers in 
the nearby social housing projects. Natives blamed social housing projects for the deficit 
in service and infrastructure, the deterioration of the environment, the deterioration of 
public security, and the interruption of the landscape and the previous tranquility of life. 
Some local traditions continued in old towns but were not understood or appreciated by 
outsiders.167  
High vacancy rates are a common phenomenon in many social housing projects in 
Mexico (INFONAVIT 2015, also see Illustration 6.7). People abandoned their property for 
a variety of reasons, including insecurity, long commuting hours, deficits of service and 
infrastructure, as well as incapacity or unwillingness to continue paying their mortgage. 
According to the INFONAVIT, in 2015 Tlajomulco had the third highest housing vacancy 
rates nationwide (10,073 units), following Ciudad Juárez (12,391) and Tijuana (12,260, 
Ibid.).168 The abandoned properties in the social housing projects became both a testimony 
to broken aspirations of homeownership, but also a symbol of social alienation, made worse 
when these dwellings are appropriated by criminal organizations or street gangs (to hoard 
stolen goods or conduct drug transactions). Squatting occasionally occur in these 
abandoned properties and some squatters even managed to formalize their presence by 
proving the length of their occupancy of the property (the author’s fieldwork). Similarly, 
large extensions of what were supposed to be green areas in the social housing projects and 
which once advertised as an example of modern life-style and were supposed to foment 
mutual interaction and civil encounters are overgrown and unused due to lack of 
maintenance and reinforce a sense of abandonment.  
                                                          
167 One example was with the selection of Queen for the Day of Independence Day, in which native 
population from the town denied the participation of the surrounding social housing projects. 
168  The number regarding the amount of abandoned properties provided by the municipal 
government is higher than the number provided by the INFONAVIT: according to the municipal 
government, by 2016, in the Zona Valle, where 150 thousand social housing dwellings are located, 
70 thousand were currently not occupied by their owners and 15 thousand units were completely 
abandoned (El Informador 2016-06-22) 
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Illustration 6.7: Vacant Properties in Social Housing Project Chulavista (photo 
taken by the author) 
 
 
Illustration 6.8: Public Space Covered with Graffiti, Project Hacienda Santa Fe 
(photo taken by the author) 
 
During the early years of the social housing boom in Tlajomulco government 
agency was absent from most of the social housing projects. The municipal seat is a small 
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town and did not have strong economic links with the social housing projects. Dwellers 
had to travel a long distance to the municipal seat for paperwork or to report problems. 
However, the widespread precariousness in the social housing projects and other urban 
problems associated with the social housing boom also present an opportunity for 
politicians to extend their influence and popularity. During elections candidates promised 
to deliver and improve the infrastructure and service in social housing projects and the 
major political parties have established their local presence in large social housing projects; 
not much different from the clientelistic politics prevalent in the informal settlements 
decades ago.  
The municipal government under the Citizen’s Movement Party rule extended the 
presence of government to major clusters of social housing projects in the municipality. 
For many administrative issues dwellers no longer have to travel to the municipal seat. The 
mere size of the social housing projects means that any effective governance will require 
the synergy between the local authorities and the residents. For example, if neighbors rely 
on the government alone to mow the grass in community garden, each garden can only be 
attended every 200 days. This is the reason why so many green spaces in social housing 
projects look so abandoned. In contrast, if neighbors organize with the tools and personnel 
provided by the municipal government, the public spaces can be much better maintained 
(interview with local official).  
Before the 1992 reform (mentioned in Chapter 3) the INFONAVIT was in charge 
of fomenting neighborhood associations in the social housing projects that the institute 
financed. Although the INFONAVIT no longer undertook this task, some developers do so 
with varying extent of success. 169 Neighbors collaborate in official or informal ways: 
raising money to hire someone to patrol the project entrance, constructing a neighborhood 
religious site, organizing a summer program for kids, forming a WhatsApp group to share 
information and to warn each other about any danger or suspicious person presented in the 
                                                          
169  The developer GIG (one of the major developers based in Jalisco) has a department of 
neighborhood organization, which helped to (the author’s interview). 
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neighborhood. Organization and events such as soccer game, religious events, 
Independence Day celebration etc. are opportunities to foment neighborhood social 
cohesion. The municipal government also seek to promote social cohesion by constructing 
sites and symbols that dwellers in the housing projects can identify themselves with. One 
example is Chiva-Barrio, a large sports complex that serves surrounding social housing 
projects. The Institute of Alternatives for Youth of Tlajomulco (INDAJO) fomented 
neighborhood identity with murals, which invites the participation of the neighbors, 
particularly the youth to rescue the damaged public space and foment neighborhood 
identity. By the end of 2016, INDAJO had painted 89 murals in the municipality (many of 
them in social housing projects), and almost 38 thousand people participated directly or 
indirectly (La Verdad 2016-12-18; for an example, see Illustration 6.11).     
The Citizen’s Movement Party often uses the promotion of citizen participation to 
highlight its legitimacy in governing the municipality. The municipal government tried to 
institutionalize neighborhood associations to foment the synergy between the 
neighborhood and the municipal government (Illustration 6.9). Local authorities hold 
neighborhood meetings and are also proactive in neighborhood WhatsApp groups, sharing 
information such as career-training workshops, social programs of the municipal 
government, etc. The municipal government even created a smartphone application “Tlajo 
App”, on which people can take a picture of the urban problem they encounter, upload it 
and thereby submit a real time report to the government. Note that in many large social 
housing projects such as Hacienda Santa Fe, conditions vary considerably among different 
neighborhoods. Neighborhoods that are organized and are able to obtain the support of the 
municipal government are often more likely to have better public security and public 
appearance.  
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Illustration 6.9: An Early-Evening Neighborhood Meeting with Local Authorities 
in Project Hacienda Santa Fe (photo taken by the author) 
 
 
Illustration 6.10. Participatory Planning: a Neighborhood Forum Organized by the 
Metropolitan Institute of Urban Planning (IMEPLAN, photo taken by the author) 
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Illustration 6.11: The Entrance of Social Housing Project Hacienda Santa Fe 
Repainted by INDAJO with a Mural (photo taken by the author) 
 
Of course, such attempts at communication and transparency cannot guarantee the 
solution of the problem, since the deficits are accumulative and structural, and the solution 
requires the collaboration of authorities of different levels. It is for this reason that the 
neighborhood associations are also vulnerable. Scenarios such as the lack of response from 
the local government, partisan interests, neighborhood conflicts, or simply the fatigue from 
daily commuting, can easily reduce the morale among organizers and participants. While 
the improvement of living conditions in existing social housing projects requires structural 
measures such as job creation and investment in infrastructure, it is definitely a desirable 
goal that the citizen participation and government-society synergy can move forward and 
become a permanent aspect of life in these projects. These are the agencies that carry the 
capacity to significantly solve many of the daily problems and to mitigate the adverse 
structural conditions in the social housing projects.  
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6.3. Conclusions: Comparing China with Mexico  
 
Despite the different policy paradigms (communist versus democratic), in this 
chapter I have identified various similarities in social housing projects developed in the 
2000s and 2010s in both Nanjing and Guadalajara (Tlajomulco). In both cases social 
housing projects have been developed following the logic of “minimizing costs” and 
“meeting quantitative goals”. Governments and developers had very little concern over the 
built environment, or the social consequences generated by the deficits in infrastructure 
and service provision. As a result, social housing projects in Nanjing and in Guadalajara 
are often located at the far periphery where land is cheap, and where poor quality of 
construction can prevail.  
Social housing projects in both Nanjing and Guadalajara concentrate a large 
proportion of low-income population. Compared to middle and upper class citizens, they 
are more dependent on service provided by the public sector. Yet, social housing projects 
also suffer a variety of deficits in infrastructure and service, such as public transportation, 
hospitals and policing, although the degree varies between the two cities and is especially 
marked in Tlajomulco. Moving into a social housing often implies rising living cost, fatigue 
due to long commuting hours, rupture of previous social circle, etc. The influx of new 
arrivals also means a lack of local identity and fragile social cohesion, which leads to public 
security issues and alienation. 
The similarities mentioned above are not random coincidence: social housing 
development in the two cities are embedded in the process of social and spatial 
reorganization of the city, as well as the expansion of the real estate capital. In Nanjing, 
the urban area was once quite socioeconomically heterogeneous (to the extent that it could 
be under a planned economy). Since urban land was capitalized in 1990s, local government 
converted land leases into one of its most important revenue sources and as a result the 
government actively promotes urban expansion and redevelopment, with little concern 
over issues such as socio-spatial inequality or residential segregation. Social housing 
projects became a policy tool with which the local government in Nanjing relocates the 
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low-income urban neighborhoods and rural communities from locations that are desirable 
to urbanization and urban redevelopment projects. In Guadalajara, the social housing boom 
is mainly the product of the capitalization and speculation of land in the far periphery 
(previously communal/ ejidal land, for agricultural use) as well as the mortgage boom 
promoted by diverse agencies of housing finance, including the INFONAVIT. There, too, 
there is rising socio-spatial segregation and a trend towards (working) class and low income 
homogenization. 
Although social housing projects offer housing access to the low-income 
population, I argue that social housing development in both cities represents more 
dispossession than an advance in housing rights. In Nanjing, urban families that were 
relocated to social housing projects lost their previous access to infrastructure and service 
in the central area of the city; while relocated rural communities lost their land and 
livelihood. Moreover, neither of the two groups can negotiate effectively with the 
government and the developers over the relocation decision or the compensation terms. 
These are imposed by the government. Moreover, the relocated families are systematically 
excluded from sharing the rising land value generated by urban (re)development projects. 
In Guadalajara, the mortgages (including those granted by the INFONAVIT) that social 
housing homebuyers contracted are relatively expensive (especially in the long-term). The 
burden of risks falls disproportionately on low-income homebuyers rather than developers 
or the financial agency. The volatility of the labor market, the fluctuation of 
macroeconomic conditions, the employers’ omission in making monthly deposits to the 
employees’ INFONAVIT account, and the unexpected depreciation due to the poor design 
and construction of the housing complex, all heighten vulnerability and weaken the 
exercise of housing rights. Some homeowners had to abandon their dwelling or go through 
a foreclosure, and lost what they had invested in the property.  
While social housing represents dispossession for low-income dwellers, they 
nonetheless represent different forms of dispossession: (forced) relocation/ displacement 
in the Chinese case and financial indebtedness/ lack of tenure security in the Mexican case. 
This variation is due to the different roles social housing plays in the capitalization of urban 
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land. In the Mexican case, social housing is the final product of the capitalization of land 
and is for profit. In the Chinese case social housing is not the final product of the 
capitalization of land, rather it is a policy tool used by the government to smooth that 
process and achieve an intermediate product of the process of capitalization of land.  
Social housing dwellers respond to the hardship, social exclusion and abuse from 
the authorities and the developers in a variety of ways. In both cities low-income social 
housing residents resort to informality (informal supporting network and informal 
economy), try to modify their built environment, or collaborate with the authorities to cope 
with the hardship and improve their condition. Dwellers sometimes resort to collective 
actions to fight for their social and housing rights -- even in Nanjing where the government 
is far more authoritarian, protests occasionally occurred around compensation for 
relocation or the condition in social housing projects.     
A grassroots and comparative perspective reveals that for residents the outcome of 
the social housing policy does not necessarily depend on the agencies that construct and 
distribute them (government versus the market). Rather, it is subject to the way that the 
city is made: how the land market is structured and stratified, and how urbanization and 
housing development is financed. As long as the current regime of urbanization that 
prioritizes profit and segregation predominates, a real “social housing for housing rights” 
is unlikely to happen. For the short and medium term, two main tasks remain for the public 
and the policy makers: first, how to hold the authorities and the developers accountable 
when it comes to urban planning and housing development; and second, how to solve the 
accumulated deficits that many social housing projects suffer.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions 
 
This research intended to respond to a broad question: what motivates 
governmental agenda to make and implement social policy for low-income populations in 
two developing countries with very different polities (communist authoritarian and 
neoliberal democratic). And how, and under what calculus, do these to polities mobilize 
resources to implement social policy? I argue that in contrast to the post-WWII social 
housing development in advanced industrialized countries, in which the State acts as a 
force of de-commodification and social provider of essential services, social housing in 
China and in Mexico during the past thirty years is essentially used as a policy tool to 
facilitate the expansion of real estate and financial capital. More specifically I compared 
the Chinese and the Mexican cases on three levels: the national, the local, and the 
community and household level. Through a discussion of these comparisons I explored the 
policy options for governments in the two countries when it comes to housing production 
and provision for urban low-income populations. I discussed what actually motivated the 
governments to form and implement the social housing policy, and how the policy 
formulated by the national government was reinterpreted, adopted and implemented by the 
local authorities. Finally, I examined the policy outcomes, particularly regarding social 
housing dwellers’ housing rights, largely from a household and community perspective. In 
this final Chapter, I will first summarize some of the analytical lessons that I drew from 
the comparisons, and then discuss some of the policy implications generated from this 
research.    
 
The National Level:  
Social housing has developed fast in both China and Mexico since the 2000s, but 
through different approaches: a government-centered approach in China, and a market-
centered approach in Mexico. The variations in these approaches are largely the result of 
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the existing housing regime when the neoliberal transformation of housing and urban 
policy started in these two countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Interestingly, residential tenures in large cities in China and in Mexico in the eve 
of the state-led industrialization (1940s and 1950s) were quite similar. Private rental 
housing predominated the urban housing stock. Both the Chinese and the Mexican 
Revolutions caused profound social, economic and political transformations. The post-
revolutionary governments in China and in Mexico actively sought to industrialize their 
country under the leadership of the State. They used housing policy as a mechanism to 
cheapen the cost of social reproduction of labor and as a component of the state formation 
project, and in this way to create a favorable condition for industrialization and capital 
accumulation. That said, the variations in approaches to industrialization were different. In 
China it was through a centrally planned economy that prioritized heavy industry, while in 
Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America it was import substitution industrialization. State 
construction was also different: proletarian dictatorship in China versus political 
corporatism in Mexico, and both led to contrasting paradigms of housing policy. By the 
1980s public rental housing predominated the urban housing stock in China, while self-
help informal housing was the major form of housing access for urban working class in 
Mexico. Note that in this period, the public sector in both countries also supported formal 
housing production for the urban working class; but in Mexico, these programs were of 
much more limited scale compared to China, and only targeted workers of certain key 
sectors and affiliated to official unions. The main form of support that the public sector 
provided was credits, and public rental housing was almost non-existent in Mexico.   
By the 1980s housing policies in China and in Mexico were in deep crisis.  In China 
where the public sector never invested adequately in the urban housing sector by the late 
1970s the housing deficit was even worse than in 1949– the year in which the Communist 
Party took power. In Mexico, housing agencies were severely decapitalized by inflation 
and poor governance that led to the 1982 Debt Crisis. As a response to the respective crises 
both governments launched a market-oriented housing reform. This reform was also 
embedded in a redefinition of the role of State in economic development and social 
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provision, the deregulation of the labor and financial market, as well as the expansion of 
the market relations and the financial capital in the urban housing sector.  
Although such market-oriented housing reforms aimed at releasing the government 
from the burden of housing provision, the role of the public sector in the reform was critical. 
In both China and Mexico policy makers made important institutional arrangements to 
facilitate the private participation in low-income housing development. Reforms sought to 
eliminate anti-market practices and enhance neo-liberal policy approaches such that the 
role of collective organizations and group mobilization in housing provision was 
significantly reduced, and a direct link between the developers and home buyers was 
established. In both countries, while reducing the housing deficit and maintaining political 
control remain desirable policy goals, there has been a more pronounced emphasis on the 
profitability of the housing industry and the real estate sector.  
Despite these similarities, just as the formal housing policies in the pre-reform era 
in China and in Mexico had targeted different populations, the market-oriented housing 
reforms in these two countries generated different approaches to social housing. In the 
Mexican case, formal housing policy in the pre-reform era mainly attended the low-income 
working class in certain sectors who earned less than 2 times the minimum wage (through 
agencies such as the INFONAVIT). Thus, the housing reform then mainly targeted the low-
income working class by actively seeking to reduce the entry-barrier to a home mortgage, 
while middle and upper class housing remained largely untouched. The mortgage boom, 
the deregulation of land development, and innovative financial arrangements converted the 
social housing sector for the low-income urban working class into a profitable business. In 
the Chinese case, since the majority of the pre-reform urban housing was public rental 
dwellings, the Chinese housing reform targeted the entire urban sector and thereby 
embraced a wide income strata that was emerging as a result of the economic reforms put 
in place in the 1980s and 1990s. The product of the Chinese housing reform was a 
commercial housing sector which became far more profitable for developers than just 
developing affordable/ social housing.  
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In other words, the housing reform in Mexico sought to fix the government failure, 
and the “market” was seen as a solution to the housing deficit among the low-income urban 
working class. The housing reform in China also intended to fix the government failure in 
the early phase, but as it targeted the entire urban population (including the middle and 
high income groups), the newly-formed commercial housing market became subject to de 
facto “gentrification” and favored middle and upper-class housing over low-income 
affordable housing. In this context, a profitable, commercialized social housing sector, as 
in the case of Mexico, does not exist in China. The implication is that in China the market 
is viewed by policy makers as the cause of low-income housing problem and to the extent 
that Chinese governments were able to reduce the housing exclusion among the urban poor, 
would require direct intervention to fix that market failure. In other words, the government 
should take supply-side actions such as constructing dwellings for the urban poor.  In 
Nanjing, demand-side actions were likely to be ineffective since subsidizing the urban poor 
so they can afford a commercial housing would further raise the commercial housing price, 
and would be more expensive than constructing dwellings for them. This is why although 
in most Chinese cities a housing provident fund has been established (similar to the 
INFONAVIT solidarity funds), it mainly subsidizes middle and upper income homebuyers, 
rather than help low-income urban working class to get access to a commercial dwelling.   
 
The Local Level:  
Although the social housing policy was formulated by the national governments, in 
Chapters 4 and Chapter 5 (my case studies in Nanjing and Guadalajara) examined the 
critical role played by local governments in the policy implementation. Local governments 
in these two cities hold overlapping yet considerably different interests and policy goals to 
those of the central government, but they both actively promoted social housing 
development, albeit through different approaches and motivated by different policy 
agendas. In particular I identified the structural constraints and incentives within which 
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local governments responded to the social housing policy established by the central 
government.       
In China, the central government intended to use social housing to stimulate 
investment and economic growth in time of adverse external economic condition 
(particularly following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis), as well as to appease the 
widespread discontent against the deteriorating housing affordability. For local 
governments in many Chinese cities, social housing represents a heavy fiscal burden and 
an opportunity costs, because they are responsible for bulk of the investment and promotion 
of construction, and yet given that social housing is exempt from land use fees, there is 
little opportunity to recover fiscal income from such developments (through property taxes 
etc.)  Not surprisingly therefore, many governments – as in the Nanjing case -- passively 
resisted direct construction of social housing and recast policies that would generate urban 
development investment.  
Adjustments in the central-local relationship in China occurred often in the 1980s 
and 1990s (e.g. the decentralization of the 1980s, the fiscal reform in 1994, etc.). Even 
though the central government dominated this process and eventually consolidated its 
control over the macro-economy after the 1994 tax recentralization, local authorities 
responded to each adjustment with considerable sensitivity. Local governments no longer 
simply took command from upper-level authorities, but became stakeholders with their 
own economic interests and sought to maximize their fiscal autonomy by not only relying 
on the transfer payment from upper-level government, but also actively expanded off-
budgetary revenues.  These off-budgetary revenues became a parallel fiscal system, with 
which the local authorities finance their infrastructure and developmentalist projects. In 
sum, the fiscal and political arrangements among governments of different levels created a 
set of structural constraints and incentives that came to influence and shape local authorities’ 
behavior patterns, and the promotion of urban development expenditures over social 
expenditures, etc.   
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Local governments in Nanjing and elsewhere have converted land-use rights into a 
finance machine to finance their developmentalist projects. In China, all urban land is under 
public ownership, and all rural land is of communal ownership. The only legal approach to 
incorporate rural land into the city is through state expropriation. Land-use rights were 
increasingly commodified and capitalized in the 1990s and 2000s, when commercial 
developers were able to obtain land-use rights from the local government for a price, which 
is now determined in public auctions. Having monopolized the land supply in the primary 
land markets, local governments extract enormous revenues from leasing out urban land, 
which provides them with considerable alternative fiscal resources and sometimes even 
surpassed local government’s general fiscal revenues. Local government land reserves also 
serve as collateral to contract loans or issue bonds from the financial market. Many local 
governments in China, as in Nanjing, envisioned a virtuous feedback loop regarding urban 
development: by borrowing loans and building urban infrastructures, they promote the 
appreciation of land value and extract revenues from leasing out the land use right, which 
will further allowed borrowing more loans and building more urban infrastructures. In sum, 
the rapid urbanization of China was to large extent financed by the re-capitalization of 
urban land and government’s monopoly in the primary urban land market.  
This pattern generates three consequences in urban and housing development in 
China. First, local governments have strong incentives to hold tight control over land, and 
urban housing development in the country retains a high level of formality- alternatives 
such as squatting, housing cooperatives etc., that are common in other developing countries 
are rarely viable in China. Second, through maximizing revenues from land leases, local 
governments actively promote appreciation of land values, which is largely responsible for 
the deterioration of housing affordability and for developers’ lack of interest in low-income 
housing. And third, local governments have strong incentives (and the fiscal and 
institutional resources) to lead urban spatial expansion and reorganization. This inevitably 
led to large-scale relocation and displacement among the urban population.  
The displacement of low-income families became a focus of state-society 
confrontations since the early 2000s, and yet many of the affected families did not want to 
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leave the original neighborhood, and the monetary compensation offered by the local 
government was low, insufficient to purchase a new dwelling. Against this backdrop in 
Nanjing the local government altered its previous (somewhat) indifferent attitude and 
started to build a large amount of social housing, the vast majority which were reserved 
only for relocated families. (Note that this rule was not established by the central 
government, but was an invention of the local government.)  In other words, social housing 
is largely used by the local authorities as a policy tool to smooth out the relocation process 
while also getting access to prime inner city sites for commercial and other redevelopment. 
It became an indispensable component of the land-driven finance machine of the city. 
Between 2000 and 2014, the metropolitan and the district governments in Nanjing 
demolished approximately 200,000 urban residential dwellings, and constructed and 
allocated a similar amount of social housing, mostly for relocation purposes in the city 
periphery.  
Almost in the same period as in China, Mexico initiated its wave of decentralization 
in 1983 with the modification of the Article 115 of the Constitution. The reform gave 
municipal government more autonomy, resources, and responsibilities that required them 
to assume more responsibilities in public works and service provision. Although municipal 
governments in Mexico do not lead social housing development, they are nevertheless in 
charge of regulating it through: zoning, urban development planning, construction 
authorizations and inspections, as well as providing basic services after the project is 
handed over to the municipality.   
The social housing boom in the peripheral municipalities of the Metropolitan Area 
of Guadalajara, and the negative consequences it generated, reflects a gap between the 
national-level policy and local political reality. It took place in a context in which there 
was almost no urban planning or regulatory framework. Local actors of the public sector 
(municipal governments, state government, agencies of metropolitan coordination, or the 
state delegation of INFONAVIT) in the early 2000s were not prepared for the social 
housing boom. Local authorities facilitated the expansion of real estate capital by turning 
a blind eye to the irregularities committed by the developers. By issuing construction 
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authorizations, they legitimized the operation of the developers. In other words, the 
institutional failure at planning and regulating the market contributed to profits that the 
developers could make. Local officials advanced their personal interests, while 
construction authorization and property taxes did contribute to the municipal fiscal budget 
(though nothing like the extent of fiscal capture from the land leases for local governments 
in China).  Ultimately, though, in Mexico especially (but also in Nanjing), it is the local-
income dwellers who suffer the precariousness of these social housing projects.  
There is a general consensus regarding the main challenges faced by the 
decentralization movements in China and in Mexico: the gap between the resources and 
the expenditure responsibilities, and insufficient institutional and administrative capacity 
of the local governments. However, Chinese local authorities play a much more central 
role in leading urban development, not only as planner and regulator, but also as 
constructor, entrepreneur and developer, and the case of the social housing development in 
Nanjing shows quite clearly. The form and degree of government intervention in urban 
development and redevelopment is much deeper in Nanjing– a difference, I argue, that is 
due to the different political and land regime in the two countries.  
The political dimension matters. Mexico is a democracy in which municipal 
president is elected by the local electorate, while in China mayors and local head of the 
Communist Party are essentially appointed by the upper-level authorities. As the Nanjing 
and Guadalajara cases show, the wider political regime largely influences the career pattern 
of the local authorities, and the extent to which they will be held accountable. Different 
political contexts lead local authorities to develop different preferences in the fiscal 
expenditures. In China, local leaders are more likely to respond to the expectations from 
upper-level authorities, which prioritize economic growth and political stability, to obtain 
promotion. In Mexico, local leaders have to respond to the demand of their local electorate 
to win the election, which often centers on public work, basic service and public security.  
Indeed, in contemporary Tlajomulco it was the patent incapacity to curb the chaotic social 
housing boom and to provide services that led to the power transfer from the traditional 
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political parties (PRI and PAN) to a new and relatively minor party, the Citizen’s 
Movement (MC).   
Regarding the land regime, compared to their Mexican counterparts local 
governments in China resemble more the features of a real estate enterprise in leading urban 
development. Although the prefectural governments in China also face the challenge of 
mismatch between their fiscal revenues and the expenditure responsibilities, and they are 
also dependent on the transfer payment system from central government, they can 
nevertheless operate a parallel budgetary system that is primarily based on the revenues 
from land leases to finance their infrastructure and development projects. In comparison, 
Municipal governments in Mexico play a much more limited role in the urban land market. 
Although municipal governments possess land, they can only use it for social purposes 
(such as building schools, hospitals and cultural facilities), not for profit as in the Chinese 
case. The fees for construction authorizations and property taxes are only a minor share out 
of the rising land value, and their rates are not as sensitive to the market as the land leases.  
One difference that may become important in the future, is that Mexico municipalities 
(cities) do set and recover property taxes, which is not the case in China.  While auctioning 
land leases in Nanjing is the “golden goose”, failure to seek downstream property taxes (at 
least on commercial housing), is likely to erode fiscal capacity once city development 
slows.  
 
The Household and Community Level:  
Although in Nanjing and in Guadalajara, local governments apparently operate 
under different institutional frameworks and with different resources, and the social 
housing development took different approaches, my fieldwork identified some key features 
and problems shared in the social housing projects in the two cities. Social housing in both 
is largely located at the far periphery where land is the cheapest (but maybe geologically 
hazardous or close to industrial pollutions). There are deficits in services and infrastructure, 
poor quality of dwelling construction, concentration of poverty and residential segregation, 
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lack of employment opportunities and long commuting hours, as well as problematic public 
security, among others. Despite different modes of construction, social housing projects in 
China and in Mexico follows a same logic: prioritizing the quantitative goals and 
minimizing the cost of construction. Government and developers in general overlook the 
built environment, or the social problems that the deficit and the concentration of poverty 
can generate. Ironically, in both cities, the lack of institutional capacity and the hasty 
construction process result in various forms of irregularities and informalities in these 
housing projects that are supposed to be “formal”.    
Besides the precarious condition in these projects, social housing dwellers went 
through various forms of dispossession. In the case of Nanjing many families were de facto 
forcibly relocated to social housing projects, despite their rejection to the relocation or the 
compensation terms. They often had to wait a long lapse of time to actually move in the 
new dwelling. They also have to live with other consequences of the relocation: the rise of 
living cost and the loss of previous easy access to urban infrastructure and service. 
Moreover, it is the local government who extracts the lion’s share of the rising land value 
from urbanization/ urban redevelopment, not the relocated urban households or rural 
communities.   
In the case of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara, I argue that although social 
housing represents a fast-track alternative to self-built housing as an affordable housing 
option, the decision-making of purchasing a social housing dwelling is the result of a 
variety of structural factors, such as the availability of mortgages of low entry-barrier, the 
fact that mass social housing projects somehow squeezed out land available for self-help 
housing, the pro-homeownership ideological and commercial campaigns, etc. Different 
from the previous generation of settlers in the self-built informal settlements, social 
housing dwellers are subject to formal financing through a mortgage that requires monthly 
payments for up to thirty years. However, the property that homebuyers purchased may 
incur various structural failures and deficits of essential infrastructure and service. The 
mortgage regime is exploitative against the low-income homebuyers, as it imposes a 
variety of risks disproportionately on them, including the volatility of labor market, the 
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fluctuation of the economy, and the omission of the employer etc. Mortgage borrowers are 
also victims of information asymmetry, as they often do not possess the full knowledge of 
the legal terms and the current situation of their account. Mortgage agencies take advantage 
of this, and impose other abusive and punitive terms in the mortgage contract. As a result 
foreclosure is today a real threat to many households living in social housing projects.  
Social housing development in both cases are deeply embedded in the processes of 
expansion of real estate and financial capital, as well as the increasing spatial 
reorganization of the city, although social housing development serves different purposes 
in these processes. In Nanjing it is used as policy tool to facilitate the relocation process 
(intermediary product in the land capitalization of the city), and in Mexico it is a 
commercial product (the final product of the land capitalization). This lead to different 
forms of dispossession: social housing dwellers in Nanjing often moved in under the state 
coercion and are excluded from the rising land value generated by the urbanization and 
urban redevelopment projects after the relocation, while those in Guadalajara have to face 
an abusive and exploitative mortgage regime that poses a serious threat to the tenure 
security.   
Social housing projects in Nanjing and in Guadalajara also generates the challenge 
of creating and responding to an influx of a large number of low-income families. This has 
reinforced the residential segregation and socio-spatial inequality of the city. Households 
living in social housing developments are more dependent on the infrastructure and service 
provided by the public sector; yet public provision in these projects are often far from 
meeting the demand. These deficits (including policing), as well as the breakup of previous 
social networks and sense of local identity, lead to low-level of social cohesion and creates 
particular challenges for public security. Of course, when moving into a new environment, 
people usually seek to reconstruct their social network, which was also the experience 
among the settlers in earlier self-help informal settlements; however, factors associated 
with moving into a social housing project, such as abandoned housing and long commuting 
hours, created considerable obstacles for such efforts.   
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Both individual households and the community have developed some coping 
mechanisms as response to the social infrastructure deficiencies, hardship and 
dispossession. Informality, for example, is an emerging feature in social housing projects, 
even in Nanjing where the local authorities are much less tolerant with the informal 
economy. The informal economy targets the deficits of service provision by the public 
sector. Social housing dwellers also reproduce their previous life experiences and seek to 
develop informal support networks. Collective actions also occasionally form a response 
to deficits and abuses from the government or the developer. For local authorities, it 
becomes clear that the only way to effectively govern social housing projects is to seek 
partnership with the dwellers, although the approaches they take vary. The mobilization of 
the dwellers is embedded in the political contexts of the two countries as well. While in 
Mexico, clientelist practices that were widespread in the consolidation process of the 
informal settlements, are also being actively reproduced in social housing projects. In 
China, political and social stability of the social housing projects is among the top priorities 
of the local authorities and is tackled by strict means of social control.  
Although social housing projects in China and in Mexico have come to house a 
very large number of low-income urban working class families, I argue that they were not 
designed to address the housing rights of the urban working class. Rather, social housing 
projects in these two countries are developed to promote the agenda of the government, the 
developers and the finance agencies. This has led to various forms of dispossession, abuse, 
and hardships rather than a strengthening of rights and empowerment of urban citizens. 
Despite their different contexts, the social housing development in these two cases 
represent more of accumulation by dispossession than a real advance in housing rights.  
These aforementioned comparisons lead me to offer three analytical lessons, each 
with theoretical implications. First, this study expands our knowledge on how the processes 
of neoliberalization are unfolded in developing countries such as China and Mexico. In 
particular, social policy is used as a tool and venue to facilitate the advance of neoliberal 
projects such as financialization towards low-income population. Disguised as a form of 
“welfare” that targets certain vulnerable social groups, groups in power use social policy 
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to effectively impose their (sometimes hidden) agenda on the target population. Note that 
the advance of a neoliberal project is often not simply imposed by an external force, but is 
rather characterized by an embeddedness in local institutional and political contexts. Of 
course, embeddedness does not determine the policy outcome. But they are powerful 
structural constraints and incentives for the policy-making and informs us about the 
possible policy options. For this reason, government-led social housing construction is 
simply not viable in Mexico, while the commercialization approach to social housing is 
unlikely to be able to prevail in the long term in China. 
Second, the role of local government in development is highlighted in a context of 
increasing fluidity of capital. Local governments have their own interests and stakes. They 
respond with considerable sensitivity to the changing national and international economic 
landscape, and the changing central-local relationship. In particular, local governments 
play a major role in urban zoning and planning. In other words, with their power over how 
the territory should be spatially organized, they shape the locus where the capital operates 
and expands. This happens, of course, within a set of structural constraints and incentives 
generated by the political and land regime of each country.  
Third, this research leads one to reject an essentialist understanding of government 
and market. The fact that social housing dwellers in Nanjing and in Guadalajara suffer 
various forms of dispossession and deficits remind us that, who constructs the social 
housing does not necessarily determine the welfare and housing rights of the people. Rather, 
what matters is the way that the city is made. The fact that the government in Nanjing 
monopolizes the primary land market of the city does not mean that the government would 
dedicate the land to house the low-income population; on the contrary, local authorities 
take advantage of this monopoly to maximize their fiscal revenues. Government agencies 
in China, as well as financial agencies and private developers in Mexico seem to operate 
on the same canvas: to maximize profit from the capitalization of land. In other words, the 
key to issues such as rights to the city lies in a more inclusive way of making city.    
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So what does this mean for policy? This dissertation underscores four main points. 
First, social housing development in China and in Mexico contains a high level of financial 
risk. As Chapter 4 addressed, the state-led urbanization in China largely relies on land 
appreciation, over which the local government has monopoly. However, the land value is 
also subject to economic fundamentals, such that even local authorities resort to speculation. 
Note that the local governments in many Chinese cities, including Nanjing, have already 
been heavily indebted to finance their infrastructure and developmentalist projects. As 
shown in quite a few Chinese cities, the land appreciation is not as sustainable as many 
policy makers would hope. The collapse of land use caused by a recession (even at local 
level) can have systemic consequences not limited to the economic sphere. And, as 
mentioned above, the lack of a strong property tax regime is likely to undermine fiscal 
sustainability for urban development.  In the Mexican case, social housing development 
takes a market-centered approach. Concerning the INFONAVIT, although it is public-
sector agency and its financialization is still of limited scale, and although the obligatory 
contribution from employers have to some extent dispersed the financial risk for the agency, 
it is still showing that the low-income homebuyers disproportionately absorb the financial 
risks caused by the volatility of labor market and macroeconomic fluctuations.   
Second, the current paradigm of social housing development is likely to continue 
in the short and medium term. The social housing development in Nanjing is an 
indispensable component of a model of urbanization based on land capitalization, 
government monopoly of the primary land market and government-imposed relocations. 
As long as this model persists, the local authorities are likely to construct more social 
housing to accommodate relocated families. Currently, the government’s demand of social 
housing for relocation purposes still surpasses the supply, even with the completion of the 
four mega projects that combine to provide 82,800 social housing dwellings. Not 
surprisingly, recently the Prefectural Government of Nanjing announced that it will 
continue the current rhythm of social housing construction. Meanwhile, it remains 
questionable to what degree the city can expand the social housing to groups such as 
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migrant workers and to other low-income families whose neighborhoods are not the target 
of relocation.  
In the Mexican case, there is a general consensus in the country that the social 
housing boom in the 2000s is problematic and unsustainable. The Peña Nieto 
Administration (2012-2018) called for a re-densification of the city, and did not rescue the 
giant social housing developers such as Homex when they were at the edge of bankruptcy. 
In Tlajomulco, for example, a ban against the construction of dwellings smaller than 90 sq. 
m. is a clear sign of some local authorities’ rejection to the chaotic expansion of social 
housing. Nationwide, the social housing industry has to certain extent been restructured. 
Some mortgage agencies (including several SOFOLs), as well as some major social 
housing developers (such as HOMEX) are in bankruptcy. Medium-size developers have 
also made attempts to balance and diversify their operation, for example, by constructing 
more middle and upper class housing. Because social housing development in Mexico took 
a market-oriented approach, we can expect the industry to shrink when the demand for 
social housing diminishes. Of course, the case of Tlajomulco is somehow an exception, 
where there is a clear over-supply of social housing dwelling at this point. In the rest of the 
country, it might be too early to envision an end to the social housing development. Indeed 
Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s swearing in as the new president of Mexico on December 
1st 2018, means that we are at an interesting moment to observe the orientation of the new 
Administration (2018-2024) regarding the housing policy for the urban low-income 
working class. As an energetic critic to the neoliberal order, it remains as an open question 
whether his administration will actively promote alternative forms of housing access, such 
as renting and housing cooperatives, etc..          
Third, more attention should be put on how to improve the living condition in the 
existing social housing projects. This is critical to the social mobility among the low-
income social housing dwellers. The previous experience with social housing development 
in the postwar Europe and United States showed that without proper long-term 
management and maintenance, mass social housing projects were prone to becoming 
“vertical slums”. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, social housing dwellers are usually 
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more dependent on the provision from the public sector, which requires a long-term 
commitment from the public sector. Yet, the task is tough because a lot of the social 
housing projects were constructed with defects and bad (sometimes irremediable) planning, 
and these are not where public-sector investment prioritizes. In Nanjing, as most of the 
social housing dwellings are highrises, the maintenance is even more costly and risky. 
Moreover, the improvement of the condition of the social housing projects require a holistic 
solution that addresses not only the deficits in service and infrastructure, but to foment 
employment, neighborhood social cohesion, local identity, etc. Particularly in the Mexican 
case, tenure security in social housing projects is an extra challenge. Similar as for self-
builders in informal settlements tenure security matters and shapes dwellers’ willingness 
to invest in improving the housing and neighborhood condition. The risk of foreclosure 
among social housing homebuyers is likely to hinder the consolidation of these projects.  
The first step is probably to identify the agents and venues for positive changes. As 
shown in the case of Nanjing and Guadalajara, the improvement of the living condition in 
social housing projects requires not only the political willingness from the local authorities, 
but also the collaboration of governments of different levels, and a synergy between the 
government and the dwellers. In this sense, practices such as participatory budgeting and 
planning, neighborhood associations, micro-projects fomenting local identity – all seem to 
increase social cohesion in some parts of the social housing projects, despite the harsh 
structural conditions. Local authorities may also need to work with, rather than trying to 
eliminate informality to address the most urgent deficits.  
Finally, as the entire dissertation suggests, a common problem in the urban and 
housing development in developing countries is the insufficient institutional capacity and 
the lack of mechanism of checks and balance against the abusive practices of powerful 
stakeholders. For countries like China and Mexico, the current context is no longer one of 
absolute shortage of capital as it was in the 1940s and 1950s. On the contrary, capital 
becomes increasingly abundant and fluid, and seeks to operate and expand voraciously, 
often bypassing or overlooking government regulations and social claims. This happens 
with the complicity of authorities (or is led by them, as in the Chinese case). Of course, a 
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capitalistic urban land market will not disappear in short or medium term in neither China 
nor Mexico. Yet, more democratic participation should be introduced into urban 
governance with, ideally, more explicit recognition and respect for citizen housing rights.  
Even in an authoritarian context such as China, existing institutions and mechanisms such 
as local legislatures and public hearings should play a more pronounced role in urban 
development, rather than leaving the executive branch alone to make all the decisions.   
 
For future research, I argue that policy-related research in China and in Mexico 
should not be limited to “how to improve the financial efficiency of the mortgage agencies”. 
Rather, we should conduct a systematic evaluation of the financial risks generated by the 
current wave of financialization of low-income housing development. Particularly, how 
these risks affect the fiscal sustainability of local authorities, as well as the housing rights 
for the low-income population. Other developing countries that have developed a 
significant social housing sector, such as Chile and Brazil, can be included for further 
comparative research. Another relevant research topic is how the experience of living in a 
social housing project influences the social mobility patterns among the dwellers- and this 
research can be undertaken in longitudinal manner. Moreover, while there has been a 
general consensus over the common problems of the social housing projects in China and 
in Mexico, little has been discussed on how to improve the condition of the existing social 
housing projects.  
In the end, this dissertation has also set a solid basis for a future study of 
comparative cultural sociology on the social costs of financialization and neoliberal 
urbanization in the developing world, as well as the population’s response to these 
consequences. Treating individual cases in an isolated way often leads to the “exoticization” 
of the case, to the detriment of theoretical development. I end this dissertation with a quote 
from a recent article on the current situation of cultural sociology in China. Tsang and 
Lamont (2018) convincingly concluded that “overall, few cultural sociological works we 
are familiar with situate Chinese cases within a comparative study or within a transnational 
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theoretical framework...”. They continue, “It is our hope that cultural sociological work on 
China will mature by moving beyond the currently-dominant area-studies paradigm, one 
in which the Chinese case is frequently regarded as an extreme or an anomaly for the 
purposes of theory building. More research that situates Chinese phenomena within 
comparative and transnational frameworks will serve to normalize rather than exoticize 
Chinese social phenomena”. The endeavor of such comparative studies can help us to 
further theorize the hegemony of capital, as well as to identify the agency of resistance.  
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Appendix 1: Informal Housing Development in Mexico: 1950s-1980s 
 
This appendix serves as  supplementary reading for those who are interested in the 
development of self-built, informal housing in Mexico. I will review how informal housing 
became the most important form of housing access for the low-income urban working class 
in Mexico, particularly during the country’s rapid urbanization (1950s-1980s). I will also 
discuss the changing attitude and policy of the government regarding informal housing 
development.   
Self-built settlements, also called colonias populares, had been formed in many 
Mexican cities by the Cardenas Administration (1934-1940). During the Avila Camacho 
Administration (1940-1946), it became an increasingly important housing option for low-
income urban dwellers (Perló Cohen 1979). When urbanization accelerated in 1940s, 
although the political stability and economic growth opened up opportunities for real estate 
investment (Gilbert and Varley 1991), the construction industry in the country was not apt 
for an industrialized production for the urban mass due to the dependency on the 
importation of construction materials, as well as the lack of mechanisms to finance housing 
projects for developers (Jaramillo and Schteingart 1983). Neither the existing housing 
structure (private rental housing) nor the government-led construction of affordable 
housing (“social housing”) was sufficient to accommodate the housing need of the growing 
low-income urban population. In this context, self-built housing became a pragmatic and 
prevalent option for the low-income urban dwellers. In the metropolitan area of Mexico 
City, the proportion of the population that lived in the self-built settlements increased from 
2.3% in 1947, to 32% in 1952, and 50% in 1970 (Coulomb 1992: 92). Villar Calvo (2007: 
574) estimated that the “formal sector” (public and private sectors combined) produced 
around 35% of the dwellings in Mexico between 1951 and 1970, and the informal sector 
produced 65%.  
It is the informality in the land transactions and in the process of housing production 
that made self-help housing low-cost. Informal settlements were often established on land 
(of public, communal, or private ownership) on the periphery of the cities. Such land was 
either unattractive to commercial developers or of little agricultural value (Coulomb 1992: 
91; Jaramillo and Schteingart 1983). Settlers obtained land mainly through illicit land 
subdivision or, to less extent, through land invasion (Gilbert and Ward 1985). More 
specifically, the illegal subdivision of ejidal land170 was the most common method of land 
                                                          
170 Ejidal land is a form of communal land ownership, which was reinstalled after the Mexican 
Revolution as part of the Agrarian Reform. It cannot be sold to third party or used to accommodate 
urban expansion. Officially, the only legal approach to urbanize ejidal land is through state 
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alienation for self-building. The “illegality” consists of the fact that these subdivisions 
often lacked proper titles, basic services and failed to meet the planning norms (Gilbert and 
Ward 1985: 86). Scholars generally accepted that overtime, self-help settlements in the 
urban peripheries have the potential to get consolidated and integrated into the urban fabric, 
thanks to the upward social mobility of the settlers, community-based organizations and 
government support (Eckstein 1990). Once settled, informal housing will be subject to 
market transactions (land speculation, renting etc.) as well, albeit this market refers to 
informal residential market (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 69). 
That said, how the urban low-income population obtained land for self-building 
varied significantly among cities and may change over time, depending on factors such as 
land aptitude, land market dynamics and local state interventions (Gilbert and Ward 1985; 
Gilbert and Varley 1991). Occasionally, the government also expropriated land and 
assigned lots to form new self-built settlements. Perló Cohen (1979) documented that 
between December 1941 and December 1943, the Department of the Federal District (DDF) 
distributed 17,326 lots to household heads for self-building. Indeed, between 1936 and 
1954, some self-built settlements acquired the legal status of “colonias proletarias” and 
were authorized to exist even their condition did not meet the minimum requirement for 
urbanization (Coulomb 1992: 93; Perló Cohen 1979). In contrast, between 1953 and 1966, 
Mayor Uruchurtu of the Federal District imposed a strict and fairly effective ban against 
new informal settlements and invasions within his jurisdiction prompting a shift of new 
settlement into the State of Mexico where the state government actively promoted lot sales 
and failed to enforce regulations over developers and subdividers. Not surprisingly, 
informal settlements expanded rapidly towards where regulation was much weaker, that is, 
the State of Mexico (Gilbert and Ward 1985: 88). Similarly, the reason why the ejidal land 
became a major source for illegal subdivisions and invasions in Mexico City is related to 
the fact the Mayor exercised relatively weak control over ejidal land, where the Secretariat 
of Agrarian Reform and the official peasants’ leagues held more authority (Gilbert and 
Ward 1985: 90).  
The rapid expansion of self-built, informal settlements in Mexico resulted from a 
combination of political and economic factors. Amid the crisis of rental housing and the 
almost-non-existence of social housing for the low-income working class, the government 
considered self-building as a pragmatic policy option to tackle the urban housing deficit. 
                                                          
expropriation by the Secretariat of the Agrarian Reform. However, as Gilbert and Ward (1985: 89-
91) documented, ejidal land provided widespread opportunities for illegal subdivisions, as it is a 
profitable business for the ejidal community due to the high demand for self-built lots, and it 
became a venue for political patronage between the Secretariat of Agrarian Reform and the local 
peasants.      
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Indeed, the government was actively involved in monitoring and allocating the land 
(Gilbert and Ward 1981). Politicians saw informal settlements as a venue for clientelistic 
politics and use it to enforce political control over the mass: legal recognition of the 
informal settlements and service delivery were lengthy and highly selective, often in 
exchange for political loyalty (Eckstein 1990, Gilbert and Ward 1985, Perló Cohen 1979). 
These demands were often channeled and mediated by local political brokers (often also 
called “urban caciques”, see CIDAC 1990: 38, 39). The official party sought to maintain 
the settlers’ associations under its control through political patronage and denied some 
radical demands that could threaten the private property of the dominant class (Perló Cohen 
1979). It was not an easy task for the government, as residents of the informal settlements 
never formed a homogenous groups, and their relations with the official party was often 
not always submissive. Confrontations occasionally occurred between the government and 
some settlers’ associations that took an independent position around issues such as 
evictions and regularization (Perló Cohen 1979). Yet, overall, political control over 
informal settlements was fairly effective until late 1960s (CIDAC 1990: 39), although it 
did not offer a structural solution to address the deficit in infrastructure and service.  
From a structuralist perspective, self-help housing (and the informal sector in 
general) reflects a symbiotic connection between the expansion of the modern capitalist 
sector and the rapid growth of urban population under Import Substitution Industrialization 
(Portes and Shauffler 1993, Jaramillo and Schteingart 1983). That is, the informal sector 
cheapens the expansion of the modern capitalist sector by providing low-cost goods and 
services for the formal sector. In this way, the housing demand of the low-income urban 
population was reduced to legal recognition of the land lot, as well as access to services 
(CIDAC 1990: 38). This idea somehow coincides with a Marxist perspective: self-building 
cheapened the social reproduction of labor for industrialization, because when the working 
class self-build their home, the bourgeoisie takes advantage and suppress demand for 
higher wages (Burgess 1982, Ward 2012).  
While the PRI was able to exercise political control quite effectively in many of the 
informal settlements in the 1960s, independent community organizations that refused to be 
co-opted by the official party gained considerable impetus in the 1970s (CIDAC 1990: 
40).171 Some of these associations had their origin in the 1950s and 1960s; yet, the 1968 
student movement was a catalyst to the proliferation of these urban social movements. 
These movements targeted a wide range of urban issues, including housing, service 
                                                          
171 To name a few: the Comité de Defensa Popular in Durango and Chihuahua, the Frente Popular 
Tierra y Libertad in Monterrey, the Unión de Colonias Populares in Mexico City, and the Coalición 
de Obreros, Campesinos y Estudiantes del Istmo in Oaxaca (Bennett 1993, Bennett and Bracho 
1993).   
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provision and labor condition. Some organizations, such as the Frente Popular Tierra y 
Libertad in Monterrey, organized successfully land invasions in various occasions. Despite 
the heterogeneity among these organizations in their demands and strategies, essentially, 
they represented a popular expression and response to the precarious condition of the urban 
working class during the years of the Mexican Miracle and a rejection of the political 
patronage and traditional approach of demand-making (Bennett 1993). Despite 
government repressions and co-optation, these independent organizations strengthened 
their collaboration nationwide with the creation of Coordinadora Nacional Provisional de 
Movimientos Urbanos Populares (CONAMUP) in 1980 (CIDAC 1990: 41). These 
movements reinforced the civil society, undermined the hegemony of the official party, 
and forced the government to use new social (including housing) programs to restore its 
legitimacy and rewrite the social pacts with the urban working class (CIDAC 1990: 42, 
Bennett 1993, Bennett and Bracho 1993).  
While the government had tacitly tolerated self-help housing as a pragmatic 
solution to the housing deficit since the early stage of the rapid urbanization, in the 1970s, 
the government further institutionalized its support to this sector (Gilbert and Varley 1991: 
48). This change occurred in a context of a general consensus in the academia and among 
policy makers that self-help housing could be a solution to the urban housing deficit and 
had its potential in consolidation and integration into the city. In contrast to the earlier 
views that the poor were trapped within a “culture of poverty” (Lewis 1959), it was taken 
into consideration the social mobility among the settlers and their ability in improving the 
infrastructure and service of the settlement through community organization and 
clientelistic network with the local authorities (Perlman 1980, Portes 1972, Roberts 1973; 
Ward 2005, 2012). Later, in the aftermath of the 1982 Debt Crisis, informality was seen as 
a mechanism that could cushion the negative impacts of economic crisis on family income 
(Gonzalez de la Rocha 1994, Roberts 1994).  
At the federal level, INVI was reorganized and transformed to INDECO in 1970, 
and led programs such as social housing development, land expropriation and 
regularization for self-help settlements, rural housing, etc. The INDECO was dissolved in 
1982 due to its financial difficulty and was decentralized to become housing agencies at 
the state level (ASE 2012; Puebla 2002: 52). Its former role as a federal agency for low-
income housing was replaced by the FONHAPO, agency created in 1981. In the 1970s and 
1980s, programs of slum clearance and relocation, which were once carried out by the 
Government of the Federal District, were reduced (Puebla 2002: 53). Instead, policy 
initiatives such as progressive housing, lots with service, and land title regularization were 
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incorporated and consolidated into the housing policy agenda, as clearly reflected in the 
programs of agencies such as CORETT172 and FONHAPO (CIDAC 1990: 44).  
The FONHAPO soon became the most prominent housing agency for low-income 
population that were not attended by other agencies (household head whose income was 
less than 2.5 times of the minimum wage, which represented 70% of the total population 
in 1977 and 90% of the housing demand between 1983-1988 [CIDAC 1990: 197]). 
Particularly, based on an understanding that community organizations could play a crucial 
role in the consolidation of the settlements and improve the financial efficiency of the 
investment, the FOHNAPO assigned collective credits to sub-national governments and 
community organizations (including both official ones and independent ones) instead of 
directly to individuals. However, this also politicized the program (CIDAC 1990). Between 
1982 and 1994, FONHAPO issued 500,918 credits, among which 40.7% were for 
progressive housing, 35.9% were for housing improvement, and 23.1% were for lots with 
service (Puebla 2002: 168).  
The FOHNAPO was funded by the fiscal resources of the government, but since 
late 1980s, increasingly by loans from the World Bank.173 That said, the general trend of 
the 1980s and early 1990s was a decline in the public investment in housing for low-income 
population in the informal sector (Puebla 2002). Largely due to financial reasons, the 
FONHAPO had to end, suspend or reduce that programs that were more costly (such as 
land reserve for self-building and new housing construction) and instead favored the 
cheaper ones (such as housing improvement and progressive housing [Puebla 2002]). Most 
of the credits issued by the FONHAPO were of small amount. For this reason, in 1986 and 
1988, around 25% of  the housing credits were granted by the FONHAPO, yet FONHAPO 
received less than 5% of the total investment from 1982 to 1994, except for 1984 (5.06%, 
see Puebla 2002). Although the government used housing as a tool to create jobs and 
stimulate the economy after the economic crisis, the public funding favored the middle 
class (through FOVI) and the formal organized workers (through the solidarity funds). This 
has much to do with the fact that, different from the solidarity funds and the FOVI, agencies 
that attended the lowest-income group such as FONHAPO relied more heavily on federal 
                                                          
172 CORETT (Comisión para la Regularización de la Tenencia de la Tierra) was founded in 1971, 
and is a federal-level agency that regularizes/ formalizes land tenure for informal settlements. 
Between 1974 and 1994, the CORETT regularized 1.086 million lots nationwide (Villar Calvo 
2007: Table 47).  
173 In 1984, 75% of the FONHAPO’s investment in housing development came from the fiscal 
resources (668.1 million Pesos). In 1994, only 15% of the investment came from the fiscal 
resources (113.6 million), and 47% from the loans granted by the World Bank (358.4 million, see 
Puebla 2002: 161).   
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budgetary funding (Graizbord and Schteingart 1998). Actually, in the 1980s, even though 
self-help homeowners could consolidate and expand their housing through their extra 
savings and labor, it became increasingly difficult as the result of the economic crisis.  
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Appendix 2: Housing Development and Deficit in Nanjing under the 
Planned Economy: 1950s to 1980s 
 
This appendix offers an overview of the housing development in Nanjing from the 
1950s to the 1980s, which corresponds to the period of planned economy in China. This 
period is characterized by the de-commodification of housing and land, the predominance 
of the public rental housing in the urban housing stock, the chronic underinvestment in the 
urban housing sector, as well as a severe housing deficit. This discussion will help the 
reader to understand the background of the housing reform and the urban development in 
the city in the 1990s and 2000s.   
Nanjing was the capital of China under the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) 
Government (1927-1949) and the city was severely damaged during the Japanese 
occupation (1937-1945). By the end of the Kuomintang’s rule, similar to other large cities 
in the country, Nanjing went through a rampant housing crisis. The city had a population 
of 1.12 million in 1947, and the housing deficit was estimated to reach 76,000 units (Long 
2014). Overcrowding and tenant-landlord conflicts were widespread. By the end of 1948, 
there were 309 slums in the city, which combined to house more than 200,000 people (Long 
2014).174   
Prior to 1990 housing development in Nanjing from 1950s to 1970s in general 
reflected the national trend. Resources were channeled to the development of heavy 
industry. The local government launched campaigns to upgrade slums and shantytowns, 
often by replacing the shacks with dwellings of permanent materials. Local authorities and 
work units of the public sector also constructed a few new public rental housing projects 
for registered urban residents and public sector employees (Zhang 2011). Yet, investment 
in housing and urban development was considered non-productive and was soon 
marginalized (Table A2-1). From mid-1950s to mid-1970s, construction of new dwellings 
was rare (Figure A2-1). During the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960), local government 
even expropriated a large amount of residential housing (about 1 million sq. m. in floor 
area) for industrial and service purposes (Zhang 2011).  
 
                                                          
174 As Nanjing was the capital of the previous regime, when the Communist Party took over the 
city, many city residents associated with the old regime fled. The new regime also sent a large 
amount of war refugees to their home origin or other areas. Unlike other large cities in the country 
such as Beijing and Shanghai, housing deficit was somehow less intense for a short period of time 
after the Communist Party took power.   
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Table A2-1: Housing Investment in Nanjing: 1949-1984 
Time 
Period  
Investment in housing production per 
year (million Yuan) 
Investment in housing production 
as a percentage of total investment 
(%) 
1949-1957 5.1 5.1 
1958-1965 8.4 4.2 
1966-1975 6.2 3.1 
1976-1984 141.9 18.7 
(Source: General History of Urban Development in Nanjing: 95; calculation by the 
author) 
On several occasions, local authorities resorted to expropriation and redistribution 
in response to the severe urban housing crisis. After the Communist Party took over the 
city in 1949, the new regime expropriated and redistributed the properties of the old regime. 
By 1956, there were still about 53,000 homeowners in Nanjing, who owned about half of 
the floor area of the urban housing stock (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 
64). The new regime socialized bulk of the private rental housing stock in 1958, converting 
about 65% of the floor area of the private rental housing stock into public rental housing 
(History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: Table 2-12). 175 During the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976), 5,408 private dwellings were expropriated by the local 
government with no compensation. Moreover, the local authorities maintained a strict 
restriction against in-migration (also see Figure 4.2). In 1969 and 1970, 12,281 households 
were deprived of their urban registration and sent to settle in the rural area. Their dwellings 
were expropriated with a minimum compensation (less than half of the regulated price of 
the time) and converted to public rental housing (History of Real Estate Development in 
Nanjing: 61, 62). Between 1961 and 1970, the city witnessed a net out-migration of 
370,000 (Figure 4.2), and the population size of the city proper of Nanjing almost stagnated 
around 1.65 million between 1960 and 1975 (Figure 4.1).  
Between 1955 and 1975, rent in public rental housing was reduced by about half. 
On average, rent equaled 7.28% of a workers’ monthly income in 1955, and only 1.76% in 
1975 (History of Baixia District: 143, 144). Rent collection was even not sufficient for the 
cost of maintenance, and housing construction and maintenance was mainly funded by 
fiscal resources (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 186). Despite some new 
                                                          
175 This campaign targeted landlords who rented out housing of floor area over 150 sq. m. After the 
property was converted into public rental housing, the previous homeowner received a shared 
revenue that equaled 20%-40% of the monthly rent (on average 29.6%) from July 1958 to October 
1966 (History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 65). After that, the property was converted 
into full public ownership.  
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housing construction and the restriction against in-migration, overcrowding and absolute 
housing deficit troubled the city for years: per-capita floor area in 1980 (9.26 sq. m.) was 
still below the 1949 level (9.32 sq. m., see Figure A2-2); by 1979, more than 30 thousands 
families in the city had no access to housing (Zhang 2011). According to the housing census 
of 1985, only 51% of the urban households lived above 10 sq. m. per capita usable floor 
area, and strikingly, 1,042 households lived under 2 sq. m. per capita usable floor area 
(History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 46).  
 
Figure A2-1: New Dwellings Constructed Each Year in Nanjing (floor area, in 
thousand sq. m.) 
(Source: General History of Urban Development in Nanjing: 95 [calculated by the 
author]; Nanjing Almanac, 1987-2016) 
 
 
Figure A2-2: General Housing Condition in Nanjing: Per-Capita Floor Area (sq. 
m.) 
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(Source: History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 40 [calculated by the 
author]; Zhang 2011: 17; and Nanjing Almanac 2006, 2016) 
 
Housing Reform in Nanjing: 1980s  
Housing deficit in Nanjing persisted throughout the 1970s. By late 1970s, although 
the natural increase of the city’s population had declined, in-migration resurged to trigger 
a rapid population growth (see Figure 4.2): after the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the 
120 thousand former city residents who were expulsed and sent to settle in the rural area 
during successive political campaigns were allowed to move back to the city. However, 
when they finally returned, they were unemployed and found their former dwelling either 
occupied by others or demolished. Their request for housing and compensation posted a 
serious challenge for the public sector at the time. The city government had to allow them 
to self-build in small pieces of vacant land (such as along the city wall). These shacks 
formed shantytowns that lacked basic service, and were highly stigmatized (Zhang 2011). 
Several of them persisted well into the 21st century, though in general they had been 
formalized and upgraded (Yangtse Evening Post 2015).    
In this context, the city government reinforced its control over housing production 
and dramatically increased investment in the housing sector (see Table A2-1, Figure A2-
1). Several housing projects were constructed to house the returnees who had not been 
accommodated at the time.176 Work units, now with greater autonomy over the use of their 
revenues, played an active role in producing housing for their employees.177 Usually the 
city government was in charge of the planning and land allocation for the housing project, 
and work units were in charge of financing the project and allocating the new dwellings to 
their employees.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the central government launched a housing reform in 
the 1980s that sought to release the government from the burden of housing production and 
to introduce the market mechanism in the housing sector. The public-sector developers 
actively participated in the incipient commercial housing production (History of Real 
Estate Development in Nanjing: 232). Although most of these dwellings were bought by 
                                                          
176 For example, in 1985, the Nanhu Xincun Housing Project was inaugurated, among its 9,622 
dwellings, 5,275 were assigned to accommodate the returned households.   
177 In 1977, the city government confirmed that registered residents living in housing deficit could 
apply for housing to their district government; yet, as the shortage was severe, in 1981, the city 
government reduced the eligibility of beneficiaries to who were registered in the city but not 
employed. Whoever were formally employed should first apply for housing to their work units 
(History of Real Estate Development in Nanjing: 74). 
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foreign investors, oversea Chinese, or work units that later assigned the dwellings as public 
rental housing to their employees,178 the business generated considerable revenues for the 
local government and the public sector developers. The experience in the 1980s and 1990s 
raised the awareness among the local authorities that urban development and urban land 
could potentially become a highly profitable business.  
It should be noted that, following the economic reform and the decentralization in 
the 1980s, local authorities in Nanjing made considerable efforts in diversifying the 
economy, attracting foreign investment and introducing industries of high technology. All 
this required necessary infrastructure and facilities. Apparently, the public sector was the 
only agent to carry on this task, given that the private sector was almost non-existent. In 
Nanjing, since 1981, the prefectural and the district governments, as well as some state 
enterprises, established numerous “urban development companies”, which later became 
public-sector real estate developers. By 1990, there were 22 such developers in the 
prefecture (General History of Urban Development in Nanjing: 14). Government-led 
housing production at the time was to serve the purpose of the spatial reorganization of the 
city: entire old urban neighborhoods or rural communities were demolished for 
infrastructure and new housing projects. Local authorities subjected the urban 
redevelopment and the urban expansion under increasing government planning, guidance 
and control. From then on, mass housing projects (rather than scattered single residential 
buildings or self-built settlements) became the predominant form of housing development.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
178 In 1996, only 28.5% of the sold commercial housing (in floor area) in the city was sold to 
individuals (Nanjing Almanac 1997: 149).  
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Appendix 3: Housing Affordability in Nanjing in 2000s and 2010s 
 
This appendix provides more detailed information on housing affordability in 
Nanjing from 2003 to 2016- mainly the average housing price (by district) and average 
per-capita disposable income (by income quintile). It highlights the exclusion and 
inequality of the commercial housing market in Nanjing in the 2000s and the 2010s, and 
how the commercial housing development became a powerful sorting mechanism that 
further exacerbated the spatial stratification of the city.     
One of the key arguments in Chapter 4 is that, while housing production has 
increased and the general housing condition in Nanjing has improved significantly since 
1980s, new forms of inequality and exclusion also emerged that disadvantage low-income 
working class to get decent access to housing. This appendix intends to support this 
argument with more detailed information regarding the housing inequality and exclusion 
in Nanjing since 2003, year in which the central government proposed that commercial 
housing should target the majority of the urban population and reduced social housing to 
the role of social assistance.  
In general, the housing affordability deteriorated from 2003 to 2016, though 
significant fluctuations also occurred. This deterioration of housing affordability applies to 
all income groups. That being said, it should be noted that from the very beginning, 
commercial housing was not economically accessible for people in the lowest two quintiles 
(Figure A3-2): to purchase a new commercial dwelling of 90 sq. m. in 2003 would cost 70 
years’ income for the lowest quintile, and 41 years’ income for the second lowest quintile; 
meanwhile it only costed 12 years’ income for the highest quintile.  
High income groups are in general in better positions in contracting home 
mortgages from commercial banks and the housing provident funds. More importantly, as 
the average housing price rose 560% from 2003 to 2016,179 for those who own extra 
properties, it is feasible to finance home-buying by selling out an old property and taking 
advantage of its rising value. These strategies, in general, are not disposable for low-
income groups. They were further disadvantaged by the increasing spatial differentiation 
                                                          
179 The rising housing price is not due to inflation- actually, between 2003 and 2016, the consumer 
price index (CPI) in Nanjing fluctuates between 0.1 and 6.2 (on average 2.9, see Nanjing Statistical 
Yearbook 2004-2017, calculated by the author), which is much lower than the growth rate of the 
price of new commercial housing.   
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in the commercial housing market, which is illustrated in Table 4.4. In 2015, if one plans 
to spend 30 years’ income to buy a new commercial dwelling of 75 sq. m., the only options 
for the quintile of the lowest income are found in the two far-peripheral districts: Luhe and 
Gaochun, while for the quintile of highest-income, they had options in all districts. In this 
sense, commercial housing market is a powerful mechanism to stratify the urban space by 
sorting homebuyers to different locations according to their purchase power and excluding 
the low-income groups.    
  
Table A3-1: Commercial Housing Price and Disposable Income in Nanjing: 2003-2016 
Year Average 
commerci
al housing 
price (per 
sq. m.) 
Per capita 
annual 
disposable 
income  
Average per-capita annual disposable income by 
quantiles  
Lowest 
20% 
Lowest 
40%-
20% 
Middle 
20% 
Highest 
40%-
20% 
Highest 
20% 
2003 3035 10196 3899 6586 8946 12015 22158 
2004 4115 11602 4558 7570 10439 13537 24784 
2005 4403 14997 5326 9265 13044 18584 31986 
2006 4265 17538 6458 11410 15528 21326 37498 
2007 4700 20317 7461 12824 17580 24393 44123 
2008 6208 23123 9553 15557 20346 26907 47813 
2009 7737 25504 9846 16824 22162 30791 54967 
2010 11403 28312 11743 18652 24264 34025 59612 
2011 11640 32200 14172 22371 28693 38585 63471 
2012 11214 36322 16997 25770 32412 42943 69419 
2013 13346 39981 18675 28421 36494 46852 75497 
2014 14356 42568 20615 31059 38643 50627 81469 
2015 15107 46104 22542 33881 41892 54230 87896 
2016 20058 49997 24938 36880 46022 58836 94919 
(Note: Disposable income: income remaining after deduction of taxes and other 
mandatory charges, available to be spent or saved as one wishes. Source: Nanjing 
Almanac 2004-2017; Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2004-2017, calculated by the 
author) 
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Figure A3-1: Housing Price, Income and Housing Affordability in Nanjing: 2003-
2016 
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2004-2017; Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2004-2017) 
Note: suppose that a regular commercial dwelling measures 90 sq. m.; I calculate 
the price of a regular commercial dwelling by multiplying the average per-square-
meter housing price listed in Table A3-1 by 90 sq. m.) 
 
 
Figure A3-2: How Many Years of Annual Disposable Income Does It Take to Buy 
a New, Regular Commercial Dwelling in Nanjing? By Quintiles of Income, 2003-
2016  
(Source: Nanjing Almanac 2004-2017; Nanjing Statistical Yearbook 2004-2017 
Note: suppose that a regular commercial dwelling measures 90 sq. m.; I calculate 
the price of a regular commercial dwelling by multiplying the average per-square-
meter housing price listed in Table A3-1 by 90 sq. m.) 
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Table A3-2. Housing 
affordability in a context 
of spatial differentiation: 
2015 
Average 
price of 
commercial 
housing, per 
sq. m. (2015. 
12.) 
Years of per-capita disposable income it 
takes to buy a commercial dwelling of 75 
sq. m. 
Lowest 20% Lowest 
20%-40% 
Highest 
20% 
Average of the prefecture 18697 63 41 16 
Core- central 
districts 
Gulou 23824 79 53 20 
Xuanwu 21944 73 49 19 
Jianye 22151 74 49 19 
Qinhuai 19393 65 43 17 
Core- non 
centric 
districts 
Qixia 15565 52 34 13 
Yuhuatai 16417 55 36 14 
Near 
periphery 
Jiangning 15036 50 33 13 
Pukou 12669 42 28 11 
Distant 
periphery 
Luhe 7108 24 16 6 
Lishui 9415 31 21 8 
Gaochun 6129 20 14 5 
(Source: for housing price: https://www.anjuke.com/fangjia/nanjing/ ; for 
disposable income, see Table 4.3)  
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Appendix 4: Housing Development in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara: 1950s-1980s 
 
This appendix reviews the housing development in the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara from the 1950s to 1980s. I documented how informal housing development 
became the predominant path to homeownership in this period, in the context of rapid urban 
population growth under the Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI). Currently, despite 
the social housing boom at the far periphery of the metropolitan area, these informal 
settlements still represents a significant part of the urban housing stock, and remains as a 
main form of housing access for the low-income population.  
Under the ISI model, Guadalajara witnessed a significant industrial expansion. In 
the 1960s, national and international companies such as Motorola, Kodak and IBM started 
to expand their industrial production in Guadalajara. The city was attractive for investors 
for its big regional market, the incentives offered by the local authorities and a low-level 
of unionization (Gilbert and Varley 1991). This wave of industrialization to certain extent 
squeezed out the local, small-scale industries that traditionally predominated in the city’s 
economy. As a result, an important part of the local capital was channeled into the real 
estate sector.  
Unlike in Nanjing and other large Chinese cities, where the local government 
imposed a firm restriction against in-migration and expelled part of its population to the 
rural area during the urban crisis of the 1960s and 1970s, in Mexico population mobility 
was not regulated, despite some attempts of planning population distribution (e.g. 
CONAPO). By 1986, one-third of Guadalajara’s population were migrants (Walton 1987). 
Whereas in 1950, the municipalities that formed today’s Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara 
only concentrated 28% of the population of the State of Jalisco, by 1980, this figure 
increased to 53% (INEGI, Census data, calculated by the author). By the 1970s, 
Guadalajara had already concentrated more than half of the industrial establishments and 
two thirds of the industrial labor of the state of Jalisco (LAHN).  
Until late 1970s, Guadalajara accommodated its rapidly-growing population first 
with its rental housing stock and the private land available at the urban fringe for “legal” 
low-income subdivisions. Guadalajara remained as a predominantly rental city in the 
1970s.180 In 1980, only 52.1% of the residential dwellings in the city was owner’s housing. 
                                                          
180 In 1950, only 29.1% of the residential dwellings in the municipality of Guadalajara was owner’s 
housing. This figure was 28.3% in 1960, but rose to 43.1% in 1970 (Gilbert and Varley 1991: Table 
3.1). 
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Quite different from other major cities in Mexico, illegal subdivisions on ejidal land were 
rare in Guadalajara in this period, partly because of the municipal authorities’ opposition, 
but also due to the presence of a large amount of private land at the urban periphery for 
sub-dividers’ “formal private housing development”. That said, Varley and Gilbert (1991) 
pointed out that a lot of those legal subdivisions were approved only because of the 
collusion between developers and the municipal government, but were actually fraught 
with irregularities and deficit in basic infrastructure.181  
Housing in general was better serviced in Guadalajara compared to in other major 
cities of the country, probably due to the rare presence of squatter settlements. Yet, in the 
1960s, population growth was faster than housing stock in Guadalajara (Gilbert and Varley 
1991: Table 5.6), which led to worse overcrowding. Indeed, Guadalajara had the worst 
housing deficit record among the 14 largest cities of the country (Gilbert and Varley 1991). 
The precarious housing and settlement conditions led to numerous urban social movements 
in the region during the 1960s and 1970s.  
Public-sector housing agencies such as the INFONAVIT and the FOVISSSTE were 
created in the 1970s and started to operate in Jalisco. These agencies led the construction 
of a small yet important number of social housing for the low-income urban population. 
Between 1972 and 1979, for example, the Delegation VI of the INFONAVIT that covered 
Jalisco, Colima and Nayarit, led the construction of 16,023 units of social housing, of 
which 14,386 were located in the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara (Regalado Santillán 
1995: 105).    
By late 1970s, the rising cost of land and service provision made low-income 
commercial subdivisions a less profitable business, and developers shifted their focus to 
middle and upper class housing. As a result, the previous mechanisms that housed the 
working class through legal low-income subdivisions and rental housing was reduced. In 
this context, as the expanding urban built area became adjacent with the ejidal land, 
informal settlements started to proliferate on ejidal land through illegal subdivision 
(LAHN). (Gilbert and Varley 1991, LAHN).182 In mid-1970s, a federal agency CORETT 
started to regularize the informal settlements built on ejidal land in an ad hoc fashion.  
In the 1960s we see the beginnings of conurbation and from 1960s to 1980s, the 
municipalities that formed the first ring outside of the urban core (Tonalá, Tlaquepaque 
                                                          
181 Gilbert and Varley (1991: 81) documented that in Colonia Agustin Yanez, plot sizes were 
reduced to 75 sq. m., despite the legal minimum of 90 sq. m. Streets were only 5 meters wide.    
182 Although many informal settlements were formed on ejidal, communal and public land, it was 
also common for some of them to have formed on private land.  
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and Zapopan) went through the fastest population growth in the metropolitan area (see 
Figure A4-1). In late 1970s, these municipalities formally became part of the Metropolitan 
Area of Guadalajara and several institutions aimed at coordinating metropolitan affairs 
such as water (e.g. SIAPA) and public transportation were established.   
 (Source: INEGI, census data) 
 
 
Figure A4-1: Annual Population Growth Rates of the Metropolitan Area of 
Guadalajara (%): 1940-2015 
(Source: INEGI, census data, calculated by the author) 
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Table A4-1: Population of the Metropolitan Area of Guadalajara: 1970-2015 
 
Municipality 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
Guadalajara 1199391 1626152 1650205 1633216 1646319 1600940 1495189 1460148 
Zapopan 155488 389081 712008 925113 1001021 1155790 1243756 1332272 
Tlaquepaque 100945 177324 339649 449238 474178 563006 608114 664193 
Tonalá 24648 52158 168555 271857 337149 408739 478689 536111 
Tlajomulco 
de Zúñiga 
35145 50697 68428 100797 123619 220630 416626 549442 
El Salto 12367 19887 38281 70085 83453 111436 138226 183437 
Juanacatlán 5501 8801 10068 11513 11792 11902 13218 17955 
Ixtlahuacán 
de los 
Membrillos 
10652 12310 16674 20598 21605 23420 41060 53045 
Metropolitan 
Area of 
Guadalajara 
1544137 2336410 3003868 3482417 3699136 4095863 4434878 4796603 
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The Debt Crisis of 1982 also swept Guadalajara. Informality and household 
strategies became important coping mechanisms for the urban poor to survive the crisis 
(González de la Rocha 1994).  
The population growth in the Metropolitan Area had decelerated in the 1980s and 
1990s (from 5.4% in the 1960s to 2.5% in the 1980s, INEGI census data, calculated by the 
author), and the metropolitan area was consolidated. In this period, the core of the 
metropolitan area (Guadalajara) started to experience negative population growth. 
Population growth also decelerated in the first ring, from 8.2% annually in the 1970s to 
under 2% between 1995 and 2000 (Table A4-1). As a result, the population distribution of 
the metropolitan area has changed significantly: while in 1960, the municipality of 
Guadalajara concentrated 81% of the population of the Metropolitan Area, this figure 
decreased to 45% in 2000. Since 1995, the first ring concentrated more population of the 
metropolitan area than the municipality of Guadalajara.     
In the economic crisis and the structural adjustments, federal housing agencies, 
particularly the INFONAVIT, continued its level of housing actions in the Metropolitan 
Area of Guadalajara. Throughout the 1980s, the INFONAVIT led the construction of 
30,471 social housing dwellings in the metropolitan area, or roughly 3,000 units per year, 
although it ceased constructing three-bedroom apartments as it had in the 1970s in an 
attempt to reduce the construction cost (Regalado Santillán 1995: 104, 105, calculated by 
the author). In 1987, approximately one tenth of the population of Guadalajara lived in a 
social housing dwelling constructed by the INFONAVIT (Ibid: 105). Similar to the rest of 
the country, public housing agencies changed their modus operandi in the 1990s. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the INFONAVIT Reform in 1992 was oriented towards 
deregulation and stimulating the participation of the private sector in housing production. 
Meanwhile, housing agencies of the Jalisco State government were in a much more 
vulnerable position during the economic recession and the structural adjustment, as they 
did not have their own resources, and were completely dependent on fiscal resources.     
Following their initial expansion in late 1970s, the 1980s witnessed a rapid 
expansion of informal settlements. The State and the municipal governments also viewed 
self-building as a pragmatic policy option, which was reflected in policy initiatives such as 
land reserve for low-income housing through expropriation of the ejidal land, as well as 
the program of subdivisions of social objective (Fraccionamiento de Objetivo Social, FOS) 
for progressive housing in the 1980s (LAHN). These programs were ephemeral and of 
limited influence. That said, the municipal government contributed to the consolidation of 
the informal settlements, through CORETT (regularizing the land title), and through the 
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Federal Commission of Electricity (LAHN),183 although this approach to the consolidation 
of the informal settlements was less feasible during and after the economic crisis, as the 
municipal governments had less resources to invest in infrastructure and service provision. 
By the year 2000, 699 settlements (59% of the total number of settlements) in the 
Metropolitan Area were associated with some forms of informality, comprising some 
309,980 lots on 16,337 hectares of land (equal to about 35% of the urban built area of the 
Greater Guadalajara). Only 27.5% of the land occupied by informal settlements of had been 
regularized by 1999 (Fausto Brito 2003).        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
183 Moreover, FONHAPO, federal agency of housing finance that served the informal sector and 
worked with various types of organization, had an important yet limited impact in the metropolitan 
area. Between 1984 and 1990, in the metropolitan area, the FONAHPO could only approve 2,470 
housing actions, out of the 29,234 applications it received (Regalado Santillán: 107). These housing 
finances were for housing improvement (1,295), progressive housing (1,050) and for lots-with-
services (125, ibid). 
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